Murtagi's Role 1967
During the crisis which preceded the 1967 Mideast war, Egypt's Vice President Amer created a special command for one of his country's ablest officers, General Murtagi. After distinguishing himself in the Yemen war, Murtagi was to head a Sinai Front Command. There is no doubt he was, in fact, commander of Egyptian forces in Sinai, despite some confusion over the matter.
In his Third Arab Israeli War, O'Ballance makes it clear that Murtagi was the one giving orders:page 133: "It was about noon that General Murtagi realized the Egyptian air force had been virtually destroyed, and he ordered his troops to fall back on the second line of defense."
page 139 "...General Murtagi had given orders for all Egyptian troops to withdraw to the third line of defense, which rested on the Central Ridge...."
page 142: " ...General Murtagi had ordered two distinct counterattacks in which one armored brigade was to move against Rafah and the other was to assault the Sharon ugda..."
Despite proof of Murtagi being in charge, Pollack included a claim to the contrary. On page 83 of Arabs at War, he stated that Murtagi was "not in the loop at all." Based on what Gamasy told him, Pollack concluded that Murtagi's command was "completely bypassed during the war." Since Gamasy was Murtagi's Chief of Staff, he seemed a reliable source. Unfortunately Gamasy was far from truthful, and this marred Arabs at War.
Pollack's information is contradictory and absurd. On page 595 of his book, he indicates Amer created a special position for Murtagi to benefit from his expertise as a commander. What was the use of creating this command if Murtagi was to be "completely bypassed during the war"?
The contradiction stemmed from false information. Gamasy lied to Pollack.
As O'Ballance makes clear, Murtagi issued the order to retreat. This order resulted in disaster. By the second day, when units were told to fall back, the Egyptian communication system had broken down. Many units did not receive the order. Without guidance from higher command they just disintegrated. Commanders abandoned their men. The retreat became a rout. It was the greatest humiliation in modern Egyptian history.
As Murtagi's Chief of Staff, Gamasy bore much responsibility for the decisions made, and the catastrophe. Not surprisingly, he tried to evade responsibility. He denied the Sinai Front Command was making the decisions. Amer and Muhsin were running the war. Divisional commanders supposedly reported to them. He and Murtagi were "bypassed." Gamasy was so desperate to disassociate himself from the withdrawal he even claimed he knew nothing of it until he saw Egyptian forces streaming westward.
In fact, the initiative for the order came from Gamasy. His lies were obviously intended to conceal this, and service records provide additional evidence. Murtagi was more inclined to attack than retreat. Twice in 1964, he had launched offensives in Yemen. The failure of the first, in June 1964, did not deter him from attacking again, in December. The counterattacks in Sinai (page 142 above) also reflect his offensive attitude. In light of that, the fallback order almost certainly resulted from pressure from his Chief of Staff. Gamasy was behind the retreat. Since it ended so disastrously, he was determined at all costs to hide his role in the decision.
It was said that arab politics "shocked Gamasy to his bones." His own lack of veracity should shock us. Gamasy's evasion of responsibility is typical of arabs, who are notorious for lying to avoid criticism. Such cowardice was not really necessary however.
On page 165 of his work, O'Ballance stated:
"On the second day, General Murtagi realized the Egyptian Air Force had been knocked out, and his lengthy lines of communication were completely exposed, so he gave the order to withdraw from the first line of defense. It is thought he intended the other intermediate positions--El Arish, Jiradi, Bir Lafhan and Jebel Libni--to be delaying ones, and that he planned to stand firm regardless of the air situation along the Central Ridge and counterattack into central Sinai from there. This was a sound strategy which might have worked had he been able to put it into practice, but on the second day the Egyptian communication system broke down. All Egyptian units forward of the Central Ridge were left without positive orders from the GOC (i.e. Murtagi) from the evening of the second day onwards. The fog of war......Many formations, such as Shazli force, the 6th Infantry and part of the 4rth Armored division, were never engaged in battle until they were sucked up in the desperate retreat which nullified their fighting capability completely."
Ultimately the disaster was not the fault of Murtagi or Gamasy. Both had been misled until it was too late. If only the official Egyptian reports had given accurate information, the Sinai Front Command could've acted in time to put the above plan into effect. Had Murtagi and his Chief of Staff known the Egyptian Air Force was wrecked immediately after it was--no later than noon on the first day of the war, June 5th--they could've ordered the retreat to the Central Ridge before the communication system failed. The bulk of Egypt's fighting power could've established a strong defense, repelled the Israelis and possibly retaken some lost ground.
Properly informed from the start, Murtagi would've almost certainly told his troops to fall back. Without MIG-21s to provide air cover (a SAM defense for ground troops didn't yet exist) it would've been pointless to maintain large forces in eastern Sinai. Israeli jets could shred their logistical tether. Prodded by Gamasy, Murtagi would've issued timely instructions, and the catastrophe would've been avoided.
posted by starman at 3:21 AM
78 Comments:
Sometimes military higher ups want to scapegoat particular officers. Gamasy and Murtagi did not deserve any punishment, since they were not at fault. The fighting in the Sinai was an extreme disaster for Egypt. The loss of most of the MIGs very much added to it.
As far as I know, Murtagi never served in any capacity after the 1967 disaster. According to O'Ballance, he was among those dumped for suggesting Nasser resign. Gamasy did continue in the military. He was Chief of operations in the 1973 war and represented Egypt in the negotiations at Kilometer 101 immediately after the cease fire. Later Gamasy became a Field Marshal. He long defended his boss, the blundering Sadat, until finally denouncing him as a traitor.
It seems to me, just from what I read here, that if there is anyone to blame, it was the breakdown of the Egyptian communications system. Who was at fault for that?
I don't know what caused the breakdown of the communications system or who was to blame for that. But it was still working on the first day of the war. Those behind official reports deserve most of the blame. They concealed the destruction of Egypt's air force. Had Murtagi and Gamasy known about that right after it happened, on June 5th, they would've issued instructions to withdraw while the instructions could still get through.
Of course Gamasy was to blame for a different problem--confusion over Murtagi's role. Determined it seems, to avoid any responsibility for the withdrawal order--long blamed by Egypt for the catastrophe--Gamasy foolishly denied Murtagi was in command. As Murtagi's Chief of Staff, much responsibility would've been placed on him, and rightly so. But Gamasy was cowardly as neither he nor Murtagi were really at fault.
(December 10) I just edited the post--what else is new. :) I needed to cite more evidence that Gamasy was behind the withdrawal order of June 6, so I mentioned Murtagi's offensives in Yemen. Murtagi was a gung ho type, more inclined to attack than pull back, and not easily daunted. Ergo Gamasy must've pressured him to withdraw.
it seems to me that Gamasy was cowardly only in the face of public (or official?) opinion, it would have been more respectable for him to have told the whole truth even if the public or the Egyptian gov't would have resisted it and continued to blame (scapegoat?) him?
I agree. Gamasy should've been truthful. But it would've taken a lot of courage. I remember back in September 1971, when an Egyptian SAM crew shot down an Israeli ELINT (electronic intelligence) craft near the canal, the Egyptian officer who rewarded the SAM crew insisted that "Egyptian troops had always distinguished themselves on the battlefield." The rout of 1967, he insisted, was due to "the mistaken order to retreat. The order to advance should have been given."
And that was the official Egyptian line for years. Had Gamasy been openly identified as the officer behind the retreat order, it would've meant the end of his career. Maybe worse. Even if he could defend his actions, it might've availed little, for Nasser (and Egypt) needed a scapegoat. Amer was the one, but Gamasy could've gotten it too.
In his 2003 ARABS AT WAR, Pollack refuted the myth about the retreat order being the cause of disaster. But it must've persisted in Egypt for many years. Gamasy lied to Pollack as late as 1997. Even three decades after the war, the retreat order had such a stigma attached to it Gamasy appeared determined to falsify history to avoid any association with it. That was the key to saving his career and his reputation.
I haven't written any letters to the editor in a long time. Not since 1992, I think. Around then I concluded it was too early to try to "sell" my ideas. People were nowhere near ready to accept notions antithetical to current values. As I wrote a penpal at the time, "I'm not making converts, I'm only making enemies." As you may recall from reading my book, I now think the great transition (to wholism) won't occur until the second half of this century.
I thought you might have a better chance because, in contrast to my positions, plenty of people are antagonistic toward the rich. You mentioned the Times essentially "muzzling" you, but I've seen lots of political cartoons and editorials attacking the wealthy. I doubt many people would want to live in Alaska, and don't know who would pay for aquaducts in Australia. I'd prefer steps toward greater unity globally instead of splitting countries but some near future splitting may be inevitable..
It is impressive to me that the conclusion I am reaching is that we need BOTH simultaneously--greater global unity as well as stronger nationalism and "great regionalism" (by which I mean a ten-polar world order, with these ten poles being the mostly familiar groupings such as Latin America and the Islamic world. This multipolar order has to be built up through friendship and cooperation between the great regions, which is what will bring about the greater global unity. What I foresee as bringing about this international interregional friendship is their common struggle to overthrow the world's rich and powerful. Competition between nations and regions is fine and can help motivate progress as long as it's based in overall commitment to global equality and the success and well-being of all members, just as the siblings in a family are often rivals but the bonds that hold the family together are stronger. It is imperative to fight for equality among regions as well as the more immediately obvious need to overcome inequality between individuals. I must point this out because it is such a terrific contrast with the neoliberal "free trade" regime that the current conservative regimes of the world are imposing on us, which tend towards a particularly nasty international division of labor, wherein each region winds up doing what it is best at, which will consign Africa, for example, forever to supplying raw materials for the world's manufacturing nations like China and Southeast Asia while the US "advances" into a postindustrial future of professional services, which is actually a terrible retrogression. Each country and I would say each individual ideally should hold a variety of jobs ranging from farming and mining to mfg to professions and the arts.
That is the only way to the true equality of all peoples--not a sort of equality that might be achieved simply by transfer payments to Africa to compensate them for their less advanced industrial status.
It's true that papers do publish the occasional cartoon or op-ed or yes even editorial mentioning taxing the rich and corporations but they just never go into it with the depth that is needed. It's left at a flash-thought level of grabbing some cash from the rich instead of a thorough examination of why this is both FAIR and NECESSARY. That would take thousands of words, and they will not publish such long pieces unless you are a recognized authority. I realize that that is a different rationale than my supposition that they won't print it because it is opposed to their own interests. So I suppose there are several reasons why I cannot get published in the corporate media; but my experience certainly has been in total that I just can't, so posting my fliers on the street is all that's left for me and it would be sufficient if it could provoke the masses to action somehow...I'm not giving up on it!
As you know, I've written about a machine takeover in the workplace, which may overshadow concerns about division of labor. There may be few jobs of any kind to worry about.
Newspapers frequently publish articles by Robert Reich, who's no friend of the rich (At least THE HARTFORD COURANT does). What do you think of his writings and those of Samuelson--Washington Post, I think?
If the economy is such that there are few jobs, then the gov't must give the people good things to do--otherwise they will turn to vice and waste their lives or turn to crime or war. In fact, there is already a great need for this, and the Gov't ought to pay people to pursue any worthwhile type of activity, such as studying all kinds of subjects including those that would not seem to have any practical application, all kinds of arts and crafts, travel, conversation people should be paid to talk to each other, maybe especially with those whom they disagree with.
But I don't recall how you concluded that the machines would take over the workplace. Today, automation is mostly driven by capitalists' drive for profit; a good gov't would slow down the pace of automation to match the needs of society and people.
Yeah, Reich is generally very good although he does argue for things like labor unions and worker-owned enterprises, which I dislike, for reasons I'd like to discuss if we get time. Samuelson, his father Paul was a good strong liberal in the 1960s, I appreciated; but his son Robert is a damned neoliberal IMO what do you think of him? I must admit I haven't seen his writings lately.
Another interesting comment you made was who would want to live in Alaska (I proposed letting 30 million Chinese immigrate), but I think it has huge appeal if heating oil or other energy source is cheap. The 21+-hour long summer days, the exciting 40 below zero winters, the tremendous taiga forests and grasslands, wildlife, Eskimo cultures, Denali, someday it will be arranged to enable out-of-shape ordinary people like me to climb up portions of the great mountain which will be an amazing experience even if softened to make it easier for us. Warm clothing with heating elements will help. Glaciers can be very exciting--ok, sometimes too exciting but I can imagine many possible solutions to the crevasses, etc.
If people are unemployed they won't have much money to indulge in vice. I've written how corporations will replace human workers with cheaper, more efficient machine labor but loss of jobs will wreck the capitalist market economy. (Government won't stop automation or slow it since its currently has limited control over private enterprise.) The government will then become the employer, taxing the corporations-essentially taking them over. Most people will be assigned to the military (although many might just do janitorial or other noncombat work). Remember my book?
I was impressed by a couple of Robert Samuelson's articles but I don't have them handy right now. What are your specific comments on him?
I don't think it would be a good idea to have many more millions live in a frigid area if they rely largely on heating oil. We need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not increase them. :) Also the natural beauty you mentioned would be largely ruined by new construction to accomodate 30 million new residents. The mountains, and taiga etc may give Alaska great appeal as a tourist destination, but few choose to live there. In fact I think Alaska has the highest rate of people leaving. I would; 40 below temps aren't for me. :)
I agree with your scenario on automation up to the point where you say that the gov't will give most people military jobs, well, of course I can see that in one way which is that without a revolution the same rotten system we have now will remain in place and get all involved in stupid wars, I believe that ISIS could spearhead an Islamic reawakening so we'll find ourselves at war with the 1.3 billion Muslims, although I must admit too that none of the Muslims interviewed by mainstream media express any resentment over the past US aggressions in Iraq or anything. Maybe they know that any such criticism would be met with enormous anti-Muslim hatred so they shut up about it. . . . And if we DO have a Revolution, then it could again be true that the new government would create opportunities for people to join the struggle for a better world, which will be a 2-pronged approach of military and peaceful work, each worker could choose his field, but the peaceful prong would not be mostly janitorial but educational or other various fields. Janitorial work would be okay if it paid well. I'm sorry to admit that there must be a lot of material in your book that I've forgotten, hopefully I can get back to it one of these days although nowadays I am busy thinking a lot about getting active again with fliers, etc.
Yeah, solar might be as cheap as hating oil within a few more years, the cost keeps coming down. Alaska's long summer days provide abundant solar, once the problem of storing it for 6 months is solved; also wind would be huge in Alaska. Alaska's great natural beauty should not be ruined by even huge immigration since 30 million people may need only 3,000 square miles to live very nicely out of Alaska's 500,000+. And what don't you like about 40 below if you had warm clothing?
ISIS is now heavily beset and in no shape to turn most muslims against us. Its appeal is mostly limited to sunni areas in Iraq and Syria. ISIS leaders have been trying to establish a new haven in Libya as coalition warplanes continue to pound the "caliphate." Politically, ISIS is just a bunch of amateurs. They're great at making enemies, and a total pariah internationally.
Even after automation, and wholism, many government or military jobs will be in the field of education. People will have to be indoctrinated. :)
Alaska may get a lot of sunlight in the summer but even then the sun isn't very high in the sky. So despite long days energy yield may not be very good. In any event summer is too brief. It's doubtful enough energy can be accumulated from late May to August to suffice for the other nine months.
Many people might live in Alaska but few want to. Many are leaving.
I have warm clothing but the cold still gets to my extremities. One morning about two years ago my fingers felt awful as they "thawed." And I had been wearing gloves, in temps nowhere near as cold as forty below. My Canadian Police Gloves are better but my fingers still get cold. I've been considering heated gloves.
So no specific comments on Samuelson's articles?
I will try to look up some Samuelson articles, I just haven't run across any in the last few years--is it possible that the LA Times is muzzling him too?????
They should have shoes and gloves that have heating elements in them to protect your extremities.
I guess you are right about ISIS's international repute but I haven't seen any polls about what the masses of Arabs and Muslims in places like India and Pakistan feel about them. But one thing to consider is that even while ISIS is hated, the West may be hated even more by the masses in many places. One thing I read recently was that if US troops should show up in Iraq, local Shiite militia supposedly on the Gov't's side, would fight those US troops before attacking ISIS. But I only read this in one place so am waiting for confirmation from other stories.
Yikes, yes, indoctrinated, what is the difference between that and education, ...
Now you see, the fact that the sun is low in Alaska's sky just means that the solar panels have to be tilted relative to the ground in order to be perpendicular to get full advantage of the solar input.
I hadn't heard of mas flight from Alaska but even if so, I suspect that the problem is due to a lack of investment to build up the infrastructure and housing that would make it a much more attractive and pleasant place to live. That investment doesn't get made under capitalism because it is not profitable, it is HUMANISTIC instead of economical, so good government would make it.
But my face is red I goofed because I said 30 million Chinese could fit into 3,000 sq mi forgetting about the area they'd need to FARM, which might be 50,000 sq mi HOWEVER that also is just a guess, I would need some research to back it up but if so, it still would only be a tenth of Alaska's area.
If you can't find Samuelson articles I'll find a couple myself. I think I saved two from publications and they're somewhere around here.
I'd be a bit surprised if Shiite forces fight US ground troops. Recent government or Shiite gains at Ramadi owe much to US airstrikes. Pro-Iranian militiamen may oppose US influence. But they're dependent on US jets and drones. Isn't it strange btw that the US, egged on by Israel and its supporters, has been generally anti-Iran, yet is helping its allies in Iraq? Every Shiite gain against ISIS is a gain for Tehran's influence.
Even if solar panels directly face the sun, a low position in the sky reduces the solar energy received--why winter is colder. I don't think Alaska is a great place to invest in panels. They'd accomplish more at lower latitudes.
Fifty thousand square miles may be a tenth of Alaska's area, but farming it would mean clearing forests and reducing habitat for wildlife.
I just relocated a report on one of Samuelson's articles for the Washington Post. Entitled "Who really controls Washington" it appeared in condensed form in THE WEEK some time ago. I liked it but you probably won't. I reproduce much of it here:
The conventional wisdom is that Washington is controlled by corporations and the rich, said Robert Samuelson. But federal spending proves that this wisdom is wrong. Over the past three decades, annual spending on the top 10 federal programs for the poor and near-poor--such as Medicaid, food stamps,and Pell Grants--soared from $126 billion (in inflation adjusted 2011 dollars) to $626 billion.....Programs that transfer wealth to the middle class are even more massive, with Social Security consuming $725 billion last year and Medicare $560 billion. All told, Uncle Sam spends nearly $2.1 trillion on social programs--60 percent of all federal spending.That's not ignoring "the will of the people to favor the rich." I fact, "the real Washington is in the business of pleasing as many people as possible," which is why our budget deficit has ballooned out of control and our tax code is such a mess. Fixing what wrong would require simple common sense and some shared sacrifice. Sadly our system rewards both parties for taking "the path of least resistance."
By that last remark, the author means elected officials must do what's popular regardless of the ruinous effects. To maintain his influence, Samuelson can't say what I've been saying for many years--the fundamental problem is democracy. Real solutions require sacrifice and that's usually too unpopular to be possible in a democracy however essential it may be.
I just discovered I already posted on Samuelson's article, in his blog, back in October 2012--"Who Really Controls the US?"
Correction I meant I posted on Samuelson in THIS blog, a few years ago.
Thanks, I'm reading your blog of Oct 2012, plus I got Samuelson's book, The Great Inflation and Its Aftermath, and will respond when I get time in a few days
Israeli intelligence had the information necessary to win that war even before it started. Some dummy Egyptian planes were on the ground. The Egyptians put those dummies there in an effort to distract the Israeli pilots. The Israeli bombers flew past the dummies and did not drop any bombs on them. If it had not been destroyed, the Egyptian Air Force could have provided support for the ground troops, which would have made a difference.
Great to see you back Neal, with an on-topic post. :)
For the most part, what you wrote was true. Israeli jets left the dummy planes untouched. If I remember correctly, before the war, Russian advisors said Egypt's dummies were unconvincing.
There was an exception, however. One Israeli admitted that at Abu Suweir, Israeli jets hit some dummies as well as all of the actual aircraft. But dummies were indeed mostly ignored.
I tend to doubt the Egyptian Air Force would've made much of a difference had it not been destroyed at the outset. The Israelis were more skilled at dogfighting, and their Mirages had two 30mm guns whereas Egyptian MIG-21s had a single 23mm cannon. One MIG-21 variant had no gun at all, just Atoll missiles with a 15% chance of hitting the target.
Had the EAF not been demolished at the start, the result probably would've been similar to that of the 1982 Lebanon war. Syrian MIG-21s and MIG-23s were mowed down by Israeli F-15s and F-16s. By keeping the Israeli jets preoccupied in the air however, they limited its ability to provide close air support i.e. bomb and strafe Syrian ground forces. To an extent the EAF might've achieved the same thing, even if it scored few kills.
There was a difference, however. Syrian bases were much closer to the Bekaa than most Egyptian bases were to eastern or central Sinai. It would've been difficult for the EAF to provide any degree of air cover in those areas, far from the Delta and its key bases.
The MIG was not an invincible plane. I have read that a few of the MIGs in the 1967 war were flown by Russian pilots. However, Israeli pilots are as good as Russian aviators. I know that some MIGs in the Korean War were flown by Russian pilots. The American Air Force had more difficulty fighting against the Russian pilots than they did against the North Korean fliers.
Yes Neal, Soviet MIGs were far from invincible. Many hundreds were downed or destroyed in battle.
As far as I know, no Russian pilots fought in the '67 war, although some fought in 1970. Israeli pilots were as good or better than Russians. During one engagement in the summer of 1970, Israeli jets ambushed and shot down five Soviet piloted MIGs.
Very interesting, on a topic I know nothing about but this question occurred to me, was the Israeli triumph in the summer of 1970 you referred to due more to the superiority of Israeli military personnel and training or to their use of Mirages vs MIGs?
I don't know what date your (Tim and Neal) above posts were on, so I just hope I'm not intruding in getting back to the discussion we were having earlier regarding the economist Robert Samuelson.
I have a lot to say having reread Tim's Oct. 2012 blog and Samuelson's 2008 book, but I don't have much time today so I hope I can get back to this next week.
First, I disagree with him in that since Reagan, the enormous tax cuts for the rich and corporations have yielded far more to the rich and corporations PER CAPITA and per corporate executive and major shareholder, than the programs helping the poor, working class, and middle class have given THEM, per capita.
Darn, my time's up for the day, see you next week!
Hi Roger. Hope you're doing fine. :)
By 1970, Israeli pilots had had far more experience than Russians in air combat. Essentially Russians had none since WWII. A new inexperienced generation was now flying. They were capable--no doubt more so than most arab pilots. But the Israelis used their experience to beat them. They had ambush tactics.
The Mirage was essentially as good a platform as the MIG-21, and better armed. As I wrote above, it had two 30mm guns whereas the MIG-21MF had just a single 23mm cannon. One MIG-21 variant had a 30mm gun but another, the MIG-21PF(?) had none, just Atoll missiles--much inferior to Israeli matras and shafrirs.
So, the Soviet setback mirrored inferior weapons and less experience, mainly the latter in this case.
Thanks, very interesting. By the way, one thing I used to notice was a similarity among the names of various nations' military aircraft, like the Phantom (US), Ilyushin (USSR?) and Mirage (French?) were those all fighter jets or what? How come you never hear of Ilyushins anymore, do you know?
Anyhow, do you still think that the poor and middle class have the most influence over the government like Samuelson? I would agree that the middle class still has some residual clout thanks to the great entitlement programs that were begun 50-80 years ago plus the high propensity of old folks to vote defensively to protect their Social Security but the poor--I would say the bottom third of the population-- are absolutely powerless. It probably is true, however, that Obamacare helps some of them although it was more intended to help the insurance companies; but their health care has always been assured mostly out of sheer compassion of the providers. It's good if these doctors and hospitals get paid for their work but they might wind up getting paid less under Obamacare than they were under Medicare and Medicaid, I'm not sure about that, we seem to get a big mix of stories. But when it comes to the needs of the broad middle class and working class, such as for more affordable housing, full employment and better-paying jobs, and decent benefits for those unable to work, the federal gov't has just abandoned them. Nothing. But the gov't sure hasn't abandoned the rich!!!!! What do you think?
Always good to see your comments, Roger. Yes the Ilyushin was Russian and the Mirage French built. The Phantom was primarily an attack aircraft while the Mirage was mainly an air superiority jet. Ilyushins were, I believe, entirely for attack missions. In WWII the IL-2 was named the "flying tank" by Germans that came under strafing or bombing attack by the well-armed plane.
Down to the sixties Egypt had the IL-28 bomber but it was replaced by the Tupelev TU-16.
Did you see Samuelson's latest article? He's skeptical that environmental accords will stop global warming. So am I--there's no real enforcement mechanism and sacrifices are too limited for political reasons. You know my take. It'll take an an authoritarian global regime.
The rich have plenty of money to influence politics but what matters most are votes. The middle class vastly outnumber the rich at the polls. If the rich had really had their way, there wouldn't be half as much social spending and it wouldn't have been necessary to relocate industries elsewhere.
Thanks, Tim! BTW is the Tupelev still in production or use? I rarely hear (read) anything about it,
I think you're right that it will take an authoritarian global regime to save the environment as well as to solve world poverty although I don't know if THAT is a priority of yours? I also agree I think that democracy is not the way to BUILD an empire or world government. But once the WG has established its authority and begun liberating humanity in Space, then democracy, like peace, freedom, a clean environment, prosperity and equality, can flower.
Gotta go now, more later
You're welcome Roger! I don't know if Tupelev jets are still in use. Back in 1973 Iraq had TU-22 bombers but wouldn't risk them in combat with Israel. The TU-22 was said to be the equivalent of the US F-4 Phantom.
I'm glad you agree an authoritarian World Government is needed to save the environment and democracy is no way to build it. But once authoritarianism is established, it should be maintained or the problems which necessitated it in the first place will recur. The WG will expand into space but that also requires authoritarianism. As I wrote only authoritarianism can ensure adequate sacrifice for space too--priority given to space vehicles not bubble gum and fast cars. :)
Of course there should be no poverty but it' hard to define what that is. People should live comfortable, safe and healthy lives and can, without all kinds of material possessions. Or political perogatives. :)
Oh btw Roger--and Neal, and everybody else--Happy New Year!
O yeah, happy New Year Tim, Neal and all and I think 2016 is going to be a great year but then I seem to think that every year (sigh) Which do you think will be worse, President Trump (or Cruz or Bush or Christie et al) or President Hillary? I wouldn't pay any attention to either of them--the only hope for America is if we can make the Revolution!
I think I am looking a little farther into the future than you are, Tim, or maybe it is more like history shows that empires don't last forever and I actually think that's a good thing, in 1991 it was time for the USSR to go (its leadership was tired and disillusioned, I love Gorby but he had little left to do in his own vision, I think) despite the efforts of the coup plotters to save it; maybe what I should say is that by AD 2200, with humanity well diffused throughout the enormous Solar System and universal prosperity, most people will be satisfied and too content to do the hard work heavy lifting needed to maintain let alone expand the very regime that will have so uplifted and liberated them . . . but if it so happens that someone like yourself gets into power then and still seeks to grow the State, you might well be able to do it but maybe only through your own lifetime.
I don't know if Trump really has a good chance. He's not popular outside the republican party. There's probably at least a 50% chance 2017 will witness our first woman President, so soon after our first black President.
IMO past empires crumbled because they were flawed in various ways--not enough of a scientific and technological basis for a great ideology and State. And/or they were just not strong or wealthy enough relative to opponents. I envisage a future truly Global Empire or World Government, with scientific and technological knowledge vastly exceeding that of its predecessors. THAT Empire could last forever or FAR longer than any that came before.
By 2200 CE humanity may have spread throughout the solar system and beyond, but humanity itself will be transformed--probably into genetically engineered beings or androids. And the prevailing Worldview will be far different from that of today.
Maybe since we're getting way off topic on both threads, we can continue this on the latest one. :)
okay, I'll go there now
January 18, 2016: Yesterday I discovered the need for a slight correction. Amer was not Egypt's War Minister in 1967. Shamas Badran was. Amer was first Vice President.
Btw I'm now reading RUSSIA AND THE ARABS by Primakov. What an interesting read. The book makes it clear that Israel knew Nasser had no intention of starting a war in 1967, that mass demonstrations demanding that Nasser stay (after his resignation June 8, 1967) were spontaneous not orchestrated, and the Mossad was behind the defection of a Syrian pilot with his MIG-23 in 1989 (just as it was behind the defection of an Iraqi pilot with his MIG-21 in 1966).
Yikes I must admit I'm not knowledgeable about what led up to the 1967 war, I thought I just remembered that Nasser ordered the UN peacekeepers out of the area? Why would he have done that unless he was planning to start a war?
Who is this Primakov, the name rings a bell but it is probably another person with the same last name, the Primakov I'm thinking of was a good guy in the Soviet era like Sakharov. And that reminds me I was wrong I just assumed that Robert Samuelson was the son of Paul; I read since that they are unrelated.
It will be very interesting to see how Russia deals with the Arabs but so far I am not impressed with Putin--he should not be fighting ISIS but maybe he just says he is fighting them because he needs friendly relations with the West, or maybe it is just part of his effort to save Assad's regime. I guess he is helping to arrange talks which should start soon, so we'll see. But of course there is a whole lot more going on in the Arab world. It is perhaps unfortunate that Russia is too weak economically to help the Arabs much, but they could still help them a lot militarily and diplomatically. But does Primakov have anything to say about current events and the future?
Sensing a threat to his leadership of the arab world, Nasser precipitated a crisis to get the other arabs to rally around him. Getting rid of UN peacekeepers was essential to maximize the impression of a crisis. Btw have you seen my blog post "Best Egyptian Strategy 1967"? Lack of prior planning and preparation cost the Egyptians dearly.
Yevgeny Primakov was a Soviet foreign affairs official. RUSSIA AND THE ARABS was published in 2009 so it's not up to date. Still, it provides an interesting, fresh perspective at the history of the region.
Sure, Putin's jets strike ISIS at least occasionally to help Assad's regime. The latest news suggests the effort is bearing fruit, but things can be unpredictable.
A slight correction: "Still, it provides an interesting, fresh perspective ON the history of the region." One thing I don't like is the inability to edit comments, though I can,and often do, edit posts.
It seems Primakov erred by considering Amer the actual commander of Egyptian forces in '67. He didn't mention Murtagi at all. Nor did he mention the Soviet claim about Egypt's tanks (discussed at length in 2012 posts).
What I no is that what brought the communication system down is because those who are working there are not Serious about the work. I just put the balm on those two people which is Murtagi and Gamasy for not putting proper measures concerning the wall.
Failure of the communication system was likely due to lack of sufficient practice and or technical skill during a period of wartime stress.
Great article Starman! I will reply back to you shortly soon. Need to get a good cup of coffee to let all of this sink in.
Adham
Great to see you here Adham! I look forward to your comments.
April 2, 2016
Did you try to get in touch with the 73Historians group regarding this article? Your analysis can result quite a shock wave as the masses in Egypt believe that Amer was behind the retreat order-going with Gamasy's story.
Regarding Pollack's contradictions is it possible for Murtagi to have been bypassed even with his "special position"? Communications broke down and as we all know it was a total disaster so Murtagi's bypass is quite possible. The only thing that contradicts that is other book's statements of Murtagi issuing orders at certain dates.
If Gamasy was the one who ordered the retreat Murtagi could have easily pointed his finger at him at the conclusion of the war.
No I didn't contact the 73Historians about this. I've heard of them but don't have contact info. It's easy to blame Amer because he was eliminated from power after the war. Gamasy, who kept out of politics, lasted much longer.
I guess everybody was "bypassed" when communications broke down. O'Ballance, though, clearly indicates Murtagi was issuing orders, even if they failed to get through to many units after the first day.
I didn't say Gamasy ordered the retreat. He was Murtagi's chief of staff and therefore subordinate to him. As Sinai Front Commander Murtagi bore ultimate responsibility for the decision. I believe Gamasy PERSUADED Murtagi to order the withdrawal. It was his idea but Murtagi's decision, so he couldn't blame Gamasy. Since the retreat resulted in disaster Gamasy obviously didn't want to be associated with it in any way. Hence the "bypassed" story.
Well when I said Gamasy ordered the retreat I meant that he relayed the order to Murtagi who carried it out. But yes, the persuasion point does make a lot of sense. If my memory doesnt fail me Pollack stated that there was absolutely nothing the Egyptians could have done but retreat as any resistance even if it lasted for a while would eventually be destroyed by the IAF or basically surrounded and ravaged...higher IDF casualties but the outcome remains the same. Again, that's if my memory doesnt fail me; wouldnt that make Gamasy's persuasion basically "valid" so to say but how it got carried out (downfall of comm. + possible Murtagi's mistakes from his side when issuing the order) have led to that disastrous outcome?
If Gamasy had merely relayed an order from Amer to Murtagi, why didn't he just blame Amer for it and its consequences? Why say he and Murtagi were "bypassed" which makes so little sense?
Pollack said the Egyptians had to retreat but claimed the way the retreat was carried out was disgraceful. It was not properly planned, or organized, so it became a disorganized rout. But how could the Sinai Front Command, or anybody, have supervised the retreat if the communication system wasn't functioning?
Gamasy and Murtagi basically did the right thing, except that, as I posted above, they waited too long because they were misled. If only they knew the EAF was wrecked right away, or no later than noon on the 5th, they could've ordered the 4rth Armored division, the Shazly force and other units to establish a good defense along the Central Ridge, BEFORE the communication system quit on them. The real blame should go to those who misled them about the fate of the EAF.
We need to see how the communications broke down , where did the first domino piece fall, perhaps then we would be able to solve the puzzle. So what was Amer's role if he had any in 67 if the SCF was the one in "control" of the show?
But Could the Shazly Force and 4th armored maintained a good defense with the lack of Air support and perhaps almost no anti air as well? They would be attrition ed down by the IAF before sending the main ground assault force to wipe out the defenders.
I don't know how it broke down. And even the best functioning system is of no use if it's used as a tool for propaganda instead of disseminating vital intelligence. Technically, comunications were OK on the first day, but the Sinai Front Command was not informed of the true situation of the EAF.
Pollack said Amer wavered between inattention and attempting to micromanage operations. O'Ballance definitely gave the impression Murtagi was truly in command.
The 4rth Armored Division, Shazly force and 6th mechanized perhaps, could've formed a strong defense along the Central Ridge (perhaps more properly called the western ridge as I assume the term refers to the line of the passes). As I posted, the SFC attempted to order this but everything went awry. Had Gamasy and Murtagi known the EAF was eliminated by say noon on the 5th, so they had no air cover, they would've ordered the withdrawal that day. It would've been possible to redeploy in an orderly fashion as the communications system was still OK. Once the armor, troops and artillery were deployed and concealed within the passes, Israeli air superiority would've been less effective. I presume that's why Murtagi envisaged a stand along the Central Ridge, "regardless of the air situation."
April 7, 2016
July 20, 2016 Update
I just got RECONSTRUCTING A SHATTERED EGYPTIAN ARMY. Some information on page 40 may go a long way toward explaining the breakdown in Egyptian communications. More at a latter time and in a newer thread.
LONG TIME NO SEE!!! Lots of drama on my side and unfortunately the lost tribes of Egypt are...most likely lost forever :(
Anyways I am looking forward to read your new thread, unless you posted it somewhere already lol.
By the way, if Gamasy was the one behind the order. Why didnt Amer deny issuing the retreat and face the full brunt of its responsibility?
The lost tribes of Egypt are lost forever? No more gomig, qweasd or the crocodile? :(
I haven't posted anything new on this, but Fawsi's memoirs, in RECONSTRUCTING A SHATTERED EGYPTIAN ARMY, mention something about communications units not even entering Sinai with the army(??!). It seems communications were pretty deficient to start with...I may consult the book and comment more on that if you like.
Did Amer admit to issuing the retreat order? I'd be surprised if he did admit it, although of course a well known version of events says he did issue the order.
According to Fawsi's memoirs, an MP handed Murtagi the retreat order. He asked who issued it and was told "The Field Marshall" (Amer). Murtagi then left immediately. But his chief of staff, Gamasy, told Pollack the Sinai Front Command had no idea a retreat had been ordered until they saw Egyptian forces streaming westward. I just can't believe Amer would create the Sinai Front Command if it was really "out of the loop" and had no authority. It must have had authority, so, as O'Ballance wrote, Murtagi was issuing the orders, including those to fall back. And I strongly suspect Gamasy talked Murtagi into issuing those orders. Gamasy had good reasons but the outcome was ruinous and he didn't want the responsibility. His version, told to Pollack, makes him appear desperate to avoid it.
In his memoirs, Fawsi was very critical of Amer. It's not surprising, therefore, that Fawsi blamed Amer for the retreat order. Indeed he was stripped of his power and killed himself. The official Egyptian line--that Amer issued the order--must have reflected his fall from power and influence after the '67 war. It wasn't necessarily true, however. I think the Sinai Front Command was behind the retreat, and specifically Gamasy.
October 4, 2016
I will definitely try to get the 73 Historians to get in touch with you because do you know the size of the shock wave if Gamasy was actually behind the retreat order? This leaves other questions, what was Amer's role in this bloody mess? Plus how does the version of events mentioned in Fawsi's memorirs fit in all of this? How did he get to know that Amer handed down the order to Murtagi? Why wasn't it passed to Gamasy? I still believe if Amer wasnt behind it he wouldnt have accepted to carry its weight, thats the last thing he needs; more responsibility.
Hi again,
I suppose it would be quite a shock if Gamasy was behind the retreat order. I suspect he talked Murtagi into issuing it, but Murtagi had the actual authority. Murtagi must have been giving orders, since I don't believe the Sinai Front Command would've been created if it had no command authority. But Amer, as Defense Minister, bore ultimate responsibility. Does "accepted to carry its weight" mean he personally issued the order, or just accepted responsibility? Of course, the official version, echoed by Fawzi, says Amer ordered the retreat. But that may just be an attempt to lay blame on someone who was disgraced and died after the war. I assume Amer's role, as officially recorded, was completely clouded by his fall. Amer was no general; that's why he created the Sinai Front Command, to let an experienced, real soldier run the war. I think he just went along with the SFC, and essentially did nothing.
October 7, 2016
I forgot to answer something: Murtagi was the head of the Sinai Front Command and Gamasy was just his chief of staff. If Amer really issued the order, it would've been given to Murtagi (not Gamasy). That's what Fawzi wrote, but I think it's a reflection of the official line not a real historical event. I think during the second day of the war, Gamasy persuaded Murtagi to order the troops to fall back. Meanwhile Amer was either doing nothing or just rubber stamping Murtagi's orders.
October 7, 2016
Lets say they managed to get out the orders on the first day before communications fell. Would the Egyptian forces be able to stop the IDF advance at the ridge? Taking in consideration the IAF ravaging their logistic tethers? Would IDF's tactical competence be somehow nullified then?
I think there was an excellent chance Egyptian forces could've stopped the IDF advance at the ridge. Egypt's best unit, the 4rth armored division, was already in the Gafgafa or Khatmia pass. Shazli's armored force could've fallen back to the Mitla and established a defensive position along its eastern entrance. Likewise, 6th mechanized and 3rd infantry might've strengthened ridge defenses, in the Gidi or Khatmia areas.
There was one problem, though. The 7th infantry division was quickly overwhelmed in northeast Sinai, and there were few if any forces positioned behind it to defend the coastal road all the way to Qantara. The Egyptians, therefore, should've ordered some unit, maybe 6th mechanized, to pass through the Giddi or Khatmia and establish a defense along the coast road somewhere east of Qantara, to prevent the Israelis from flanking the whole ridge position from the north. (Remnants of the EAF btw should've given priority to strafing Israeli vehicles advancing west along the coast road after the fall of El Arish, to slow them down as much as possible, and thus grant the Egyptians more time to send a blocking force east of Qantara.)
Pollack wrote that fortifying and defending the line of the passes would've been Egypt's best military option, but it was "politically inconceivable." I agree they couldn't have made it the policy before the war. Most Egyptians didn't know how strong Israel was and expected the nation to defend all its territory. But during the war, after 7th and 2nd Infantry were overrun in frontier positions, Nasser could've said he had done his best to defend eastern Sinai and had not let any of Egypt's territory fall into Israeli hands without a fight. Under those, circumstances, a defense based on the ridge would've been acceptable.
Assuming the Egyptian 6th, 3rd and Shazi divisions could've repositioned themselves along the ridge by the morning of the 6th, IAF strafing shouldn't have been a major problem. I don't think the IAF operated after dark then, when the Egyptian mobile units would've traveled most of the distance back westward (i.e. during the night of June 5-6). Also, according to Pollack, even after the EAF was broken on the morning of the 5th, the IAF concentrated on attacking Egyptian infrastructure in the canal zone and then worked its way eastward. For the time being the Egyptian army in Sinai wasn't heavily targeted.
Now as for IDF tactical proficiency, that resulted mainly from mobility--the tendency to outflank Arab positions. But that would not have been possible had Egyptian forces been deployed in the passes. There was impassable mountain terrain on either side. The Israelis would've had to launch frontal attacks and, had great numbers of Egyptian tanks and guns been deployed to face them, that would've been too costly.
Always great to see your comments, and hope I've answered them. Fell free to comment more anytime on this thread or any other. :)
October 10, 2016
Correct me if I am wrong but after they sent out the order to retreat, it wasnt retreat to the ridge but retreat to the other side of the canal right?
From what I've read, in THE THIRD ARAB ISRAEL WAR by O'Ballance, Murtagi ordered a retreat to the third line of defense, the line of the passes, on the 6th. I think that lack of guidance from higher authority, following the failure of communications, caused many units to disintegrate and just flee all the way back, across the canal. A retreat turned into a panicky rout.
October 10, 2016
Here is another question. What on Earth was the Sinai Command Front doing when they received reports that Israel is about to attack them and why wasnt the Egyptian forces especially the EAF prepared? Why were the fighters and planes left outside on the runways in an extreme act of carelessness? Shouldnt the SCF answer these Qs?
The Egyptians knew an attack was coming, and they knew the EAF would be targeted at the start of hostilities. But they didn't know exactly when the IAF would strike, nor from what direction. Israeli planes flew far out over the Mediterranean and then approached and struck Egyptian airfields from the WEST--an unexpected direction. The timing was also a surprise. According to what I read, in THE SIX DAY WAR by the Churchill brothers, the Egyptians were most alert at dawn, since that is when attacks were usually launched. By 8:40 AM or so, after no attack had yet come, the Egyptian alert had passed its peak. They had switched off some radars, and the early morning fighter patrol had landed. In addition, since EAF commanders didn't reach their offices until 9 AM, striking 15 minutes earlier caught them in transit--neither at home anymore nor at their base offices yet. While in transit they had no access to phones and could neither hear reports nor issue orders. Therefore, by attacking around 8:45 Egyptian time, the Israelis hit the EAF when it was most vulnerable. It was relatively unalert and had no commanders to issue orders that might've mitigated the damage.
I once read the Egyptians were relying on Jordanian radar for early warning of an Israeli attack. But if I remember correctly there was a change in command and the new commander didn't understand the code word for an imminent attack(!)
The EAF might not have survived even if it had been alert. In 1967, Egyptian jets had no shelters of the kind built after the war. They were exposed to strafing. And jet turnaround time was far slower than that of the IAF. Israeli jets, it was claimed, could be rearmed and refueled in just seven and a half minutes, whereas Egyptians took two hours to do the same.
By the way, I don't think the Sinai Front Command had direct control of the EAF.
As for Egyptian GROUND forces, which the SFC (I believe) DID control, they were about as ready as possible, under the circumstances. Nasser had ordered a forward defense of the Sinai, which of course was much harder than a defense based on the ridge. The 2nd and 7th infantry divisions had plenty of artillery, tanks and antitank guns in their frontier positions. But the Israelis outflanked those positions and crushed them. It wasn't the fault of the SFC or Murtagi that much of their forces had to fight under unfavorable circumstances--far from supply lines and vulnerable to enemy manuever.
I wrote elsewhere that 7th Infantry might've stopped the Israeli 7th armored brigade had it been deployed farther west, in the Jiradi pass near El Arish. But that would've gone against Nasser's order for a forward defense. So there wasn't much the SFC could do to ready Egyptian troops properly-- at least not before the war.
October 11, 2016
I doubt even if if the Jordanian officer knew it would have changed the outcome. What should the Egyptians have done in your opinion to avert the six day war disaster? I think one of it is giving Nasser the middle finger and not setting up a forward defense line.
Lol, right! :) Did you see an earlier post I wrote, in June 2012--Best Egyptian Strategy 1967? I think the proposed deployments would've given Egypt its best chance that year, although it could be argued that Egyptian forces needed more training and practice. Both US and Israeli intelligence assumed Cairo would not be ready for war until 1970.
Well, I cant see how training and practice would have changed anything if in the core of the Egyptian army junior officers are discouraged from taking initiative and thinking "out of the box" and have to be wait for orders for literally everything. Most likely the training would be just rehearsals over rehearsals without any increase in tactical value of the units participating.
Yeah, I read Pollack too. He considered intermediate level officers the achilles heel of arab forces. I'm not sure, though. From what I've read, about both the '67 and '73 wars, the worst problem was strategic (or political) leadership. Units were deployed too close to the frontier in '67, and most of the high ranking generals were selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime. As you're no doubt aware, I've repeatedly criticized Sadat's "leadership" in '73.
I agree that junior officers had serious limitations. But as Pollack noted, it was hard to rectify pathologies which often stemmed from the larger culture. They couldn't solve them directly but had to work around them. Better strategic leadership could've done a lot more in this regard. It wasn't just a matter of scripting operations, so lower officers didn't have to make command decisions. If in '67 high ranking officers had been allowed to deploy units along the central ridge, instead of along the frontier, it would not have been necessary for junior officers to take initiative. If their positions couldn't be outflanked like frontier positions, they could just stay where they were and fight like they were told. There would've been much less need to shift defense lines to meet attacks from another direction. The Israelis could only have attacked from the front. Look at the fighting in the Jiradi for example. There was no way to outflank Egyptian positions in the pass, so the 7th armored had no choice but to attack head on. The problem was, very few Egyptian units were deployed in such favorable terrain.... This wasn't the fault of junior officers but higher ranking ones. Or rather, THEIR bosses. The political leadership was mostly to blame, in both wars.
Oh by the way, any comments on the June 2012 post--Best Egyptian Strategy 1967?
October 12, 2016
I read it quickly today and I really liked your plans. I will reply here and there soon.
OK look forward to further comments. :)
October 14, 2016
I agree with your comment on the 11th of October but there is one thing that confuses me. I remember reading that SCF didnt really expect the Israelis to be able to outflank their forward defense line but them not taking any precaution for a possible attempt confuses me. If they knew that the forward defense strategy is disastrous, then they should have tried to mitigate its flaws by anyway possible.
Actually, I dont really know what Egypt had in its arsenal of air defense other than Russian 50smm AA guns. I doubt they had the SA-2 then.
To an extent, the Egyptians relied on the terrain to prevent flanking attacks. There were sand dunes to the north of their position at Abu Agheila. The problem was, the dunes were not really impassable. The Israelis had trained to go up and down dunes. They were able to cross such terrain and attack Abu Agheila from the (northern) flank. Only in the Jiradi area was the terrain really impassable.
The Egyptians also had reserve forces to assist the frontline divisions. If I remember right the Shazli armored force was supposed to back up 2nd Infantry at Abu Agheila. Cairo's generals did what they could to establish a strong frontier defense, but the whole strategy was inherently flawed. Even if the terrain on the flanks were impassable, it would've been very hard to provide frontier troops with air cover.
As you know the forward defense strategy was a political decision, by Nasser. However ill-advised it was (just like the October 14, 1973 attack) the generals just had to obey and do their best under the circumstances.
Egypt did have SAM-2s in 1967. I think there were many at Cairo West. But they weren't of much use against low flying enemy planes. The attacking Israelis came in low.
October 15, 2016
Lets assume that the forward defense line wasnt flanked; how long do you suppose it would have lasted till it fell apart?
If the terrain to either side of the forward positions was really impassable, the Israelis would've had to attack frontally. If the actual fighting in the Jiradi is any guide, the defenders still wouldn't have lasted long. I'm not sure that the Jiradi is a good guide though. Relatively small Egyptian forces were in the pass. Had the bulk of 7th infantry been deployed in that area, it probably could've held back Tal's forces for several days at least.
In real life, the 7th was positioned along a broader area of front. It's hard to say how things would've gone had the IDF acted the way the Egyptians believed it would, and prepared for. The mass of Tal's armor probably could've broken through, but the 7th's artillery might've been a major problem. Tal planned his operation to avoid the 7th's guns. Had that been impossible, the Israelis might not have attacked there or called off an attack if losses started to mount. (Egyptian shelling was most accurate where attacks were anticipated.)
Farther south, it may have been the same at Abu Agheila. It's true that Sharon used heliborne commandos to knock out the Egyptian guns. Still, attacking entrenched forces frontally, or the flank guard to the south (initially avoided in real life) might've been prohibitive.
I think a probable outcome would've been the capture of most frontier positions, albeit at significantly higher cost. The key difference, I think, is that IDF losses in men and tanks would've impaired, perhaps even prohibited, further major advances into Sinai. Even if their forces were still adequate, sensitivity to casualties was a key factor.
October 17, 2016
Strange question because I know you would rather focus on the bigger picture which is a canvas of tactics and strategies but do you know what was the Egyptian's main light anti tank weapon other than russian RPG-43 and perhaps RKG-3? I heard that they used the RPG-2. There is a diary for an Egyptian soldier who was involved in the Ras El Esh battle during the six day war (ever heard of it?) who claimed in it that most of the specialized AT teams with him were RPG-2 operators and when the battle commenced they used small numbers of RPG-7s presumably the first batches Egypt ever received. Honestly need to read the diary but that is what I remember hearing about it.
Egyptians had the RPG-2 in '67; I have a wargame in which their infantry squads have it, in '67 scenarios. And yes, I have read about the battle of Ras El-Ush (that's the spelling I've seen). Anticipating that the Israelis would advance northward to take Port Fuad, Ismail deployed antitank guns and commandos to ambush them. But this was a few weeks after the six day war, on July 1, 1967 I think. Just like the sinking of Eilat a few months later, it was a much needed morale booster. :)
By the way, did you see the latest post, on the communication issue? Any comments on that?
October 20, 2016
I DIDNT GOING TO CHECK IT NOW (Caps is an indication to the hype)
OK saw your comment there and replied. :) By the way, the "Best Egyptian Strategy 1967" post is old (June 2012) but that needn't matter if you want to comment there too.
October 21, 2016
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