Illusory Success in Syria

The looming collapse of the Syrian regime is touted as a "huge blow to Iran" and a great victory for the US and its Mideast allies. The ultimate outcome, however, may look quite different.

If or when Homs falls, Assad and his allies will realize the game is up. Unable to prevent an HTS takeover, they will simply abandon Syria. Assad will load the gold and cash obtained from the captagon trade onto planes and fly to Iraq or Iran. Similarly, Syrian pilots shall escape with their MIG-25s and SU-22s etc.

HTS and its allies will boast of their victory; there may be a triumphal entry into Damascus. But they will inherit a bankrupt, ruined nation. Needless to say a return of refugees from Turkey and other nations will compound the problems. The rebels won, but their backers will have little to show for it.

The Syrian disaster will reduce Iranian prestige and influence, but it won't be fatal. It may actually be beneficial. Like the US in 1975, when South Vietnam fell (and more recently, following the failure in Afghanistan) Iran will be relieved of the awful burden of propping up a precarious regime in a nation wracked with problems. There will be no more futile squandering of blood and treasure. From now on, Syria's massive problems will be someone else's.

The US, HTS, Turkey, Israel etc will cheer over Assad's fall and gloat over Iran's putative setback. Things will look much different, however, in 2025 and 2026. The "winners" will see just how high the price of victory will be. They'll be stuck with the costs of the war, refugee resettlement and reconstruction. Economically ruined, and with its captagan business eliminated, Syria will require massive infusions of cash. This will prove onerous for the US, EU and Saudi Arabia.

The enormous cost of reviving Syria will ultimately prove a waste, for the nation won't be subservient to the West. If, following masssive aid, Damascus become reasonably prosperous and stable, it'll again focus on foreign policy. Almost certainly, this will be to the detriment of relations with Israel and the US. It's hard to imagine any Syrian regime just writing off the Golan. Inevitably, Damascus will demand its land back. Regaining Golan will require allies, as Syria won't be strong enough to achieve this without help. There may be a Syria--Iran rapproachment (if Iran and Iraq reconciled after a decade of bloody war so may Iran and Syria).

Even without such a development, the new Syrian state may ultimately pose a more formidable challenge to Israel than the old alawite regimes. Assuming the new regime is based on the Sunni majority, it should prove more stable, with greater support, than past governments. This will reduce the need for internal security measures, such as promotion based on loyalty rather than merit, which so plagued Syrian forces in the past. Better led and motivated forces should perform much better than those of 1967 or 1973. They may prove to be Israel's nemesis in a future war.

As Rabin often said, one can't predict the future of the Mideast. The fall of Assad is just the latest example. But those who think it'll mean an end to Iran's current regime, and and perpetual peace in the region, are probably dead wrong.

Below, victorious rebels.

The Syria Scheme

The Mideast has witnessed a startling new development. HTS launched a sudden, major invasion of northern Syria, imperiling Assad's regime and raising the specter of a nation ruled by an al-qaida offshoot. Aided by surprise, the rebels overran the city of Aleppo and have just forced the Syrian arab army (SAA) to withdraw from Hama. Reports that the SAA has stabilized the front appear premature. A further HTS advance, to Homs, may prove fatal for the regime. Besides troops, Syrian losses include Buk and Pantsyr AD systems, an S-400 radar and T-90 tanks. The Syrian air force (SAF) has fought hard, hitting HTS troops, drone and ammo dumps. But it hasn't stemmed the rebel tide.

The setbacks are a major embarrassment for Assad, and may auger a geopolitical shift in the Mideast. Heavily beset, Assad sent an SOS to Iran, which instructed its Iraqi allies to help. Reinforcements are arriving in Syria. Little if any help, however, is forthcoming from Assad's erstwhile saviours, Russia and Hezbollah. Battered by Ukraine and Israel, respectively, neither can do much. Iraqi forces might compensate for their absence, but this is far from certain. Turkish drones may decimate Iraqi armor, just as they massacred Syrian tanks advancing toward Idlib a few years ago.

Why did the HTS offensive occur, and who was responsible? No doubt, Erdogan aided HTS but the assault wasn't on his initiative. The US was the real power behind it. Lately, Washington sensed a golden opportunity to eliminate most of Iran's allies and influence in the region. Ultimately, Israel is to be the main beneficiary, as successful implementation of the scheme would eliminate its entire northern front.

Preoccupied with Israel lately, Syria let down its guard and neglected its HTS front. Aware of this, the US devised a plan to topple Assad with local forces--including, besides HTS, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. With his northern front weak, and bereft of Russian and Hezbollah assistance, Assad looked temptingly vulnerable. Ousting him would end Iranian influence not only in Syria but also in Lebanon. Cut off from Iran by the fall of Assad, Hezbollah would wither on the vine and die.

Despite US denials, America's role as instigator is confirmed by the participation of US artillery and jets in SDF attacks--operations coordinated with those of HTS. The SDF reportedly has taken Deir Ezzor and may soon take Boukamal. By taking border crossing areas SDF seeks to prevent reinforcements from Iraq or Iran from saving Assad.

Coming weeks may witness either the success of the scheme, or an embarrassment for the US.

Below, Assad.