General Orabi

Recently General Orabi, commander of the 21st armored division in 1973 and later Chief of Staff, passed away at age 88. He had a long, successful career, rising from Lieutenant in 1950 to Lieutenant General a few decades later. Like some of his colleagues, however, he does not appear to have been successful in war.
As commander of Egyptian tanks in Yemen, Orabi's performance was not distinguished. He did not fare well as commander of the 21st division either.
At the start of the 1973 war, only one of the 21st's brigades, the 14th armored, crossed the canal. It was in the sector of the 16th infantry division (just north of Great Bitter lake). The 14th missed an opportunity to seize the Hamadia ridge without a fight, and then failed to take it. Sharon moved out of the area on the 8th to attack the Third army, leaving Hamadia almost unprotected. Orabi should've ordered the 14th, part of his command, to seize the position. Instead the 14th attacked on the 9th when Sharon was back. The Egyptians were repulsed. Rabinovich says the Israelis hit 30 tanks with "hardly a loss" of their own.
On October 14, the 21st went into action again. The decision to attack was Sadat's, so Orabi can't be faulted for that. Aware that Sadat's order was foolish, the Egyptian generals launched a "show offensive." Only a few brigades were committed for a brief period. No doubt Orabi did his part, but he should have tried to do better. Despite the brevity of its assault on Hamadia, the 21st's 1st armored brigade lost too many tanks. Orabi should've ordered the brigade to advance well behind a few obsolete vehicles (perhaps T-34s), borrowed from another unit. As soon as they were hit the 1st armored (with its better T-55s) should've fled back to the bridgehead.
The 14th armored also participated in the ill-starred offensive, albeit farther north, on the road to Tasa. After some initial progress it was halted by Israeli defenders and suffered losses. Orabi contemplated using the 21st's third brigade, the 18th mechanized, to overcome enemy resistance by hitting the Israeli flank. He should've just ordered the 14th to fall back.
Already battered, 21st armored lost nearly all its remaining tanks in the Chinese farm. Orabi should've anticipated that the enemy would attack the south or right flank of 16th infantry division. Or, if he did foresee the Israeli move, he should've better prepared his forces. The 14th armored brigade should've been deployed in ambush positions just north of the Tirtur road. Likewise, 18th mechanized should not have launched an attack against the Israeli corridor, but strengthened the Chinese farm defenses with dug in T-55s.
Sadat's order to counterattack again, on the 17th, left Orabi's command further and gravely depleted. While Orabi did not bear responsibility for this, he could, again (albeit at personal risk) have taken liberties with the President's foolish orders. The 1st armored brigade should've just feigned a southward thrust while conserving its strength for more economical (and effective) defensive engagements. If subsequent Israeli assaults on the Chinese farm and Missouri ridge had incurred much higher losses than they did historically, the surviving Egyptian armor might've been in a better position to overrun or disrupt the Israeli crossing site. Even if the Israelis, fearing high losses, avoided attacking toward Missouri, the 21st could still have tied down more enemy strength in the corridor, reducing what was sent west of the canal. That, in turn, could've reduced the extent of Israeli advances toward Ismailia, Suez or both. Egypt would've been in a better position by the time of the ceasefire.
Orabi may not have been a genius. Nevertheless, he deserves credit for helping to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, and for serving his country to the best of his ability. RIP.

1973: "The First Nuclear War"

Cooper and Emran have a new book out. It shows how threats of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles influenced the course of the '73 conflict. For example, fear that SCUD missiles would be sent to Port Said--where they would've been able to strike deep inside Israel--lead to heavy, sustained airstrikes on the port. The Egyptians were puzzled by the duration and intensity of the strikes. They did not know what the enemy goal was. Another example occurred in the last days. Although reports of delivery of nuclear weapons to Egypt on October 25 turned out not to be true, they hastened an end to the conflict.
The book contains exciting accounts of air combat. Some stories have appeared in published works for decades, but others appear new. The authors stress that while Egyptian pilots were very well trained they were hampered by inferior weapons. This point was made previously, many times, but the new work explains it at greater length. There are diagrams showing limited cockpit visibility in the MIG-21 and the small engagement envelope of its R-3S missile compared to Israeli Sidewinders.
 Egypt had some Libyan Mirages, based at Tanta, but generally they were not effective. I already knew about the failed mission against El Arish; there was another against Fayid after the Israelis took it. The first mission on the 7th, though, hit Israeli armored vehicles while refuelling. The book should've included the results of the attack, instead of just mentioning Israeli surprise at being struck by Mirages.
One thing I find slightly suspicious is the Israeli claim that on October 14, a Phantom was shot down by one of their own Mirages. According to Spector, the mistake occurred because "it was late afternoon and the light was bad." The Phantoms were "still entangled with MIGs" when Mirages joined the battle and "weren't careful enough..." It's hard to believe a Mirage pilot, one of Israel's elite airmen, couldn't tell the difference between a Phantom and a MIG. Or if visibility was so bad he couldn't distinguish friend from foe, why did he shoot? Was there a Court of Inquiry after the war, in which he had to testify? Not to my knowledge. I suspect the Phantom was really felled by a MIG-21, but the Israelis preferred to blame it on an accident.
















Sadat and his generals in the last days of the war.  By then the situation was desperate. The Third Army faced entrapment. A report of nuclear weapons arriving in Egypt may have saved it. Although mistaken, the report deterred Israel from destroying the army.


Ref:

1973: The First Nuclear War   Crucial Air Battles of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War

by Tom Cooper and Abdallah Emran