Gamasy
General Mohammed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, above, was best known as the Egyptian Chief of operations in 1973, and Egypt's negotiator at Kilometer 101 right after the war. Other aspects of his career are more obscure.
In an earlier post, on Murtagi's role in 1967, I opined that Gamasy was behind the order to retreat. In my reconstruction, following the loss of the EAF, and the failure of 4rth division to repel the Israelis, Gamasy talked Murtagi into ordering a withdrawal. Because the retreat led to a disastrous rout, Gamasy hid his role in it. He lied to Pollack, claiming Murtagi's Sinai Front Command (in which he was involved) had no command authority. This was absurd, since the SFC had been created to enable Murtagi, a proven commander (as opposed to Nasser's political hacks) to direct operations. In one of his works, O'Ballance shows clearly that Murtagi was giving the orders. Gamasy's other claim, that he didn't even know a retreat order had been issued until he saw Egyptian forces streaming westward, reflects his desperation to avoid responsibility for the order. It's hard to believe the order got through to the troops without a high ranking officer and his superior knowing about it. Instead of having the courage to defend the decision (which, as Pollack showed, was basically right yet poorly executed) he denied having anything to do with it.
Gamasy was hardly more courageous in 1973. Perceiving that Egyptian defenses were too weak west of the canal, Shazly proposed sending some units back. Angered, Sadat threatened him with a court martial. Later, as the situation deteriorated seriously, Ismail called for a cease fire, despite Sadat's opposition to it. As far as I know, Gamasy did nothing which might anger the President. Any military professional would've held views different from Sadat's. Apparently, Gamasy was no exception but fear of personal consequences prevented him from speaking up, as others had done. Even after the war, at a symposium on the October war (1976) he defended Sadat's decisions.
Not surprisingly, a man determined to avoid trouble kept his job a long time. While Sadat dismissed the capable Shazly, and later purged Badawy and his colleagues via a copter "accident," he kept Gamasy. The obsequious general rose to Field Marshal.
Of course, Gamasy painted himself differently. He allegedly rejected Sadat's order to retain only 30 tanks in Sinai, and later said he refused an order to crush rioters in 1977. But these stories may be no more credible than what he told Pollack.
In fairness to Gamasy, his attitude stemmed from pragmatism not conviction. Before his death in 2003, the erstwhile lackey showed his true feelings. He denounced Sadat as a traitor.
References
Edgar O'Ballance The Third Arab-Israeli War
Kenneth Pollack Arabs at War Military Effectiveness 1948 --1991
posted by starman at 6:30 AM
14 Comments:
Think how much better the October war would've gone without sadat in charge.
Indeed, without Sadat, Egypt's initial advantage would've been preserved.
April 26, 2019
April 28, 2019
I just got a better pic of Gamasy for the post.
Starman, hopefully by tomorrow I will give you some good news about his diary!
Good to hear that!
June 7, 2019
Hey Starman, So I read a good chunk on 1967 in his diary, and he states that Amer was behind the retreat order and hints that Nasser approved it based on statements of other individuals close to Nasser. He criticized the chaos for a retreat and interestingly said that Egypt did not need to retreat even after the air force was taken out. I am still not done reading it so expect more to come soon!
So you've finally begun the review. :)
Amer has long been considered the one behind the retreat order, but I'm suspicious of that. The order has long been criticized as it led to disaster. Soon after the war, Amer fell out of favor and committed suicide. I suspect blaming him for the order, and by implication the defeat, was politically motivated.
In his book on the 1967 war, O'Ballance wrote that Murtagi gave the order. That made sense. I don't believe what Gamasy told Pollack. Gamasy claimed the Sinai Front Command had no power. But then what was the use of creating it?? The SFC was created to enable a proven general, Murtagi, to command the forces in Sinai without having to remove Nasser's political hacks--the men he relied on to keep him in power. And I don't believe Gamasy's claim, mentioned in ARABS AT WAR, that he had no idea a retreat had been ordered until he saw Egyptian forces streaming westward. Again, what was the use of creating the SFC if it was "out of the loop" to the extent that it didn't know what the common soldiers did? It sounds absurd.
By claiming the SFC was irrelevant Gamasy invites suspicion that HE was behind the retreat order. Since Gamasy was with Murtagi in the SFC, he had a powerful incentive to hide his role. I think Gamasy talked Murtagi into ordering the retreat. And, despite what he wrote in his diary, loss of air cover was the reason for the retreat. That, in fact, was the reason given by O'Ballance for Murtagi's decision to pull back. And it made perfect sense. Without air cover Egyptian forces, particularly in eastern Sinai, became vulnerable to air attack and loss of logistical support due to interdiction. But falling back to the line of the defiles enabled them to "make a stand regardless of the air situation." Gamasy probably made these points to Murtagi, who told the troops to pull back.
I just don't think Gamasy is credible. He seemed almost desperate to hide his role, any trace of it.
June 10, 2019
Btw is the book by Gamasy based on an actual diary he kept, or is it his MEMOIRS? I suspect the latter. :)
June 10, 2019
It is his memoirs.
So basically according to him, Amer was always in contact with the SFC and issued orders. He also informed Nasser of his decision to order a retreat. Here is the thing :
according to the book, Fawzi stated that high command (Amer) communicated with the commander of the forces in Sharm El Sheik, ordering him to put a plan to withdraw all his forces to the west of the canal.
And Amer requested him on the 6th of June (Fawzi) and ordered him to make a withdrawal plan for the forces in Sinai to the west side of the canal in 20 minutes only.
Now it gets more interesting....
Fawzy says that he went to the room of operations and meet with Anwar Al Qady and Tohamy and they decided to put a PROPER withdrawal plan which Tohamy wrote down. Then they confronted Amer and started reading out the plan, which was supposed to take around four days and three nights to achieve.
Amer replied back saying" four days and three nights Fawzy? I already ordered the retreat." After that, he entered his bedroom under huge mental stress and in hysteria.
Thank you for the comment!! I'll have a response soon.
July 18, 2019
That version of events is virtually identical to the one in Fawzi's memoirs, reproduced in RECONSTRUCTING A SHATTERED EGYPTIAN ARMY. On page 50, he wrote, in translation:
The first inkling to withdrawal occurred at 0550 on June 6. Amer sent a message from his command center in Cairo to the commander of combat forces in Sharm el-Sheikh to withdraw to the east (sic) of the Suez Canal. At noon on June 6, he (Amer) requested that IU plan or a withdrawal and do so in twenty minutes. I attempted to reason with Amer, but Amer's mental state was not conducive to discussion or debate. I then summoned General Anwar al-Qadi, operations chief, and and his deputy, General Tilhami to plan this impromptu withdrawal. We discussed the inconceivability of the order, because from our perspective all forces, except for Egyptian 7th Infantry Group, were holding their ground. When we attempted to brief Field Marshal Amer, annotating key locations in the Sinai and saying a phased retreat to salvage as many men and as much equipment as possible would take four days, Amer cut off the briefer and in a raised [incredulous] voice said "I've given the order already. Four days and three nights Fawzi!" Amer then went into his sleeping quarters and suffered a nervous breakdown in front of me and the two generals.
The book goes on to say "A few hours later, Fawzi learned that Amer had ordered a withdrawal via Ismailiyah directly through Suez Canal Command.... Fawzi and the General staff were stunned and outraged at having been cut out of such an important order."
The whole point of Fawzi's story is that he opposed the retreat order, which he (supposedly) viewed as unnecessary, and it was the work of Amer. At the time Gamasy was chief of staff to Murtagi in Sinai, so he couldn't have seen Amer and how he was acting. He must have copied the version from Fawzi. Or both men and others just adhered to a manufactured narrative, or official version, which laid the blame on Amer.
Murtaji, who also fell from favor at the time, was similarly criticized:
General Murtaji, Sinai front commander, was informed verbally by a military policeman [MP] and not given written orders to withdraw. When Murtaji asked where the order originated from, the MP relied that it was from the field marshal. Astonishingly, Murtaji took this version at face value and withdrew with his staff to Ismailiyah, instead of remaining at his post to conduct an orderly retreat. Murtaji did not bother to inform higher headquarters in Cairo, the General Staff, or his field commanders in the Sinai of his withdrawal. General Saleh Mohsen's desire to create a shielding force for the retreating units was undermined by Amer's order and the cascading effect that led to chaos on the battlefield.
But that contradicts Gamasy's version, told to Pollack, that Murtaji's Sinai Front Command was "out of the loop" and had no idea a retreat had been ordered until he saw Egyptian troops streaming westward.
Pollack wrote that by the morning of the 6th the Israelis had overrun 7th infantry, taken Abu Agheila, and defeated the (reserve) 4rth armored division at Bir Laftan. Contradicting Fawzi, he said that under the circumstances the decision to retreat was justified, even essential. I think Gamasy, then with Murtaji, knew this and persuaded Murtaji to retreat, but poor communications made it impossible to organize the withdrawal properly. Meanwhile, Amer and other political hacks were essentially clueless and bore only limited responsibility for the order. The disastrous course of the retreat naturally made Fawzi and Gamasy eager to shift the blame to Amer, or at least to adhere to an official version which sought to discredit him.
Just my two cents. :)
July 19, 2019
Darn typos--second paragraph, third line down should read "he (Amer) requested that I plan for a withdrawal..."
Btw what (if anything) does Gamasy say about the 27th brigade in the Om Habara/Jebel um-Katif area (west of Fayid) on October 21, 1973?
July 19, 2019
I will look into the 27th brigade, but regarding the whole matter with Fawzy, he was quoting him. Gamasy wasn't there at all and doesnt claim he was there.
Still, the whole contradiction between what he told to Pollack-and Murtagi's version should be looked into and perhaps Historians 73 should be notified of it.
If I remember right, Gamasy wrote that around October 21st the 27th brigade "had a successful battle." I think it was pretty successful too, or at least caused enough losses to force Magen to urgently request more tanks, which were rushed to him from Golan.
Murtagi was a hero of the Yemen war, chosen to head the Sinai Front Command because of his ability. I think it would've been out of character for him to just "cut and run" like that. The version given by Fawzi is probably another fictional, official narrative to discredit someone who fell out of favor in '67.
July 19, 2019
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