General Orabi

Recently General Orabi, commander of the 21st armored division in 1973 and later Chief of Staff, passed away at age 88. He had a long, successful career, rising from Lieutenant in 1950 to Lieutenant General a few decades later. Like some of his colleagues, however, he does not appear to have been successful in war.
As commander of Egyptian tanks in Yemen, Orabi's performance was not distinguished. He did not fare well as commander of the 21st division either.
At the start of the 1973 war, only one of the 21st's brigades, the 14th armored, crossed the canal. It was in the sector of the 16th infantry division (just north of Great Bitter lake). The 14th missed an opportunity to seize the Hamadia ridge without a fight, and then failed to take it. Sharon moved out of the area on the 8th to attack the Third army, leaving Hamadia almost unprotected. Orabi should've ordered the 14th, part of his command, to seize the position. Instead the 14th attacked on the 9th when Sharon was back. The Egyptians were repulsed. Rabinovich says the Israelis hit 30 tanks with "hardly a loss" of their own.
On October 14, the 21st went into action again. The decision to attack was Sadat's, so Orabi can't be faulted for that. Aware that Sadat's order was foolish, the Egyptian generals launched a "show offensive." Only a few brigades were committed for a brief period. No doubt Orabi did his part, but he should have tried to do better. Despite the brevity of its assault on Hamadia, the 21st's 1st armored brigade lost too many tanks. Orabi should've ordered the brigade to advance well behind a few obsolete vehicles (perhaps T-34s), borrowed from another unit. As soon as they were hit the 1st armored (with its better T-55s) should've fled back to the bridgehead.
The 14th armored also participated in the ill-starred offensive, albeit farther north, on the road to Tasa. After some initial progress it was halted by Israeli defenders and suffered losses. Orabi contemplated using the 21st's third brigade, the 18th mechanized, to overcome enemy resistance by hitting the Israeli flank. He should've just ordered the 14th to fall back.
Already battered, 21st armored lost nearly all its remaining tanks in the Chinese farm. Orabi should've anticipated that the enemy would attack the south or right flank of 16th infantry division. Or, if he did foresee the Israeli move, he should've better prepared his forces. The 14th armored brigade should've been deployed in ambush positions just north of the Tirtur road. Likewise, 18th mechanized should not have launched an attack against the Israeli corridor, but strengthened the Chinese farm defenses with dug in T-55s.
Sadat's order to counterattack again, on the 17th, left Orabi's command further and gravely depleted. While Orabi did not bear responsibility for this, he could, again (albeit at personal risk) have taken liberties with the President's foolish orders. The 1st armored brigade should've just feigned a southward thrust while conserving its strength for more economical (and effective) defensive engagements. If subsequent Israeli assaults on the Chinese farm and Missouri ridge had incurred much higher losses than they did historically, the surviving Egyptian armor might've been in a better position to overrun or disrupt the Israeli crossing site. Even if the Israelis, fearing high losses, avoided attacking toward Missouri, the 21st could still have tied down more enemy strength in the corridor, reducing what was sent west of the canal. That, in turn, could've reduced the extent of Israeli advances toward Ismailia, Suez or both. Egypt would've been in a better position by the time of the ceasefire.
Orabi may not have been a genius. Nevertheless, he deserves credit for helping to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, and for serving his country to the best of his ability. RIP.