MIG-23s in Action

Tom Cooper's latest book is about the MIG-23 in arab air forces. Code named Flogger, the MIG-23 appeared in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. From 1980 to 1991 Floggers saw much action. Generally, because of technical issues, lack of integrated air defense, and insufficient training, the MIG-23 was a failure. But there were some fascinating encounters, and occasional successes.
Perhaps the greatest performance of arab MIG-23s was not in combat, but mock combat, against the US Navy's best--F-14 Tomcats. I was astounded to learn that, in February 1986, Libyan Floggers  maneuvered well against them. In one engagement, MIG-23s got on "their 6," or behind the Tomcats, causing them to flee. Pollack regarded Libyan pilots as among the worst in the arab world, so it was a remarkable account.
In actual combat, Iraqi airmen achieved the most. On two occasions, in January and June 1984, MIG-23MFs fired R-24 missiles at Iranian Phantoms. Although neither enemy jet was destroyed, both were hit and badly damaged. On other occasions, Iraq's Floggers killed Iranian F-5s. The greatest victory was in August 1984.
 Determined to eliminate F-14s patrolling over the northern Persian gulf, the Iraqis sent two MIG-23MLs to ambush them. By this time, the Iraqis were employing the "Giraffe" tactic--fly low toward the target, then zoom up and attack from behind. Despite the best efforts of ground controllers, the MIG-23MLs ascended to find themselves improperly positioned. One, piloted by Lt. Rahman, was too close for a missile attack, and was ordered to fall back. After doing so, Rahman fired an R-60 missile, which went into the right engine of a Tomcat, destroying it. The downing of an F-14 was undoubtedly the best combat success ever achieved by a MIG-23, in any air force.
Rahman soon faced an Iranian F-4, vectored toward him and his leader. He got a radar lock on it and fired a R-24R and then an R-24T heat seeking missile. The Phantom evaded both. Nevertheless, Rahman saw more action that day than any other Flogger pilot.
Syrian pilots fared worse than Iraqis, because they were facing a more capable enemy and were slower to acquire the best variants and weapons. The massacre of Syrian MIGs over Lebanon in June 1982 is well-known. But even then, Syrian airmen did what they could to mitigate the disaster.
On June 7, 1982, four MIG-23s left as-Se'en airbase (AKA Tsakal) and headed toward Lebanon. Seeking to evade detection, the jets descended between Lebanese hills. One pair, in front, stayed low while the rear pair rose to act as bait. Alerted by radar, the Israelis surprised them. While F-16s attacked the low flying MIGs, the higher pair encountered four F-15s. Yet remarkably, despite being greatly outnumbered by superior warplanes, only one MIG-23MF was downed.
Could the Syrians have done better with a somewhat altered plan? After descending between the hills, they could have slowed down so the Israelis--if they assumed the Syrians were maintaining the same speed--wound up in front of them. But even then the MIGs might've been hampered by faulty weapons, notably the R-23 missile.
In 1985 Syrian Floggers, even the newer variant (the MIG-23ML) still had the R-23. Again success would've been questionable even had their jets been better positioned to fight.
On November 19, 1985, four Syrian MIG-23MLs attempted to ambush a pair of Israeli F-15s over Lebanon. Attempting to emulate the "giraffe" tactic, one pair got beneath the Eagles and climbed to attack. Unfortunately, a mistake by the ground controller caused both MIGs to end up in front of the F-15s, which shot them down.
It is unclear exactly how that happened. The MIGs may have ascended at too shallow an angle, so they appeared in front of the enemy. It is more likely the error resulted from the difficulty of positioning jets behind an enemy flying in a circular or racetrack pattern. As the Iraqis found out, this could be tricky.
Would the outcome have been different had the MIG-23MLs attained the right position? R-23s were not likely to be effective and in any event, using radar probably would've alerted the Israelis. The Syrians could've kept their radars off and tried to get close so they could use their 23mm guns. But even the guns were said to "lack the punch" of comparable Western weapons. This was a serious drawback when fighting F-15s, which were big and tough to kill. A MIG-23 probably would've had to approach very closely and fire into the Eagle's engines--rather dangerous if the Eagle exploded.
The last actions involving MIG-23s occurred in the Gulf war of 1991.Two Iraqi Floggers apparently hit US F-111F bombers with R-24Ts. Despite a "huge ball of fire" resulting from one of those attacks, there was no confirmed kill.

An R-23 missile.

How Many Men Deserted in 408?

In his work on the fall of Rome, Peter Heather rejected a claim of Zosimus, an ancient historian. Zosimus wrote that 30,000 men abandoned the Western Roman Empire in 408, and joined the army of Alaric. The figure of 30,000, Heather opined, is "impossibly high." In Heather's view, the true number was around 10,000. However, available evidence suggests Zosimus was nearer the mark.
To arrive at a reasonable estimate of the number of deserters, we must determine the size of the army of Italy before the barbarian soldiers departed, and the number of soldiers remaining after they left.
Available figures, although scanty, suggest that prior to 408 Stilicho, the Roman commander in Italy, had approximately 30,000 soldiers. Few remained in the army after 408.
In 406 CE, when the barbarian horde of Radagaisus was attacking Italy, Stilicho mobilized about 15 numerii or regiments, totaling 15,000 men. He also called in soldiers from the Rhine, perhaps 5,000 men. In addition, there was a force of goths (commanded by an ally, Sarus) and some Huns. The latter two groups added perhaps another 5,000.
It is unlikely that Stilicho had fewer than 25,000 troops. He probably needed that many to beat the invaders. Even after losing a third of its troops, the army of Radagaisus still had 12,000 good fighters and perhaps 10,000 others who were sold into slavery (and later joined Alaric). To overcome such a force, by besieging it in the vicinity of Florence and Faesulae, Stilicho must have had at least as many soldiers, or 25,000 plus. And he retained most of his army after the battle.
Roman casualties were probably light because Stilicho relied mainly on trapping the enemy and starving him into submission. He might have lost a few thousand men at most, leaving him with over 20,000 of his original force. But after Radagaisus surrendered with his army, 12,000 of the best survivors were conscripted into the army of Stilicho. By late 406 it probably numbered over 32,000 troops. The events of 407 did not cost it many of these.
After the Vandals, Alans and Suevi invaded Gaul by 407, Constantine, a Roman general, crossed from Britain to the continent. He drove the barbarians back but lacked the strength to subdue or eject them. Constantine was proclaimed emperor (Constantine III) hence became an enemy of Honorius, the emperor Stilicho served under. To deal with the usurper, Stilicho sent Sarus to Gaul. Despite some initial success, Sarus was forced to flee back to Italy. We know little for sure, but it seems likely Sarus brought the goths he had commanded the previous year. This army was probably not very large and was not annihilated. Therefore, by 408 the army of Italy (or Stilicho) probably still had around 30,000 men.
Stilicho fell out of favor in 408, and was killed. The anti-barbarian faction responsible for his fall included native Roman soldiers. These men launched a pogrom against barbarian women and children, then quartered in Roman cities. The civilians were slaughtered wholesale. It is noteworthy that the native troops didn't attempt to kill the barbarian soldiers, just defenseless civilians. And they did so in cities, presumably safe within their walls. The native elements could not have been very numerous or strong, or they would've been more ambitious and courageous. This is good evidence--if more were needed-- that most of the army by then consisted of barbarian recruits.
Apparently there was little the barbarian soldiers could do to save their families or retaliate directly. But they were extremely angry. Since the Roman troops probably killed all barbarian civilians, regardless of whether they were Goths or something else, just about every barbarian soldier would've felt incensed and completely unwelcome. They could not trust the Romans and would no longer fight for them. Ergo, they left. We shouldn't assume they all joined Alaric; a majority of them probably just went home, to the laeti or barbarian settlements along the frontier. But virtually all would've abandoned their posts. But what evidence do we have that the deserters totaled nearly 30,000 (perhaps 26-27,000)? That would require the near total loss of the army of Italy.
In fact, that is exactly what seems to have happened. There is clear evidence that 408 CE was a watershed. Almost overnight, the Western Roman Empire went from military power to near  impotence:

• In 409, the year after the mass desertion, the government had to call in a force of 6,000 troops from Dalmatia to try to garrison Rome. Apparently the army of Italy couldn't spare that many soldiers--if it had that many--for the defense of the most important city.
• In order to defend Ravenna, the capital of the Western Roman Empire, the eastern empire had to send 4,000 soldiers. Again the army of Italy appears to have been woefully short on troops. 
• Honorius negotiated to get 10,000 Huns to fight Alaric. Hunnic reinforcements would hardly have been necessary if the western empire still had a decent army of its own.
• Three times Alaric besieged Rome. It would've been quite risky for him to spread his forces out along the circumference of a big city if a Roman field army were still present. The attenuated besiegers could be attacked with concentrated force. If Heather is right, and only 10,000 men deserted, there still would've been an army of 15,000 available. Apparently quite confident, Alaric faced no army worth mentioning.

The conclusion seems inescapable: The army of Stilicho, which probably had around 30,000 men prior to his fall, evaporated soon afterwards. For that to have happened, the vast bulk of the men, or most of the 30,000, had to have quit the army. I think Zosimus exaggerated only slightly, if he exaggerated at all. His figure is the most accurate we're ever likely to have.

The weakness of the WRE, following alienation of barbarians, highlights the fundamental problem--loss of citizen support for the empire. The day the barbarians quit the army was the day the army nearly ceased to exist. Few citizens would serve anymore. Alienating barbarian troops, without a good alternative source of recruits, was an awful blunder.

Roman guard.

Heather, Peter. The Fall of the Roman Empire a New History of Rome and the Barbarians. 2006