Illusory Success in Syria

The looming collapse of the Syrian regime is touted as a "huge blow to Iran" and a great victory for the US and its Mideast allies. The ultimate outcome, however, may look quite different.

If or when Homs falls, Assad and his allies will realize the game is up. Unable to prevent an HTS takeover, they will simply abandon Syria. Assad will load the gold and cash obtained from the captagon trade onto planes and fly to Iraq or Iran. Similarly, Syrian pilots shall escape with their MIG-25s and SU-22s etc.

HTS and its allies will boast of their victory; there may be a triumphal entry into Damascus. But they will inherit a bankrupt, ruined nation. Needless to say a return of refugees from Turkey and other nations will compound the problems. The rebels won, but their backers will have little to show for it.

The Syrian disaster will reduce Iranian prestige and influence, but it won't be fatal. It may actually be beneficial. Like the US in 1975, when South Vietnam fell (and more recently, following the failure in Afghanistan) Iran will be relieved of the awful burden of propping up a precarious regime in a nation wracked with problems. There will be no more futile squandering of blood and treasure. From now on, Syria's massive problems will be someone else's.

The US, HTS, Turkey, Israel etc will cheer over Assad's fall and gloat over Iran's putative setback. Things will look much different, however, in 2025 and 2026. The "winners" will see just how high the price of victory will be. They'll be stuck with the costs of the war, refugee resettlement and reconstruction. Economically ruined, and with its captagan business eliminated, Syria will require massive infusions of cash. This will prove onerous for the US, EU and Saudi Arabia.

The enormous cost of reviving Syria will ultimately prove a waste, for the nation won't be subservient to the West. If, following masssive aid, Damascus become reasonably prosperous and stable, it'll again focus on foreign policy. Almost certainly, this will be to the detriment of relations with Israel and the US. It's hard to imagine any Syrian regime just writing off the Golan. Inevitably, Damascus will demand its land back. Regaining Golan will require allies, as Syria won't be strong enough to achieve this without help. There may be a Syria--Iran rapproachment (if Iran and Iraq reconciled after a decade of bloody war so may Iran and Syria).

Even without such a development, the new Syrian state may ultimately pose a more formidable challenge to Israel than the old alawite regimes. Assuming the new regime is based on the Sunni majority, it should prove more stable, with greater support, than past governments. This will reduce the need for internal security measures, such as promotion based on loyalty rather than merit, which so plagued Syrian forces in the past. Better led and motivated forces should perform much better than those of 1967 or 1973. They may prove to be Israel's nemesis in a future war.

As Rabin often said, one can't predict the future of the Mideast. The fall of Assad is just the latest example. But those who think it'll mean an end to Iran's current regime, and and perpetual peace in the region, are probably dead wrong.

Below, victorious rebels.