Kursk Revisited

July 2013 marked the 70th anniversary of the battle of Kursk. It was a major defeat for the reich. Khruschev considered Kursk, not Stalingrad, the real turning point of WWII. Clausewitz said the most dangerous situation is an attack that fails. The mauling of the panzer elite degraded Germany's ability to defend afterwards. Ergo, Kursk contributed substantially to defeat. Was the nazi attack doomed from the start or could it have prevailed, and ended the war on favorable terms?
In March 1943, soon after Stalingrad, Manstein's counterattack got the Germans back on an even keel. The reich now had two choices. It could either accept the Soviet offer (in secret negotiations) to return all Soviet territory in exchange for peace, or it could try to force the USSR to accept nazi control of the area west of the Dneiper. After all the losses the Germans had incurred by then, returning all Soviet territory was politically unpalatable. It is not surprising that, despite the risks of a continued two front war, they opted to keep fighting.
The Kursk salient become the focus of a new German effort. They planned to trap the Kursk defenders in a massive pincers attack. However the Russians, who anticipated the offensive, built formidable defenses. They massed thousands of anti-tank and artillery guns, backed by hordes of T-34s, in the salient. Fearing high losses, some German generals recommended the operation be abandoned. Hitler, however, insisted an attack was necessary for political reasons.
Around this time, June 1943, Manstein came up with a new plan. Instead of attacking the heavily defended neck of the salient, he suggested the Germans break through the top of the head, and then assault the defensive belts from the rear. Zeitzler rejected this scheme. What if it was adopted?
Had the two main panzer forces, the northern one under Model, and the southern one under Manstein, been shifted toward the top of the salient's head, they could've done more than break through easily. Since the forces would've been united, they almost certainly would've smashed the Soviet armor reserve. As soon as that was achieved, the panzers could've swept northeast and southeast to prevent the escape of the static defenders. Vast quantities of troops, artillery and other equipment would've been captured or destroyed, at relatively low cost to the attackers. Moreover, by the end of July 1943, when the whole Kursk position had been reduced, that would've left a gaping hole in the Soviet front. After the salient was gone, the panzer forces could've reunited and swept toward Moscow. No doubt the Russians would've massed what they had left to defend their capital, so an actual attack may not have been a good idea. But taking Moscow needn't have been the objective. The goal in this scenario was just to demoralize and frighten the Soviets, so they'd agree to peace on German terms i.e. leaving them in possession of substantial Soviet territory. If that were achieved by September 1943, it would've greatly boosted German morale and depressed that of the western Allies. The latter probably wouldn't have had the stomach for the casualties they'd incur fighting the reich without Soviet help. It is possible, therefore that Manstein's plan, had it been chosen, would've brought about a favorable end to the war on both fronts.