Disinformation 1973
According to a recent report, Egypt's M-1 tanks suffer from poor maintenance. Many vehicles, it is alleged, are not operational. This may be true but I'm skeptical of such stories. They are reminiscent of disinformation put out by the Arabs prior to the 1973 war. In order to maximize the possibility of strategic surprise, Egypt and Syria sought to appear unprepared.
A classic example of Egyptian deception appeared around May 1973. False information was given to Newsweek and published in the piece Anwar Sadat's Uncertain Trumpet. It mentioned Egyptian officials assuring westerners that, despite Sadat's saber rattling, he was "not contemplating anything as suicidal as a fullscale crossing of the Suez canal." The article also conveyed a gloomy assessment of Cairo's SAMs. A team of Soviet experts, arriving to inspect the missile defense system after the ouster of the Soviets the previous summer, was "appalled by the state of disrepair and neglect it discovered." The Israelis, the Russians concluded, "could sweep the length and breath of Egypt practically unopposed and wipe out the country's air defenses just as quickly as they did on the morning of June 5, 1967." The absurdity of such stories was clearly demonstrated immediately after war broke out. Egyptian forces successfully crossed the canal, and their SAMs provided adequate air cover. Damascus too, performed better than would've been expected on the basis of prewar stories.
After the disastrous dogfight of September 1973, Syria claimed to be on the verge of expelling the Soviets who, it was alleged, had refused to activate SAMs during the battle. Damascus also wanted the MIG-23. Of course Syria could hardly expect to receive the jet if it expelled the Soviets. It just wanted to appear in disarray and divert attention from its buildup near Golan.
A classic example of Egyptian deception appeared around May 1973. False information was given to Newsweek and published in the piece Anwar Sadat's Uncertain Trumpet. It mentioned Egyptian officials assuring westerners that, despite Sadat's saber rattling, he was "not contemplating anything as suicidal as a fullscale crossing of the Suez canal." The article also conveyed a gloomy assessment of Cairo's SAMs. A team of Soviet experts, arriving to inspect the missile defense system after the ouster of the Soviets the previous summer, was "appalled by the state of disrepair and neglect it discovered." The Israelis, the Russians concluded, "could sweep the length and breath of Egypt practically unopposed and wipe out the country's air defenses just as quickly as they did on the morning of June 5, 1967." The absurdity of such stories was clearly demonstrated immediately after war broke out. Egyptian forces successfully crossed the canal, and their SAMs provided adequate air cover. Damascus too, performed better than would've been expected on the basis of prewar stories.
After the disastrous dogfight of September 1973, Syria claimed to be on the verge of expelling the Soviets who, it was alleged, had refused to activate SAMs during the battle. Damascus also wanted the MIG-23. Of course Syria could hardly expect to receive the jet if it expelled the Soviets. It just wanted to appear in disarray and divert attention from its buildup near Golan.