Best Egyptian Strategy 1967

Because of poor preparation and poor timing, the June war was lost before it was even fought. Could Cairo have done better? It undoubtedly could have, and might even have won. Before the 1967 war, Egypt should've taken a number of steps to improve its prospects on the battlefield:

• Get rid of political hacks like Amer, and replace them with officers promoted on merit.
• Avoid intervention in Yemen, or terminate it no later than March 1963, if necessary by sacrificing the Yemeni regime. Nasser's forces should have spent the years 1963-67 training in Sinai, not fighting and dying in Yemen. The ill-starred adventure weakened the Egyptian army. Had its strength been conserved for the real showdown, with Israel, Cairo's forces would've fared better.
• Initiate a crisis during the month of November or December, certainly not May or June. Even in the best of circumstances, it would've been hard for Egypt to provide air cover for its forces in Sinai. It was certainly a mistake to fight in June, when there are maximum hours of daylight. Fighting during a period of maximum darkness would've reduced the impact of Israeli air superiority. Furthermore, cooler temperatures would've improved the performance of Soviet-made gear. It was designed to operate in cold weather and did not do well in the hottest months, particularly, in the Mideast.
• Do not deploy large forces near the frontier, or well east of the passes. In 1967, Cairo played into Israel's hands by deploying the bulk of its armor east of the Mitla and other defiles. Besides vulnerability to air strikes in the open desert the Egyptian forces were outmaneuvered. A more prudent deployment would've been:
• 7th Infantry in the Jiradi pass/El Arish area. The Jiradi proved to be a good defensive position historically; had the bulk of the 7th been positioned there the israelis could've been stopped for some time.
• 20th Palestinian mostly not in the indefensible Gaza strip but scattered in small groups astride the major roads in eastern Sinai, such as those near Abu Agheila. After the passage of Israeli combat forces, the groups could've preyed on Israeli logistical units, interdicting supplies and disrupting enemy operations.
• 6th Mechanized division, including the 125th Tank Brigade, in the Khatmia pass near Bir Gifgafa. The Stalin tanks etc should've been waiting in ambush. Because of the slow speed of the Stalins, it would've made sense to put them in rear defensive positions.
• 2nd Infantry Division in the Mitla and Giddi passes. 2nd Infantry was a good Egyptian division, which would've performed well against a frontal attack--the only kind of attack possible in this situation.
• 3rd Infantry on the west side of the ridge or defiles, as a reserve and to guard against an Israeli airmobile attack on Egyptian rear positions.
• Shazli armored force in Sudr pass.
• Fourth Armored division east of the Sudr pass. (Every effort should've been made to conceal this unit--radio silence, camouflage netting etc.)

In this scenario, the IDF assaulted the Mitla and Khatmia passes and became bogged down. Mauling of its logistical tether degraded its combat capability. In particular, loss of fuel impaired Israeli mobility. The Shazli armored force then emerged from the Sudr pass and trapped the IDF force attacking the Mitla, while 4rth Armored raced overnight to take the enemy at the Khatmia in the rear. Inasmuch as the northern Israeli division (under Tal) was tied up in the Jiradi or El Arish, there was no relief force to save the two entrapped Israeli divisions. Their destruction significantly altered the balance of forces. It became possible for three Egyptian divisions--the 6th, Shazli force and 4rth Armored, to recapture all ground lost and even enter Israel itself.


Among Egypt's mistakes in 1967 was to deploy its forces too close to the frontier.