Best Egyptian Strategy 1967

Because of poor preparation and poor timing, the June war was lost before it was even fought. Could Cairo have done better? It undoubtedly could have, and might even have won. Before the 1967 war, Egypt should've taken a number of steps to improve its prospects on the battlefield:

• Get rid of political hacks like Amer, and replace them with officers promoted on merit.
• Avoid intervention in Yemen, or terminate it no later than March 1963, if necessary by sacrificing the Yemeni regime. Nasser's forces should have spent the years 1963-67 training in Sinai, not fighting and dying in Yemen. The ill-starred adventure weakened the Egyptian army. Had its strength been conserved for the real showdown, with Israel, Cairo's forces would've fared better.
• Initiate a crisis during the month of November or December, certainly not May or June. Even in the best of circumstances, it would've been hard for Egypt to provide air cover for its forces in Sinai. It was certainly a mistake to fight in June, when there are maximum hours of daylight. Fighting during a period of maximum darkness would've reduced the impact of Israeli air superiority. Furthermore, cooler temperatures would've improved the performance of Soviet-made gear. It was designed to operate in cold weather and did not do well in the hottest months, particularly, in the Mideast.
• Do not deploy large forces near the frontier, or well east of the passes. In 1967, Cairo played into Israel's hands by deploying the bulk of its armor east of the Mitla and other defiles. Besides vulnerability to air strikes in the open desert the Egyptian forces were outmaneuvered. A more prudent deployment would've been:
• 7th Infantry in the Jiradi pass/El Arish area. The Jiradi proved to be a good defensive position historically; had the bulk of the 7th been positioned there the israelis could've been stopped for some time.
• 20th Palestinian mostly not in the indefensible Gaza strip but scattered in small groups astride the major roads in eastern Sinai, such as those near Abu Agheila. After the passage of Israeli combat forces, the groups could've preyed on Israeli logistical units, interdicting supplies and disrupting enemy operations.
• 6th Mechanized division, including the 125th Tank Brigade, in the Khatmia pass near Bir Gifgafa. The Stalin tanks etc should've been waiting in ambush. Because of the slow speed of the Stalins, it would've made sense to put them in rear defensive positions.
• 2nd Infantry Division in the Mitla and Giddi passes. 2nd Infantry was a good Egyptian division, which would've performed well against a frontal attack--the only kind of attack possible in this situation.
• 3rd Infantry on the west side of the ridge or defiles, as a reserve and to guard against an Israeli airmobile attack on Egyptian rear positions.
• Shazli armored force in Sudr pass.
• Fourth Armored division east of the Sudr pass. (Every effort should've been made to conceal this unit--radio silence, camouflage netting etc.)

In this scenario, the IDF assaulted the Mitla and Khatmia passes and became bogged down. Mauling of its logistical tether degraded its combat capability. In particular, loss of fuel impaired Israeli mobility. The Shazli armored force then emerged from the Sudr pass and trapped the IDF force attacking the Mitla, while 4rth Armored raced overnight to take the enemy at the Khatmia in the rear. Inasmuch as the northern Israeli division (under Tal) was tied up in the Jiradi or El Arish, there was no relief force to save the two entrapped Israeli divisions. Their destruction significantly altered the balance of forces. It became possible for three Egyptian divisions--the 6th, Shazli force and 4rth Armored, to recapture all ground lost and even enter Israel itself.


Among Egypt's mistakes in 1967 was to deploy its forces too close to the frontier.

Egyptian tanks again

I just relocated two refs I previously quoted only from memory: The Six Day War and Elusive Victory. Based on accounts of tank actions, I can now better estimate the number of Egyptian vehicles that opened fire in '67. It seems at least 300 of Cairo's tanks, possibly up to 400 or so, used their main guns:

• 7th Infantry sector, northern area/Rafah/Khan Yunis. 70-100 Egyptian tanks were present. (Dupuy's Elusive Victory, which says 70, was written later and may be more accurate than The Six Day War.) The Israelis are said to have first surprised and destroyed a force of 20 Stalin tanks, then did the same to 20 T-34s. They later engaged 20 tanks in El Arish, 10 of which were hit and the rest forced to flee. In view of wiki accounts of JS tanks fighting etc, I think it's reasonable to conclude that about 30 Egyptian tanks fired in these battles.
• Bir Lafhan. Two Egyptian brigades, one armored, attempted to stop the IDF advance. In the ensuing fight, the Egyptians lost 28 tanks, the IDF about half as many. If a whole brigade of tanks fought there, plus perhaps a few tanks from the mechanized unit, it appears that the total number of tanks with guns blazing was 100.
• Abu Agheila. "After losing 40 tanks, or nearly half of its strength" an Egyptian brigade pulled back. In addition, there was brief resistance from a company of T-34s (10 tanks?) in a frontier position, and possibly other local actions involving tanks. Again, about 100 of Nasser's tanks appear to have fired. (In addition, some apparently did so repeatedly in a night action.)
• Bir Gifgafa. An Egyptian force of 50-60 T-54/55s attacked IDF AMX tanks, forcing them back 1 km and blowing up some vehicles. An IDF counterattack destroyed 10 of the Egyptian tanks and compelled the rest to retreat. But 50 tanks continued to oppose the IDF advance to the canal near Ismailia. Interestingly, several Israeli Centurions got three or four direct hits. Moreover, the Egyptians, using new tactics, continued to knock out tanks until Israeli armor overcame them.
• There were various other actions involving tanks, such as the T-55s which ambushed IDF armor.

It looks like about 300 of Nasser's tanks fired, and some of them did so more than once, even several times. Still, the Soviet claim may have merit after all. Three hundred tanks, even 400, represents a small minority of Cairo's armored force in Sinai (900). A majority of Egypt's tanks apparently didn't shoot at all. This may not necessarily reflect poorly on the crews, however. At least twice, at Nakhl, and near Gifgafa, Israeli armor attacked under very favorable circumstances, either from ambush positions or from the rear. After getting mixed up with Israeli armor, a retreating Egyptian tank battalion was wiped out when the enemy left the road and attacked. Generally, Egyptian officers were to blame, and Soviet technology (Israel's 105mm tank guns outranged Russian tank guns). Naturally the Soviets blamed the Egyptians. Nasser's officers were often at fault, for abandoning their tanks or men, and being outmaneuvered in battle. Still, the Soviets clearly went too far by claiming the war would've been won with just 900 tank rounds. The Egyptians may have shot close to that number or even equalled it, with dismal results.

Math Problem

Originally I had planned to post on the transit of Venus, but clouds prevented me from seeing it....At least I saw the previous transit, in 2004.
Recently, in "yahoo answers" someone posted this problem:
"A naturalist catches 543 deer, tags them and releases them back into a game preserve. Later a sample of 531 deer are caught, 177 of which are tagged. What is the total number of deer in the preserve?"
 To me, it was obvious that if one third of a sample (531 divided by 3 =177) are tagged, all those tagged (543) must be one third of the total #. Ergo, there are 1,629 deer in the preserve. When I later posted the question in some forum, two bright people came up with the same figure. But the answer voted "best" was "622 or 623 depending on how you round it." That answer is patently absurd. The total number tagged (543) added to those in the sample not tagged (354) indicates the number present couldn't be less than 897. From now on, best answers should be chosen by experts in various fields, not lay voters.