Murtagi's Role 1967

During the crisis which preceded the 1967 Mideast war, Egypt's Vice President Amer created a special command for one of his country's ablest officers, General Murtagi. After distinguishing himself in the Yemen war, Murtagi was to head a Sinai Front Command. There is no doubt he was, in fact, commander of Egyptian forces in Sinai, despite some confusion over the matter.

In his Third Arab Israeli War, O'Ballance makes it clear that Murtagi was the one giving orders:
page 133: "It was about noon that General Murtagi realized the Egyptian air force had been virtually destroyed, and he ordered his troops to fall back on the second line of defense."
page 139  "...General Murtagi had given orders for all Egyptian troops to withdraw to the third line of defense, which rested on the Central Ridge...."
page 142: " ...General Murtagi had ordered two distinct counterattacks in which one armored brigade was to move against Rafah and the other was to assault the Sharon ugda..."
Despite proof of Murtagi being in charge, Pollack included a claim to the contrary. On page 83 of Arabs at War, he stated that Murtagi was "not in the loop at all." Based on what Gamasy told him, Pollack concluded that Murtagi's command was "completely bypassed during the war." Since Gamasy was Murtagi's Chief of Staff, he seemed a reliable source. Unfortunately Gamasy was far from truthful, and this marred Arabs at War.
 Pollack's information is contradictory and absurd. On page 595 of his book, he indicates Amer created a special position for Murtagi to benefit from his expertise as a commander. What was the use of creating this command if Murtagi was to be "completely bypassed during the war"?
The contradiction stemmed from false information. Gamasy lied to Pollack.
As O'Ballance makes clear, Murtagi issued the order to retreat. This order resulted in disaster. By the second day, when units were told to fall back, the Egyptian communication system had broken down. Many units did not receive the order. Without guidance from higher command they just disintegrated. Commanders abandoned their men. The retreat became a rout. It was the greatest humiliation in modern Egyptian history.
As Murtagi's Chief of Staff, Gamasy bore much responsibility for the decisions made, and the catastrophe. Not surprisingly, he tried to evade responsibility. He denied the Sinai Front Command was making the decisions. Amer and Muhsin were running the war. Divisional commanders supposedly reported to them. He and Murtagi were "bypassed." Gamasy was so desperate to disassociate himself from the withdrawal he even claimed he knew nothing of it until he saw Egyptian forces streaming westward.
In fact, the initiative for the order came from Gamasy. His lies were obviously intended to conceal this, and service records provide additional evidence. Murtagi was more inclined to attack than retreat. Twice in 1964, he had launched offensives in Yemen. The failure of the first, in June 1964, did not deter him from attacking again, in December. The counterattacks in Sinai (page 142 above) also reflect his offensive attitude. In light of that, the fallback order almost certainly resulted from pressure from his Chief of Staff. Gamasy was behind the retreat. Since it ended so disastrously, he was determined at all costs to hide his role in the decision.
It was said that arab politics "shocked Gamasy to his bones." His own lack of veracity should shock us. Gamasy's evasion of responsibility is typical of arabs, who are notorious for lying to avoid criticism. Such cowardice was not really necessary however.
On page 165 of his work, O'Ballance stated:
"On the second day, General Murtagi realized the Egyptian Air Force had been knocked out, and his lengthy lines of communication were completely exposed, so he gave the order to withdraw from the first line of defense. It is thought he intended the other intermediate positions--El Arish, Jiradi, Bir Lafhan and Jebel Libni--to be delaying ones, and that he planned to stand firm regardless of the air situation along the Central Ridge and counterattack into central Sinai from there. This was a sound strategy which might have worked had he been able to put it into practice, but on the second day the Egyptian communication system broke down. All Egyptian units forward of the Central Ridge were left without positive orders from the GOC (i.e. Murtagi) from the evening of the second day onwards. The fog of war......Many formations, such as Shazli force, the 6th Infantry and part of the 4rth Armored division, were never engaged in battle until they were sucked up in the desperate retreat which nullified their fighting capability completely."
Ultimately the disaster was not the fault of Murtagi or Gamasy. Both had been misled until it was too late. If only the official Egyptian reports had given accurate information, the Sinai Front Command could've acted in time to put the above plan into effect. Had Murtagi and his Chief of Staff known the Egyptian Air Force was wrecked immediately after it was--no later than noon on the first day of the war, June 5th--they could've ordered the retreat to the Central Ridge before the communication system failed. The bulk of Egypt's fighting power could've established a strong defense, repelled the Israelis and possibly retaken some lost ground.
Properly informed from the start, Murtagi would've almost certainly told his troops to fall back. Without MIG-21s to provide air cover (a SAM defense for ground troops didn't yet exist) it would've been pointless to maintain large forces in eastern Sinai. Israeli jets could shred their logistical tether. Prodded by Gamasy, Murtagi would've issued timely instructions, and the catastrophe would've been avoided.

Gamasy (left) in 1973, several years after the Six Day War.