Fate of the Fourth Armored Division

Long the mainstay of Egypt's strategic reserve, the 4rth fought with tenacity and valor. In his memoirs, Sadat praised Kabil, the division's commander. He had consummate tactical skill. With one armored division, Sadat wrote, Kabil did the work of three. The need for such skill, however, mirrored desperate circumstances late in the war, for which Sadat was to blame. His first blunder was to order the October 14 attack. Together with other units, the Fourth complied with Sadat's order, to the detriment of itself and its country.
Consisting of at least three brigades, the 2nd and 3rd armored and 6th Mechanized, the Fourth was at first kept in reserve, around Obeid mountain, west of the Geneifa hills. When the order for the ill-starred attack came, only one of the brigades, the 3rd, was to participate. Because the terrain west of the waterway, in the Third Army sector, was well suited to armored warfare, the Egyptians decided to keep two of the brigades on the west bank. Good tank ground favored the enemy, so it was prudent to keep two thirds of the division in that area.
At 12:30 AM on October 12, Kabil informed the commander of the 3rd of his mission. He was to enter Sinai and reach the Mitla pass. Around 1300 on October 13, the brigade crossed, and entered the El Shatt/Un Moussa crossroads area. Enemy artillery, firing from the Mitla area, caused some losses.
The main road leading to the objective, the El Shatt Mitla, was blocked by Israeli armor concentrations. Consulting local Beduoins, the 3rd's commander learned of an alternate route. He decided to go south before heading east. Leaving one of his three battalions in reserve, the commander neared his objective via the wadi El Mour and Wadi Mabouk. Advancing 25 kilometers, the 3rd bypassed the Israeli first line of defense but was spotted, and faced a second, about 6km west of the entrance to the Mitla.
The defenders there had tanks, guns and ATGMs. When the 3rd's leading elements came within range, they opened fire, destroying the vanguard companies of the two advancing battalions along with the command vehicles. Others were also hit. Some T-55s managed to fire back, and claimed to have blasted 13 enemy tanks. An Egyptian officer, Nour Eldean el Aziz, tried to organize the tanks but perished. Surprisingly, survivors said most losses were due to ATGMs. They seemed to have a longer range than SS-11s known to be in Israeli service. The Egyptians suspected the Israelis were using TOWs supplied by the US.
Soon, the 3rd faced another threat. Moving beyond SAM cover exposed it to air attack. Enemy jets began pounding the brigade. They targeted mainly artillery and support vehicles. The Egyptians had to pull back.
The battle of Wadi Mabouk is said to have cost the 3rd 50-60 tanks. If true, that would imply the virtual destruction of both battalions sent into action. The brigade's final battle line on the 14th was just 2km east of the Third Army's 19th division. There the 3rd established defenses and recovered damaged vehicles. Just after the 14th it had 58 tanks.
Soon, as Israeli forces poured across the canal, action shifted to the west bank. Around the 18th, the 3rd  was ordered back west (initially its reserve battalion was attached to the 7th Infantry to replace the 25th but it went back west with the 3rd's other units on the 19th). But the 2nd armored was already on the west bank and saw action sooner.
The 2nd armored brigade sent one of its battalions, the 207th, to the Deversoir area. There the battalion attacked repeatedly into the flank of Israeli forces at the Uri position, close to the canal. Advancing from cover of trees, the 207th's T-55s inflicted and sustained losses. By this time, Adan's division had crossed in that area. It was a mistake to confront it with a single battalion (said to number only 25 or so tanks). Adan ordered a subordinate, Lapidot, to head south along the Test road, along the canal, and then strike the 207th in the flank. The Israelis claim to have set half its tanks ablaze, while others became mired in mud and were abandoned.
The next day, the 19th, the Israelis broke out of their bridgehead and penetrated deep into Egypt. Sadat's insistence on sending units east of the canal had forced Kabil's depleted command to spread out far and wide to try to stop them. There weren't many other units. As related, Kabil sent the 2nd's surviving battalions, the 208th and 209th, to Om Habara and a nearby dune area. Another battalion, possibly the remnants of the 207th, was guarding the Geneifa hills. The 3rd was moving back west. The 4rth's other brigade, the 6th Mechanized, was at Kilometer 109 north of Jebel Ataka.
On the 19th, the 2nd knocked out about 20 of Adan's tanks and other vehicles. On that day, however,  Kabil received an order to prepare an offensive against Deversoir. He instructed all elements of the 4rth, save a few, to assemble at Gafra for this attack, scheduled for noon the next day. *
The speed of Adan's advance disrupted Egyptian plans. After the battalion guarding the Geneifa hills was pulled out, Adan overran the hills with scant resistance and threatened to cut the Cairo-Suez road. On the 20th, a battalion of the 3rd armored and a battalion from the 113th brigade (the latter not part of the 4rth) attempted to replace the battalion sent to Gafra. But the Israelis now held the hills and their fire forced both battalions to withdraw. Meanwhile, the enemy thrust south had caused the attack on Deversoir to be cancelled. Forced to bolster the Third Army's line of communications, Kabil now sent his units south of the Geneifa hills.
On the 20th, enemy progress proved rapid. One of Adan's brigade commanders, Natke, effectively cut the Cairo-Suez road with long range tank fire. The 4rth did however, stop the Israelis farther east. In the southeastern part of the Geneifa hills near the Egyptian camps at Odeda, the 3rd armored stopped the advance of another commander, Aryeh. Targeted by tanks, artillery and missiles, Aryeh suffered losses. He resumed his advance the next day, toward Metzila, but encountered more tough resistance.
October 21st saw elements of the 4rth and another unit attempt to restore the situation in Natke's area. Forty Egyptian tanks, with infantry, attacked the site of SAM base 5122, then held by the enemy, and reached its center. According to Adan's account, they knocked out five Israeli tanks but lost 15 of their own then, and ten more soon afterwards. Israeli progress remained slow, however.
The next day, one of the 4rth's tank battalions, advancing from the west, attacked an Israeli force moving on the Arish track toward the Cairo-Suez road. The Israelis claimed to have hit a few tanks and the rest withdrew. This was probably the depleted 3rd brigade, which Dupuy wrote had fought stubbornly until, greatly reduced in strength, it fell back westward toward Kilometer 101.
When General Wassel, commander of the Third Army, realized the Cairo-Suez road had been cut he ordered Kabil to attack with the 6th brigade to reopen it. In view of enemy superiority in armor and in the air, Kabil and Shazly were reluctant to comply. Kabil cited lack of SAM cover as a reason not to attack. By the 22nd enemy air activity had greatly increased, and the Egyptian SAM network had been disrupted.
Despite the odds the 4rth tried to break through. On the morning of the 23rd, after the first cease fire broke down, its tanks attacked Magen's forces on the Cairo-Suez and Asor roads. Adan wrote that Magen contained these attacks and inflicted high losses. This wasn't the full truth. The Israelis were forced to retreat a few kilometers, and request air support. To the end of the war, the Fourth remained a force to be reckoned with.
Unfortunately, losses in fighting power sapped the division's effectiveness. Egyptian sources say on the 25th, right after the war, it had 170-180 tanks. But that figure almost certainly includes tanks from the 27th and replacements from the 1st Army. It's noteworthy that Kabil, right after the war, was still reluctant to try to reopen the road. "My men are prepared to die to reach the Third Army" Shazli recorded him as saying. "But if we fail, the road to Cairo is open." One source said Egypt had only 46 tanks left between the Israeli army and its capital. It is stark testimony to the 4rth's courage and the ineptitude of the president.

* According to Shazly, before the war the Egyptians anticipated a possible Israeli crossing at Deversoir.  If it materialized, they planned to use the 4rth division, and 25th brigade, to launch a counterattack toward the area. It's not surprising, therefore, the 4rth actually received an order to do this. But by October 19th the 25th had been wrecked and the 4rth depleted.

References

Anwar El-Sadat In Search of Identity An Autobiography Sadat
On the Banks of the Suez  Adan
The Crossing of the Suez   Shazly
Elusive Victory              Dupuy
No Victor no Vanquished  O'Ballance
The Yom Kippur War   Rabinovich
From Sinai to the Golan  Hamad

Obscure Battle 1973

Most of the October war is well documented. A great deal has been written about the Golan battles, the October 14 attack, the destruction of 25th armored and other clashes. One aspect of the war, however, has been neglected. Jebel Um Katif, or Mitznefet, has received scant attention from historians. Engagements fought there from October 19-22 were a sideshow. The main Israeli effort was directed south, toward Suez City. Nevertheless, Mitznefet saw major fighting. The tendency to gloss over it invites suspicion. Did the Israelis cover up a serious setback?
Mitznefet, or Om Habara, is a hill west of Fayid (an airbase near the western shore of the Bitter lake). Jebel Um Katif is a larger area of high ground immediately to the west of Mitznefet. After the Israeli crossing of the canal on October 16, the area witnessed troop deployments and combat. Fighting erupted when Israel's advancing forces encountered elements of Egypt's 4rth Armored division.
 Kabil, commanding the 4rth, had only part of one brigade, the 2nd armored, in the vicinity. Originally consisting of three tank battalions, the 207th, 208th and 209th, by October 19th 2nd armored had been reduced to two. Kabil ordered the surviving battalions, the 208th and 209th, to Om Habara and the Om Kathib dune area. So grave was the emergency the battalions had to be reinforced by 14 tanks from the training school, and RPGs.
On the 19th tankmen atop Om Habara saw Israeli armor passing below them. They were part of Adan's 162nd division. The Egyptians opened fire, knocking out ten tanks and other vehicles. T-55s north of Mitznefet inflicted additional looses. Adan's division continued southward, however. Another Israeli division, Magen's 252nd, soon arrived in the area.
Soon, Kabil had to pull out. After overrunning the Geneifa hills, Adan threatened to cut off the Third Army. Kabil was forced to take the 4rth south to try to shore up defenses there. Meanwhile, another brigade, the 27th Armored, was ordered to Jebel Um Katif. Attached to the command of the 4rth, the 27th probably had 90 or so T-55s. On the morning of October 21, it deployed for action.
By then, Magen's division had reached Mitznefet. According to the Israeli version, part of the 252nd was ordered to protect the flank there while the rest of the division continued southward. For the next three days, the tanks left behind are said to have battled a brigade of Egyptian tanks and inflicted heavy losses on them.
It appears the Israelis were also mauled. For many of their vehicles and men, Om Habara became a graveyard. After a period of fighting a brigade commanded by Shomron left Mitznefet. Racing to Adabiya, it completed the encirclement of the Third Army. By then, however, Shomron had only 17 tanks left. Of the 80 tanks that crossed with Magen, only Shomron's force and a few others (on the Cairo-Suez road) remained. West of the canal, the original total seems to have fallen to around 30, perhaps even fewer. The Israelis admit the 252nd had been reduced to 50 tanks, and that figure probably includes newly arrived vehicles. On October 22, Magen was informed that an understrength brigade would reinforce him. Commanded by Ran Sarig, this brigade was rushed from the Golan front, arriving in just 33 hours.
What had happened? Despite official silence, a reconstruction of events is possible. The 252nd  attempted to do more than contain Mitznefet, or bypass it. Magen tried to capture the hill. Adan originally planned to do this and made some preparations, but decided to move south. Apparently the task was left to Magen. Dupuy hinted at his effort when he wrote that on the eastern slopes of Mitznefet, an Israeli battalion got into a firefight with Egyptian tanks. If the mission was just to guard the flank, why were Israeli tanks fighting on the slopes of the hill i.e. climbing it? Given the greater range and accuracy of their guns, why didn't they just fire at the enemy from the plain below? But while hinting at the truth Dupuy, or his Israeli source, downplayed it. A single battalion wouldn't have been committed against a brigade. The entire 252nd must've participated.
 By throwing in every tank, Magen believed, he could quickly crush the enemy, obviate any need for a flank guard, and then advance with all his armor. On the basis of easy victories on the 14th and 17th, Magen underestimated the 27th. To his great surprise, the attack was smashed. The presence of tanks and instructors from the training school meant Egyptian gunnery skill was well above average. T-55s picked off dozens of vehicles ascending the hill; those which reached the top were blasted at close range. Stunned by the massacre, Magen sent an SOS to his superiors, urgently requesting replacements. Remnants of his division then advanced to the Cairo-Suez road. Initially, Sarig's brigade, after arriving   at Mitznefet, stayed there to contain the 27th. Part of Sharon's force then came and freed the brigade to go south with the others. But the advancing 252nd was gravely depleted.
 Available figures suggest the 27th destroyed over half of Magen's original force. Apparently, fifty tanks had been wrecked; conceivably the Egyptians hit sixty. Sarig's brigade had just 30 tanks. It raised the total (for the time being, around the 23rd) to 50. The addition of 30 to reach 50 would imply all but 20 of the original 80 were lost. Certainly the speed with which reinforcements were sent hints at a serious setback. So does the Israeli tendency to gloss over the battle, in contrast to so many others.*
On October 21, the same day the Israelis got a bloody nose at Mitznefet, they were repulsed at Missouri. This was a fairly minor setback; only 22 tanks were lost. Interestingly, the minimum possible loss at Mitznefet, around 30 tanks (80-50 remaining without addition of new units) is not much more than the Missouri toll, yet the latter is well known, whereas Om Habara is not. This suggests the 252nd's setback wasn't marginally worse than the one at Missouri, but far worse, hence was concealed. Unofficial Israeli sources tend to confirm this. For the most part, though, the Israelis provide very little or misleading information.
 No Israeli author ever provided a detailed account of Om Habara actions; some omit the subject altogether. Adan's On the Banks of the Suez mentions 2nd brigade battalions on Mitznefet, but not the losses he took on the 19th or those incurred there later. Rabinovich, who also wrote from an Israeli perspective, mentioned clashes with Egyptian armor during Adan's drive south, but provided no details. The truth seems too awful to be revealed.
If the Egyptians won at Om Habara, why didn't they tout it as a great victory? That may be due to the eventual fall of the hill. Elsewhere in the last days, Egyptian successes prevented the capture of Ismailia, Suez City and Kabrit fort. There were other issues like high losses and lack of strategic significance.
After the Third Army was trapped, the 27th was ordered to help other units break through to it. Kabil and Shazly were reluctant to comply because of Israeli tank superiority. The 27th is said to have left its hills without a fight and established defenses some distance away. Overall, the brigade may have availed little. But it still accomplished something.
In his memoirs, Hamad wrote the 27th had a successful battle and prevented the Israelis from extending their bridgehead farther west. Magen's main intention was to head south, to encircle the Third Army. It appears likely, though, the 27th made his victory a pyrrhic one.

* It is true that Magen fought at other places besides Mitznefet, notably Tsach, near the canal, and Fayid. Neither battle, however, was likely to have been costly. After being softened up by airstrikes, Tsach was attacked from the north and west, whereas its defenses faced east. And Fayid wasn't strongly defended.

References

Elusive Victory  Dupuy
No Victor No Vanquished   O'Ballance
The Yom Kippur War        Rabinovich
From the Sinai to the Golan      Hamad