Axis Survival

For many years, historians have maintained that US entry into WWII doomed the Axis. Given American industrial might and resources, far surpassing those of Germany and Japan, US participation guaranteed Allied victory. This view is open to question, however. Had the Axis made better decisions in the year after Pearl Harbor, Germany and Japan might've held out and ended the war on favorable terms.

In regards to Germany, the following changes would've greatly enhanced the Reich's survivability, and prospects:

Gerrmany should've tried to negotiate an end to the eastern war (i.e. with the USSR) as soon as possible, preferably around July 1942. At the time Stalin was getting very worried over German advances (hence the order "not another step back!"). Near panic, the Soviets might've agreed to a peace deal leaving Germany in possession of many of its eastern conquests, including the agriculturally rich Ukraine.

If the Soviets didn't make peace on acceptable terms, the reich should've launched operation Blau as it did historically but it shouldn't have tried to take Stalingrad. It would've been better to follow a more economical strategy of containing Stalingrad, while the Luftwaffe focused on Astrakan and Soviet tankers in the Caspian. If the Germans avoided the Stalingrad quagmire they could've maintained a stronger Don flank and been able to repel Soviet counteroffensives. Unable to break the German grip on the area seized by Blau, which was depriving them of vital oil and Lend Lease supplies, the Soviets might've been forced to accept peace on German terms.

Better production priorities were also vital to German prospects.

The reich should've halted U-boat construction by the end of 1942. By then the u-boats were practically obsolete and not worth the enormous investment being made in them. The u-boat war would've continued of course but to enhance survivability u-boats were to maintain absolute radio silence when traveling to and from patrol areas. Long range Type IX boats were not to participate in North Atlantic convoy operations. They were to operate only in distant areas such as the Carribean, the east coast of South America, Cape of Good Hope etc. Lacking foreknowledge of U-boat plans, the allies would've suffered high losses in shipping--even after mid '43--and been forced to spread strong ASW forces over vast areas. In effect, this would've tied down far more allied assets in peripheral areas far from the main European theater of operations.

Enhancing the performance of Type VII U-boats in the North Atlantic would've been problematic but doable. After acoustic homing torpedoes became available, the VIIs should've been routinely deployed in two groups. One would've thinned out convoy escorts before the other slaughtered the vulnerable merchantmen.

One example of how this might've worked: First the latter, bigger group would've formed a long patrol line (or lines) from Greenland southward. The other group, consisting of only 4-6 boats (with the bulk of homing torpedoes) would've maintained absolute radio silence even after reaching its assigned patrol area--just south of the main line (the latter known to the allies as its boats transmitted daily position reports after reaching assigned positions). When an allied convoy, seeking to evade the main, known patrol line(s), blundered into the far southerly second group, it would've suffered high losses in escorts. It would've then had to traverse a considerable area of ocean with minimal protection before getting reinforcements and air cover. Even after "Black May," convoys might've suffered considerable losses. (Of course there would've been other variants of the tactic e.g. establishing main north-south patrol lines with a gap in mid-ocean, and the second group just west of the gap.)

The overall goal was to prolong or maximize the effectiveness of existing U-boats and the degree to which they tied down allied forces, with no new investment in the u-boat arm. There would be no Type XXI or Type XIII construction. Far more steel, labor etc would become available to maximize German ground strength. The main emphasis would be on increasing the defensive ability of infantry divisions--the vast bulk of the army.

The Germans should also have avoided another costly waste--the V-1 and V-2 missile program. Again, considerable resources would've been freed up for more worthwhile projects.

Besides better u-boat performance, and production priorities, German trategy in the West, as well as in the East, needed improvement.

After Rommel won the battle of Gazala in June 1942 the Afrika Korps should've halted at the border with Egypt. There shouldn't have been an adance to Alamein, nor any new offensive in August-September. The British would prepare a new offensive but it wouldn't have been ready by November 8, 1942 when the allies landed in NW Africa. With his forces intact, Rommel would've moved west to Tunisia. The losses of Alamein would've been avoided, hence there would've been no need to send big reinforcements into what was bound to become a hopeless trap. The Axis losses incurred by ultimate defeat in '43 would've been far less than occurred historically.

Avoiding Stalingrad and the North African debacle, the Germans would've retained far more good troops for the challenges of 1943-44 in the West, after an end to the eastern war. Had the latter occurred by late 1942 the western allies might not have had the stomach for the casualties they'd incur defeating the reich on their own. Perhaps peace with the USSR would've meant a general peace by early '43. In theory, the Americans and British had the men and resources to overwhelm the reich by themselves. There would've been a major problem, however. Ironically, the very democracy the allies were fighting for was their Achilles heel. Even historically Churchill, worried about casualties resulting from a Normandy invasion, suggested an invasion of the Balkans instead, as they were then lightly defended. Given the likelihood of an inordinate death toll, public support for the war might've evaporated, causing FDR to lose the '44 elections. Forced to abandon the goal of unconditional surrender, the allies may have had to leave Nazi Germany intact and in possession of much of its empire, especially in the East.

The Japanese might've similarly prevailed with changes of their own:

--Tokyo's forces should not have advanced to the Solomons or New Guinea. The troops would've been better employed fortifying the Marianas and Philippines instead. Just like (hypothetical) German defenses in the West, Japan's positions may have proved too costly to take.

--It was vital for Japan to establish a convoy system no later than the end of 1942.

--After 1942 (assuming there is no general peace by early '43) the IJN should've concentrated its I-boats in the Indian Ocean, the most remunerative and safest hunting ground. But the Japanese should've also emphasized production of smaller RO class subs for use against American supply lines, as US forces advanced westward. And they should never have transmitted plans via radio.

The upshot of all this would've been Axis survival post 1945. Instead of a bipolar world, pitting the West against the USSR, there might've been a tripolar world, with the West facing fascists as well as communists (Note this scenario assumes peace prior to US acquisition of nuclear weapons. Like the USSR, the Axis powers would've acquired a deterrent). Ultimately the West might've prevailed against both totalitarian systems owing to its greater innovation.

By the end of 1942, u-boat construction (example below) was a costly misuse of scarce resources. It should've been halted, even as new strategies were devised to enhance the survivability and effectivemess of the existing u-boat fleet.