Fawzi and Sadat
After the death of President Nasser in September 1970, Egypt's War Minister, General Mohammed Fawzi, opposed Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat. Fearing Sadat would deviate from Nasser's policies, Fawzi and others, such as Aly Sabry, planned a coup. To ensure that Egypt stayed close to its Soviet backer, which alone could supply sufficient weapons to take on Israel, Sadat had to go. The plot was, however, uncovered in May 1971. Several men including Fawzi were forced to resign, and sentenced to prison. Did this outcome leave Egypt better or worse off?
Believing the US was the key to peace, Sadat sought its help to resolve the conflict with Israel. This effort failed, forcing Cairo to prepare for war. To improve Egypt's chances, Sadat sought more advanced weapons, such as the MIG-23. The Kremlin refused to supply them, no doubt in part because it didn't trust Sadat. Egyptian-Soviet relations would've been far better had Fawzi won. Cairo's forces would've been better armed. That wouldn't have been the only advantage--far from it.
As a military commander Sadat was abysmally bad. His blunders almost erased the hard won victories of Shazly.
On October 14, 1973, despite near-unanimous opposition from his generals, Sadat squandered much of Egypt's armored reserve. The offensive was doomed from the start, costing Egypt over 100 tanks. The next day, Sadat angrily refused Shazly's suggestion to return some units to the west bank, to counter a possible Israeli crossing of the canal. Even after the Israelis did just that, he rejected a withdrawal of units from the east bank to stop them. Instead Sadat sent the 25th armored brigade into an Israeli trap, and squandered the 1st armored brigade in another futile attack. At the same time he rejected Kosygin's plea that Egypt accept a cease fire. Essentially Sadat deprived Egyptian forces on the west bank of sufficient strength to contain the Israelis and granted the latter ample time to reach their objectives. The result was the catastrophic entrapment of Egypt's Third Army. What should've been a great Egyptian victory nearly became a worse rout than the Six Day war.
Had Fawzi and his allies succeeded in May 1971, Egypt would've been stronger and better led. In his writings (translated in Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army) Fawzi demonstrated a good grasp of his nation's military problems. During his tenure as War Minister (1968-71) Egyptian forces arose, phoenix-like, from the disaster of 1967. Militarily, Fawzi and his associates were far better than Sadat. But was a continued relationship with the Soviet Union politically wise?
It is true that the USSR had no future. The US ultimately won the Cold war. In the 1970s, however, the Kremlin was still a good benefactor. With additional help, and without Sadat's incompetence, Egypt would've won the '73 war. That would've paved the way for an comprehensive settlement, possibly by 1975. Afterwards, Cairo could've managed without extensive Soviet aid and ideological influence (reflected in arab socialism) and opted for a more capitalist system, as other nations did when the communist world began to crumble in the late 1980s.
Believing the US was the key to peace, Sadat sought its help to resolve the conflict with Israel. This effort failed, forcing Cairo to prepare for war. To improve Egypt's chances, Sadat sought more advanced weapons, such as the MIG-23. The Kremlin refused to supply them, no doubt in part because it didn't trust Sadat. Egyptian-Soviet relations would've been far better had Fawzi won. Cairo's forces would've been better armed. That wouldn't have been the only advantage--far from it.
As a military commander Sadat was abysmally bad. His blunders almost erased the hard won victories of Shazly.
On October 14, 1973, despite near-unanimous opposition from his generals, Sadat squandered much of Egypt's armored reserve. The offensive was doomed from the start, costing Egypt over 100 tanks. The next day, Sadat angrily refused Shazly's suggestion to return some units to the west bank, to counter a possible Israeli crossing of the canal. Even after the Israelis did just that, he rejected a withdrawal of units from the east bank to stop them. Instead Sadat sent the 25th armored brigade into an Israeli trap, and squandered the 1st armored brigade in another futile attack. At the same time he rejected Kosygin's plea that Egypt accept a cease fire. Essentially Sadat deprived Egyptian forces on the west bank of sufficient strength to contain the Israelis and granted the latter ample time to reach their objectives. The result was the catastrophic entrapment of Egypt's Third Army. What should've been a great Egyptian victory nearly became a worse rout than the Six Day war.
Had Fawzi and his allies succeeded in May 1971, Egypt would've been stronger and better led. In his writings (translated in Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army) Fawzi demonstrated a good grasp of his nation's military problems. During his tenure as War Minister (1968-71) Egyptian forces arose, phoenix-like, from the disaster of 1967. Militarily, Fawzi and his associates were far better than Sadat. But was a continued relationship with the Soviet Union politically wise?
It is true that the USSR had no future. The US ultimately won the Cold war. In the 1970s, however, the Kremlin was still a good benefactor. With additional help, and without Sadat's incompetence, Egypt would've won the '73 war. That would've paved the way for an comprehensive settlement, possibly by 1975. Afterwards, Cairo could've managed without extensive Soviet aid and ideological influence (reflected in arab socialism) and opted for a more capitalist system, as other nations did when the communist world began to crumble in the late 1980s.
posted by starman at 4:33 AM
49 comments
