More on the Soviet Claim

Various delegations from eastern Europe, including a group of Czechs, arrived in Egypt after the 1967 war. The Czechs investigated the causes of Egypt's military failure (including Israeli jamming of Egyptian SAM-2s). These studies coincided with the Soviet investigation. Marshal Zakharov arrived in Cairo on June 20 with a Military Mission, to do a post mortem on the Egyptian failure and arrange for re equipping of Nasser's forces. To an extent, the Soviet "investigation" was merely an exercise in public relations. Presumably it was Zakharov who, around early July, attributed the disaster to indolence.
Naturally Soviet investigators were hampered by lack of access to the battlefields. Virtually all of Sinai had been overrun by the IDF. There was no opportunity to inspect Egyptian wreckage, or abandoned vehicles (they were towed away by Israel). In addition, many Egyptian crews had perished and could not be interviewed. It was difficult to gather evidence of the kind needed for the startling pronouncement about Egypt's tanks.
As related, there is some evidence for Russia's claim. The 125th's armor was simply abandoned. In addition, the 4rth's tanks at Bir Lafhan may have had little chance to shoot back as they were often ambushed by IDF armor behind dunes. The Israelis also shot up a Egyptian tank column with impunity during a night action.
Other vehicles, however, made use of their guns. Referring to dug in(?) Egyptian tanks in the northern area, an Israeli general said that they usually revealed their positions with their first or second shell. IS-3Ms blasted several Pattons. Virtually all of the 100 tanks supporting the 7th Infantry opened fire, and many, such as those in the Jiradi pass, probably did so repeatedly. In one engagement, T-55s knocked out several Israeli tanks. Toward the end, an Egyptian counterattack destroyed some Israeli AMX tanks; in another battle, fought at longer range, it was said that every time the Egyptians changed tactics they hit more tanks.
A total of 394 IDF tanks were put out of action in '67. Of these, 61 were irrecoverably lost in Sinai. Many more were damaged but repaired. Using el-Alamein as an analogy (150 out of over 500 British tanks put out of action were a total loss) nearly 200 IDF tanks were probably knocked out. At a guess, most or about 150, were hit by Egyptian tanks. (Cairo didn't yet have the infantry weapons of '73, such as the RPG and the Sagger, and while it did have many antitank guns, these hit only a limited number of IDF tanks in frontier positions.) And how many rounds would the Egyptians have fired to account for 150? Probably about 6 shells for every tank they hit. Cairo's armor fought according to Soviet doctrine, in which a platoon of three tanks concentrated its fire on one target at a time. In addition, the first shots were probably just ranging shots. It is possible, therefore, that the total number of shells fired (perhaps 6 x 150 or roughly 900) equalled the total number of Egyptian tanks in Sinai (900). Therefore, each Egyptian tank, on average, did fire one shot. But the result was far from what the Soviets said it would be.
The Soviet claim is patently absurd. It was just propaganda, intended to reassure Soviet allies about the effectiveness of Russian weapons. What better way to exculpate Soviet weapons in the wake of disaster than to say that Egypt would've won if each of its tanks had fired just one shot? Great public relations indeed. But it did a disservice to the cause of historical truth.

Soviet Claim 1967

This coming June marks the 45th anniversary of the 1967 Mideast war. It was a catastrophe for three Arab countries, two of which--Syria and Egypt--were armed by the USSR. Soon after it was over, in the summer of '67, Russian military men arrived in Egypt to discover the cause of the disaster. In their view, defeat stemmed from gross inaction on the part of Egyptian armor.
I have few sources on this claim. In his book, Dayan mentioned the Soviet investigation and its "startling conclusion": If each Egyptian tank had fired just one shot, Egypt would've won the war. But the majority had not fired at all. A few years later, Brezhnev reiterated this view to Anwar Sadat: "If each of your tanks had fired just one shot, the whole pattern of that war would've changed drastically."
This appears to be more of a public relations position than the result of objective analysis. Naturally, the rout of a client equipped with Russian arms greatly embarrassed the Kremlin. It was potentially very detrimental to Russian influence and prestige. Few nations would want Soviet arms and advisors in the wake of such a failure. It was imperative therefore, to explain the disaster in a way that would exculpate Soviet weapons and doctrine. The result was a claim which appears at best questionable if not outlandish. Moscow wanted people to believe Russian tanks (etc) were fine; the Egyptians just didn't use them.
Of course, this view wasn't entirely baseless. As was noted, Egypt's 125th brigade abandoned 60 heavy tanks without a fight. Evidently, the Soviets seized upon this incident, combined it with other evidence of inaction and blamed Cairo's tankmen.
On a number of occasions, however, Egyptian armor did fight, but not very effectively. The inferiority of Russian equipment was at least partly to blame. Generally, western-made IDF armor was more powerful and better suited to desert warfare than Soviet tanks.

Old Egyptian Tank

Recently I purchased a small model of a Stalin (IS-3) tank from a hobby store. With its sand colored camouflage, this one depicts a late model (IS-3M) supposedly with Egypt's 4rth Armored Division in 1967. In fact, all of Nasser's 100 Stalins served with other units. Egypt's 7th Infantry division was bolstered by an IS-3M regiment near Rafah (whereas the 4rth Armored was deployed farther west, at bir Gifgafa). The other 60 Stalins were with the 125th Tank Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Division at Kuntilla, in the southern part of the Sinai front.
Designed to fight the toughest German armor in WWII, the IS-3 proved to be a formidable opponent. Its heavy frontal armor was impervious to the bazookas of Israeli infantry and paratroopers. Even the 90mm rounds fired by most Israeli Patton tanks (M-48A2s) could not penetrate it. In contrast, the Stalin's big 122mm gun proved effective. In a number of battles, IS-3Ms knocked out several Pattons of Israel's 7th Armored Brigade. Only one Patton company, with 105mm guns, was successful, destroying seven IS-3Ms.
Altogether, Egypt lost 73 Stalin tanks in 1967. According to The Six Day War by the Churchill brothers, those at Kuntilla were abandoned without a fight. Presumably this led to the Soviet claim that if all of Egypt's tanks had fired just one shot, they would've won the war.  Although Israel captured many IS-3Ms, it decided not employ them in its own armored units. The Stalin was too slow for the fast desert warfare favored by the IDF, and the rate of fire of its big gun was too low. Since 1967, the IS-3M was phased out of service in the Egyptian Army.