Alternate Airstrike Scenario 1973

Volume 5 of ARAB MIGS 1973 indicates the EAF originally had more ambitious plans that those it carried out on October 6.  Instead of limiting themselves to targets in Sinai, the Egyptians contemplated attacking an airbase in Israel proper. A  mission against Hatzerim, however, was called off because of the limited endurance of available warplanes. Not even the Libyan Mirages could bomb a target that far away and return to Egypt.
Did the Arabs have any hope of crippling the Israeli airforce at the outset of a war? The Israelis assumed, incorrectly, that this was a prerequisite for initiating hostilities. In fact, Shazly abandoned hope of Egypt acquiring air superiority and opted for reliance on surface to air missiles (SAMs). In theory, though, the Arabs might have badly degraded the IAF at the start. This would've required major changes and preparations beginning at least two years prior to the outbreak of war:

• First, Syria, not Egypt, should have assumed the responsibility for planning and carrying out an assault on the IAF. Syrian bases were on average closer to Israeli bases than the EAF's were. Endurance wouldn't have been such a problem.
• To achieve its objective, the Syrian Air Force needed better aircraft than its MIG-17s, SU-7s and MIG-21s. It required many SU-20s, and MIG-23s to escort them to the target areas. MIG-23s weren't very maneuverable but had the necessary endurance.
• Beginning in late 1969, after Ghadafy came to power, Syria should have pressured Libya not to buy Mirages from France but instead use the money to get the Soviet aircraft required for the mission. About 100 SU-20s and 50 MIG-23s would have sufficed and probably cost no more than Mirages. Moscow would have supplied the MIG-23s and SU-20s in exchange for hard currency, which Libya had and Egypt etc didn't. It wouldn't have been so difficult to get the USSR to sell the planes; nor would it have been hard to induce Libya to transfer them to Syria. Ghadafy was so anti-Israel he would've agreed to send them to a frontline state (historically he sent Mirages to Egypt). The Syrian Air Force could've had the necessary warplanes by the start of 1973.
• To ensure it could absorb the new jets, the SAF would have to assign all MIG-17 and SU-7 pilots to SU-20s and many MIG-21 pilots to MIG-23s. The airmen would've had 6-12 months to become familiar with their new jets.

Syria would also make a trade with Egypt. The latter would keep its MIG-17 squadron at home instead of sending it to Syria, as in real life. In exchange Syria would get the Iraqi Hawker Hunters sent to Egypt historically. Skilled Hunter pilots would be vital to help the SAF achieve its daunting task.

Acquisition of the right aircraft wouldn't have been enough. The mission required careful planning and execution:

• To maximize range and endurance, all attacking jets would carry only gun ammunition (30mm). The goal should be to destroy as many Israeli jets on the ground as possible.
• The Iraqi Hunters would've lead the attack. Passing through Lebanese territory, below radar coverage, they would head straight for Ramat David, the key northern IAF base. There, they would shoot up enemy warplanes and prevent them from hindering a deeper penetration of Israeli airspace. The Hunter attack would be timed to coincide with the crossing of the Israeli occupied Golan by the main Syrian force. This force would then head for the main bases of central Israel--Tel Noff and Hatzor.
• The principal strike force would consist of three groups. The first, flying at medium altitude, would be a decoy force consisting of about 36 expendable jets e.g. gunless MIG-21 variants and SU-7s, flown by washout trainees. Behind them would be about three dozen MIG-23s flying below radar coverage. Also at low altitude, farther back, would be the actual attack force of fifty SU-20s.
• The plan would be to lure the remaining Israeli interceptors (i.e. not based at Ramat David), to go after the three dozen decoy jets. If things went according to plan, the Israeli Mirages and Neshers would approach and strike the decoys from the rear, using up many missiles and shells downing them. While they were preoccupied doing this, the 36 MIG-23s would emulate an old Israeli tactic and ambush their opponents from behind. Over a dozen IAF jets might've been downed or crippled and the remainder would've had to deal with MIG-23s.
• Unhindered by enemy jets, the 50 SU-20s would then hit enemy airfields. About half would peel off to strike Tel Noff, the rest would go after Hatzor. All would strafe IAF planes on the ground. The highest priority targets would be Phantoms but Skyhawks and Mysteres could also be set ablaze. With luck, at least 50 Israeli jets would be eliminated. Added to the Ramat David score, and those shot down by MIG-23s, that might've raised the total to about 80--far more than the Israelis lost in the first three days. Other than expendable planes and pilots, the SAF might've lost only 5-10 jets and airmen.
• While half of the SAF's SU-20s were striking enemy bases, the rest would be hitting Israeli tanks on Golan. If Syria refrained from massing armor opposite the Golan until October 2-4 (as was noted before) Israel wouldn't have sent the 7th armored brigade in time to bolster defenses there. Given 36 or so operational SU-20s to attack IDF armor (while the rest were attacking airfields),  Syria might have knocked out half of the 71 tanks it initially faced. In that case, the Israeli brigade on Golan, already understrength, would've been outnumbered more than 12 to on, by just the first Syrian attackers (three infantry divisions with tanks). The defenders would've been quickly overwhelmed, and at much lower cost in tanks than occurred historically.

Had the situation on Golan deteriorated quickly, the Israelis, by about 3:30 PM on October 6, might've concluded that they had no choice but to send their jets en masse against the Syrian attackers, to prevent them breaking through to Israel itself. They had to do this despite losses from SAF/Hunter raids and the prospect of further heavy losses from Syrian SAMs and flak. So by nightfall on the 6th, another 30 or so IAF jets might've been downed. On just the first day, total Israeli losses on the northern front alone might've reached 110--more than were lost historically in the course of the whole war. Of course that would've been just the start. Fearing more attacks, the IAF would've almost certainly tried to neutralize the SAF. In the process it would've exposed itself to more SAMs and flak. In addition, MIG-23s could've scored additional kills. Given their limited maneuverability, they might have been best employed in chasing IAF jets heading back to base instead of in dogfighting.

Scenarios of this kind may seem far fetched but in theory it was possible for Syria to battle Israel on more even terms and prevail.

EAF Mistakes 1973

In Volume 6 of ARAB MIGS 1973 WAR, Cooper et al. claim the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) made a number of mistakes. Below are summaries of these alleged errors, and my comments:

• The EAF leadership (i.e. Hosni Mubarak) cancelled the second wave of airstrikes on October 6.  The first wave, consisting of 220 aircraft, had supposedly achieved all objectives. Ergo, there was no need for followup attacks. Cooper, however, wrote that cancellation of the second wave exposed EAF helicopters to excessive Israeli resistance, resulting in high losses. He also believed the opening strikes cost Cairo only 6 jets.

 In his Arabs at War, Pollack attributed cancellation of wave two to the high losses suffered by wave one. This is the most likely scenario. I doubt EAF losses of the first wave amounted to only six aircraft. The Egyptians may have lost 4 SU-7s heading toward central Sinai and several MIGs at Ras Nasrani. Israel's report of seven MIG-17s and a MIG-21 knocked down in the latter battle appears more credible than Egypt's claim to have lost only two aircraft. Total losses for the 6th may have approached 20. Cancellation of the second wave was due to fears that a thoroughly alerted enemy would destroy another 30 or more EAF jets, severely impairing Egyptian capabilities for the rest of the war. Calling off phase two was not a mistake but a prudent decision.

• Mubarak, the "hero" of Egypt's mythical victory of the 14th, actually blew a golden opportunity to maul Israeli squadrons. According to Cooper, Mubarak failed to deploy his MIGs properly. I'm not sure how he may have done better but it seems the MIGs were unprepared to meet the first attacking Phantoms. Kadri Hamid and other EAF pilots were almost out of fuel when they were forced to fight the enemy. Hamid's base, Mansourah, was not properly defended. Lack of ready aircraft at the time may support Cooper's view.
• The EAF, Cooper maintained, blundered by focusing its attacks on the Israeli crossing area at Deversoir. This area was too well guarded by flak, interceptors and HAWK SAMs, resulting in inordinate Egyptian losses. The EAF, in Cooper's view, should have struck Israeli vehicle convoys on the Tasa road leading to the crossing area.

I have some doubts about that. While I concur that EAF jets should have avoided the crossing area, attacking farther east would've been just as prohibitive. To hit Tasa road targets, EAF jets had to venture farther from their bases, giving Israeli Mirages and other warplanes more opportunities to down them. In my view, it would've been best to attack Israeli trucks west of the canal, such as those supporting Adan's drive to Suez. Even operations on the west bank were risky. A mission against Israeli tanks near Ismailia on October 19 resulted in the loss of several SU-7s and SU-20s. Israeli Mirages got them. Strikes east of the canal would've been even more costly.