Sinai Battle Revisited

For decades, the October 14 attack has been shrouded in myths. "The Battle of the Sinai" has been called the biggest tank battle since Kursk, a veritable armageddon pitting a thousand Egyptian tanks against 700 Israeli, and ending in a catastrophic rout of the attackers. According to the standard narrative, the desert became a vast graveyard of Egyptian armor.
Historians have long accepted Israel's claim to have knocked out 250 tanks. Some authors even provide statistics for each attacking unit:

•  O'Ballance wrote the Israelis knocked out 110 of the 21st Armored division's T-55s. The defenders also claimed 93 tank kills in the vicinity of Galan, and others elsewhere. The final tally came to about a quarter of a thousand.
•  Dupuy is more detailed, and clearly indicates the same total. He wrote that Egypt's northernmost forces lost 50 tanks. Farther south, in the Second Army sector, two brigades of the 21st armored division lost 30 T-55s each. In the Third Army front, failed thrusts toward the Giddi and Mitla passes cost a total of 60 tanks. The southernmost assault toward Sudr incurred the greatest loss, almost 90 tanks. Combining all these figures yields, again, about 250.
• Adan arrived at a similar total, albeit suspiciously, with a mix of different numbers. According to him, the Israelis destroyed fifty tanks of the 3rd Armored brigade (Fourth Armored Division) at Wadi Mabouk, an unspecified number west of the Mitla pass and twenty near the Giddi. Farther north, the 21st armored division's 14th brigade suffered "forty smashed tanks." Another of the 21st's brigades, the 1st, also lost 40 T-55s. East of Kantara the 15th Armored brigade lost 30 T-62s. Elsewhere in the Second Army area, the Israelis set 40 more tanks ablaze. Altogether, Adan wrote, the Israelis eliminated 200. His own figures, added up, come to 220, or actually 250, given the probable claimed toll, not indicated, for the Mitla battle.
•  Pollack's account was not as detailed but his final number is essentially the same--264-267.

Various other authors such as Chaim Herzog, and even the Egyptians Shazli and Gamasy, have also accepted the figure of approximately 250. However, discrepancies in the various accounts raise doubts about its accuracy. Dupuy, for example, wrote the 3rd brigade lost "almost 90" tanks whereas Adan said it lost 50. The two authors also gave different figures for the 21st division. Dupuy indicated it lost 60 tanks, Adan said 80. And no other writer includes O'Ballance's story of 93 tanks wrecked around Galan on the 14th. Galan is the Chinese Farm, which didn't see action until late the next day. Not surprisingly, newer works have cast doubt on the standard narrative, or openly challenged it:

• Rabinovich repeated Adan's version of the northernmost action, including the alleged destruction of thirty T-62s. But he didn't embrace the oft repeated figure of 250. Rabinovich put the total Egyptian loss at "between 150 and 250 tanks." Some of his other information can be taken as evidence for an inflated, standard figure. 

Interestingly, Rabinovich  indicated some Israelis were skeptical the attack was the Egyptian plan's Phase 2, the advance to the passes. Dayan didn't believe it was and while Elazar did, he thought it was on a "smaller scale" than anticipated. Since the offensive didn't appear very big to the Israelis, their claim of  inflicting huge losses is dubious. Furthermore, Rabinovich indicated the Israelis were dissatisfied with the outcome. Sharon hinted at the brief and limited nature of the attack. He said the 21st division came, got hit and ran. Hoping to destroy more forces, Sharon and other generals put out disinformation. By portraying the Israelis as beaten or desperate, radio messages sought to trick the Egyptians into attacking again. This wouldn't have been necessary had Cairo's forces really received the drubbing Israel claimed they did.

• Asher rejects the figure of 250. He considers Emanuel Wald's figure of 150 tanks destroyed (out of only 300 that tried to advance that day) "more realistic."
•  Cooper et al cite Asher, and a US Intelligence report stating that Egypt lost only 76 tanks.The authors do not correctly quote Asher (who accepts Wald's figure of 150 tanks wrecked, not 100 with 50 more damaged which Cooper attributes to Asher). The authors do however, indicate the standard narrative is wrong. In view of significantly lighter, real losses, how did the battle get blown out of proportion?

Cooper et al clearly explain the reasons for the exaggeration. Eager to claim a big victory after a week of costly fighting, the Israelis hyped Cairo's losses. Ironically, the Egyptians also needed to exaggerate the magnitude of the battle, and their sacrifices. The offensive had resulted from Syria's plea for help, so Cairo wished to appear to be doing its utmost. In reality the Egyptian generals, as Cooper noted, were only putting on a show.

Shazli and his colleagues were appalled by the order to attack. This order stemmed from the ineptitude of Sadat. He was deluded enough to expect a great victory, but professional military men knew better. Indeed, if an offensive were pressed with determination, it would result in catastrophe. Unable to evade the order, Shazli and others devised a plan to minimize the scale of the defeat. They attacked with the smallest possible force and disengaged as soon as possible. That they succeeded to a considerable degree is indicated by Israeli dissatisfaction with the outcome.

The October 14 battle may have been less of a disaster than was long thought. Nevertheless Shazli was right to point to it as a watershed--a serious setback which turned the war in Israel's favor. The ultimate result was the entrapment of the Third Army. Egypt may have lost fewer tanks on the 14th than Israel claimed. But by sending key armored units into Sinai, Sadat deprived the west bank of reserves needed to stem the Israeli tide.

References

No Victor No Vanquished   O'Ballance
Elusive Victory    Dupuy
Arabs at War    Pollock
On the Banks of the Suez Adan
The Yom Kippur War   Rabinovich
The Crossing of the Suez   Shazly
The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War Asher
ARAB MIGs Volume 6             Cooper