Gamasy

 General Mohammed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, above, was best known as the Egyptian Chief of operations in 1973, and Egypt's negotiator at Kilometer 101 right after the war. Other aspects of his career are more obscure.
In an earlier post, on Murtagi's role in 1967, I opined that Gamasy was behind the order to retreat. In my reconstruction, following the loss of the EAF, and the failure of 4rth division to repel the Israelis, Gamasy talked Murtagi into ordering a withdrawal. Because the retreat led to a disastrous rout, Gamasy hid his role in it. He lied to Pollack, claiming Murtagi's Sinai Front Command (in which he was involved) had no command authority. This was absurd, since the SFC had been created to enable Murtagi, a proven commander (as opposed to Nasser's political hacks) to direct operations. In one of his works, O'Ballance shows clearly that Murtagi was giving the orders. Gamasy's other claim, that he didn't even know a retreat order had been issued until he saw Egyptian forces streaming westward, reflects his desperation to avoid responsibility for the order. It's hard to believe the order got through to the troops without a high ranking officer and his superior knowing about it. Instead of having the courage to defend the decision (which, as Pollack showed, was basically right yet poorly executed) he denied having anything to do with it.
Gamasy was hardly more courageous in 1973. Perceiving that Egyptian defenses were too weak west of the canal, Shazly proposed sending some units back. Angered, Sadat threatened him with a court martial. Later, as the situation deteriorated seriously, Ismail called for a cease fire, despite Sadat's opposition to it. As far as I know, Gamasy did nothing which might anger the President. Any military professional would've held views different from Sadat's. Apparently, Gamasy was no exception but fear of personal consequences prevented him from speaking up, as others had done. Even after the war, at a symposium on the October war (1976) he defended Sadat's decisions.
Not surprisingly, a man determined to avoid trouble kept his job a long time. While Sadat dismissed the capable Shazly, and later purged Badawy and his colleagues via a copter "accident," he kept Gamasy. The obsequious general rose to Field Marshal.
Of course, Gamasy painted himself differently. He allegedly rejected Sadat's order to retain only 30 tanks in Sinai, and later said he refused an order to crush rioters in 1977. But these stories may be no more credible than what he told Pollack.
In fairness to Gamasy, his attitude stemmed from pragmatism not conviction. Before his death in 2003, the erstwhile lackey showed his true feelings. He denounced Sadat as a traitor.

References

Edgar O'Ballance The Third Arab-Israeli War 

Kenneth Pollack  Arabs at War Military Effectiveness 1948 --1991