Communication Breakdown '67
The memoirs of General Fawzi provide insight into the failure of Egyptian communications during the 1967 war. Years after the disaster, Fawzi wrote:
"Sixteen communications battalions needed for the deployed Egyptian infantry corps and reserves remained behind on the west bank of the Suez Canal on the Egyptian side and therefore had not been set up to communicate in the field." Fawzi indicated this was the situation on the morning of June 5, 1967, when war broke out. From the start, Cairo's forces in Sinai lacked vitally needed communications equipment and personnel. Of course there must have been some means of communication already in place. But it probably didn't amount to much and soon succumbed to the stresses of combat. Fawzi's recollections suggest the problem was not so much a breakdown of communications but a lack of sufficient communications in the first place. Evidently, there just weren't enough radios and radiomen to adequately convey situation reports and orders. When the minimal existing capability, east of the canal, broke down, each unit was effectively on its own. Under the circumstances, the withdrawal order led to disaster. Although the frontier divisions were overrun before the order was issued, reserve forces suffered grievously from lack of command control. Some just disintegrated, and none could be employed in an effective, coordinated fashion. The withdrawal became a rout.
Can we be sure the 16 battalions mentioned by Fawzi played no role in the war? Couldn't they have crossed the canal after the war began, and aided their assigned units? This doesn't seem likely.
After the Israelis neutralized the Egyptian Air Force in their initial strikes, they targeted Egyptian infrastructure in the canal zone. No doubt their goal was to hinder resupply and reinforcement of the Sinai force. Since the Egyptians could not provide air cover, it is likely the Israeli mission succeeded. Few if any communications units may have crossed, and it was probably too late anyway. Fawzi didn't say why the units weren't where they belonged at the start. But once the conflict erupted, the situation couldn't be rectified, and catastrophe was the result.
Failure to ensure proper command and control wasn't the only communications failure during the war. Another egregious error involved intelligence. Fawzi described how a chance to thwart Israel's surprise attack was squandered:
"The Egyptian War Ministry in Cairo received two warnings from military intelligence in Arish....This message was the result of the Jordanian listening post at Ajloun, where it began to detect Israeli movements at 0400 and where it then sent warnings to Egyptian posts in Arish. The Egyptian intelligence officers did not forward this 0400 message urgently, issuing it at 0700. This nonurgency meant the message arrived at the General Staff at 0940; the Israeli attack began at 0800...."
Had the 0400 report been forwarded right away, the General Staff could've gotten it three hours before 0940, or at 0640--leaving ample time to alert the EAF. A timely warning might not have prevented the destruction of Egypt's air force but it could've cost the Israelis a lot more and tied down their air force longer.
Failure to ensure proper communications and convey a key message cost Egypt much of its armed forces, and the Sinai. Fawzi and his colleagues faced the daunting challenge of rebuilding the army and avoiding its past mistakes.
Reference
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army Fawzi (Aboul-Enein editor)
"Sixteen communications battalions needed for the deployed Egyptian infantry corps and reserves remained behind on the west bank of the Suez Canal on the Egyptian side and therefore had not been set up to communicate in the field." Fawzi indicated this was the situation on the morning of June 5, 1967, when war broke out. From the start, Cairo's forces in Sinai lacked vitally needed communications equipment and personnel. Of course there must have been some means of communication already in place. But it probably didn't amount to much and soon succumbed to the stresses of combat. Fawzi's recollections suggest the problem was not so much a breakdown of communications but a lack of sufficient communications in the first place. Evidently, there just weren't enough radios and radiomen to adequately convey situation reports and orders. When the minimal existing capability, east of the canal, broke down, each unit was effectively on its own. Under the circumstances, the withdrawal order led to disaster. Although the frontier divisions were overrun before the order was issued, reserve forces suffered grievously from lack of command control. Some just disintegrated, and none could be employed in an effective, coordinated fashion. The withdrawal became a rout.
Can we be sure the 16 battalions mentioned by Fawzi played no role in the war? Couldn't they have crossed the canal after the war began, and aided their assigned units? This doesn't seem likely.
After the Israelis neutralized the Egyptian Air Force in their initial strikes, they targeted Egyptian infrastructure in the canal zone. No doubt their goal was to hinder resupply and reinforcement of the Sinai force. Since the Egyptians could not provide air cover, it is likely the Israeli mission succeeded. Few if any communications units may have crossed, and it was probably too late anyway. Fawzi didn't say why the units weren't where they belonged at the start. But once the conflict erupted, the situation couldn't be rectified, and catastrophe was the result.
Failure to ensure proper command and control wasn't the only communications failure during the war. Another egregious error involved intelligence. Fawzi described how a chance to thwart Israel's surprise attack was squandered:
"The Egyptian War Ministry in Cairo received two warnings from military intelligence in Arish....This message was the result of the Jordanian listening post at Ajloun, where it began to detect Israeli movements at 0400 and where it then sent warnings to Egyptian posts in Arish. The Egyptian intelligence officers did not forward this 0400 message urgently, issuing it at 0700. This nonurgency meant the message arrived at the General Staff at 0940; the Israeli attack began at 0800...."
Had the 0400 report been forwarded right away, the General Staff could've gotten it three hours before 0940, or at 0640--leaving ample time to alert the EAF. A timely warning might not have prevented the destruction of Egypt's air force but it could've cost the Israelis a lot more and tied down their air force longer.
Failure to ensure proper communications and convey a key message cost Egypt much of its armed forces, and the Sinai. Fawzi and his colleagues faced the daunting challenge of rebuilding the army and avoiding its past mistakes.
Reference
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army Fawzi (Aboul-Enein editor)
posted by starman at 11:15 AM
31 comments
