Axis Survival

For many years, historians have maintained that US entry into WWII doomed the Axis. Given American industrial might and resources, far surpassing those of Germany and Japan, US participation guaranteed Allied victory. This view is open to question, however. Had the Axis made better decisions in the year after Pearl Harbor, Germany and Japan might've held out and ended the war on favorable terms.

In regards to Germany, the following changes would've greatly enhanced the Reich's survivability, and prospects:

Gerrmany should've tried to negotiate an end to the eastern war (i.e. with the USSR) as soon as possible, preferably around July 1942. At the time Stalin was getting very worried over German advances (hence the order "not another step back!"). Nearing panic, the Soviets might've agreed to a peace deal leaving Germany in possession of many of its eastern conquests, including the agriculturally rich Ukraine.

If the Soviets didn't make peace on acceptable terms, the reich should've continued operation Blau but it shouldn't have tried to take Stalingrad. It would've been better to follow a more economical strategy of containing Stalingrad, while the Luftwaffe focused on Astrakan and Soviet tankers in the Caspian. If the Germans avoided the Stalingrad quagmire they could've maintained a stronger Don flank and been able to repel Soviet counteroffensives. Unable to break the German grip on the area seized by Blau, which was depriving them of vital oil and Lend Lease supplies, the Soviets might've been forced to accept peace on German terms.

Better production priorities were also vital to German prospects.

The reich should've halted U-boat construction by the end of 1942. By then the u-boats were practically obsolete and not worth the enormous investment being made in them. The u-boat war would've continued of course but to enhance survivability u-boats were to maintain absolute radio silence when traveling to and from patrol areas. Long range Type IX boats shouldn't have participates in North Atlantic convoy operations. They should've operated only in distant areas such as the Carribean, the east coast of South America, Cape of Good Hope etc. Lacking foreknowledge of U-boat plans, the allies would've suffered high losses in shipping--even after mid '43--and been forced to spread strong ASW forces over vast areas. In effect, this would've tied down far more allied assets in peripheral areas far from the main European theater of operations.

Enhancing the performance of Type VII U-boats in the North Atlantic would've been problematic but doable. After acoustic homing torpedoes became available, the VIIs should've been routinely deployed in two groups. One would've thinned out convoy escorts before the other slaughtered the vulnerable merchantmen.

One example of how this might've worked: First the latter, bigger group would've formed a long patrol line (or lines) from Greenland southward. The other group, consisting of only 4-6 boats (with the bulk of homing torpedoes) would've maintained absolute radio silence even after reaching its assigned patrol area--just south of the main line (the latter known to the allies as its boats transmitted daily position reports after reaching assigned positions). When an allied convoy, seeking to evade the main, known patrol line(s), blundered into the far southerly second group, it would've suffered high losses in escorts. It would've then had to traverse a considerable area of ocean with minimal protection before getting reinforcements and air cover. Even after "Black May," convoys might've suffered considerable losses. (Of course there would've been other variants of the tactic e.g. establishing main north-south patrol lines with a gap in mid-ocean, and the second group just west of the gap.)

The overall goal was to prolong or maximize the effectiveness of existing U-boats and the degree to which they tied down allied forces, with no new investment in the u-boat arm. There would be no Type XXI or Type XIII construction. Far more steel, labor etc would become available to maximize German ground strength. The main emphasis would be on increasing the defensive ability of infantry divisions--the vast bulk of the army.

The Germans should also have avoided another costly waste--the V-1 and V-2 missile program. Again, considerable resources would've been freed up for more worthwhile projects.

Besides better u-boat performance and production priorities, German strategy in the West, as well as in the East, needed improvement.

After Rommel won the battle of Gazala in June 1942 the Afrika Korps should've halted at the border with Egypt. There shouldn't have been an adance to Alamein, nor any new offensive in August-September. The British would prepare a new offensive but it wouldn't have been ready by November 8, 1942 when the allies landed in NW Africa. With his forces intact, Rommel would've moved west to Tunisia. The losses of Alamein would've been avoided, hence there would've been no need to send big reinforcements into what was bound to become a hopeless trap. The Axis losses incurred by ultimate defeat in '43 would've been far less than occurred historically.

Avoiding Stalingrad and the North African debacle, the Germans would've retained far more good troops for the challenges of 1943-44 in the West, after an end to the eastern war. Had the latter occurred by late 1942 the western allies might've lacked the stomach for the casualties they'd incur defeating the reich on their own. Perhaps peace with the USSR would've meant a general peace by early '43. In theory, the Americans and British had the men and resources to overwhelm the reich by themselves. There would've been a major problem, however. Ironically, the very democracy the allies were fighting for was their Achilles heel. Given the likelihood of an inordinate death toll, public support for the war might've evaporated, causing FDR to lose the '44 elections. Forced to abandon the goal of unconditional surrender, the allies may have had to leave Nazi Germany intact and in possession of much of its empire, especially in the East.

The Japanese might've similarly prevailed with changes of their own:

--Tokyo's forces should not have advanced to the Solomons or New Guinea. The troops would've been better employed fortifying the Marianas and Philippines instead. Just like (hypothetical) German defenses in the West, Japan's positions may have proved too costly to take.

--It was vital for Japan to establish a convoy system no later than the end of 1942.

--After 1942 (assuming there is no general peace by early '43) the IJN should've concentrated its I-boats in the Indian Ocean, the most remunerative and safest hunting ground. But the Japanese should've also emphasized production of smaller RO class subs for use against American supply lines, as US forces advanced westward. And they should never have transmitted plans via radio.

The upshot of all this would've been Axis survival post 1945. Instead of a bipolar world, pitting the West against the USSR, there might've been a tripolar world, with the West facing fascists as well as communists (Note this scenario assumes peace prior to US acquisition of nuclear weapons. Like the USSR, the Axis powers would've acquired a deterrent). Ultimately the West might've prevailed against both totalitarian systems owing to its greater innovation.

By the end of 1942, u-boat construction (example above) was a costly misuse of scarce resources. It should've been halted, even as new strategies were devised to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of existing boats.

Comments on Crossan's book

John Dominic Crossan's Jesus a Revolutionary Biography is an old but fascinating work. I agree with much of what Crossan wrote, but not everything.

Crossan's views are highly unorthodox. His take on the purpose of Jesus is at odds with mainstream scholarship. Crossan believes Jesus was a social revolutionary. In contrast, most scholars consider him an apocalyptic prophet. Ehrman's evidence favoring the latter view appears persuasive. Like John the baptist, whom Jesus associated with, and the christians who lived soon after his death, Jesus was almost certainly an apocalypticist.

Likewise, while chapter 6 (The Dogs beneath the Cross) is one of the most brilliant and insightful chapters ever written, it is not perfect.

Crossan rightly concludes The Last Supper never happened; it is just another invention by early christians (albeit well before the gospel writers, as Paul mentioned it). Crossan noted absence of references to such an event in key christian literature. In addition, "the last supper" doesn't pass the criterion of dissimilarity. The early christians wanted to make it appear that Jesus, as an omniscient being, anticipated his approaching death and left final instructions. Therefore, "the last supper" is best interpreted as an invention.

Crossan believes Jesus was arrested immediately after the temple ruckus, which is very credible. However, his view that Jesus was led away to be crucified immediately, without a trial, is unlikely. Common soldiers or centurions weren't authorized to inflict the death penalty summarily and on their own initiative. Without input from higher authority, things could've gotten out of hand. Almost certainly, Pilate was in Jerusalem at the time. He came with reinforcements from Caesaria to discourage trouble during passover. Since Pilate was there, it was easy to bring an accused person to him for a cursory trial.

It should also be noted that Jewish police or Temple guards initially arrested Jesus. They were closer to the disturbance than the Romans in the Antonia fort. Most of the disciples escaped but the jewish guards caught Jesus and Judas Iscariot. To the Jewish leaders, Jesus was a rabble rouser who had to be eliminated. Jesus had been caught overturning tables but that didn't warrant execution. The Jews--who couldn't inflict the death penalty themselves--wanted him charged with a capital crime. As Erhman concluded, Judas gave his captors the information they needed. He told them Jesus considered himself the King of the Jews. That was sedition, a capital offense.

The next day the Jews brought Jesus before Pilate, who asked if he was king of the jews. Jesus did consider himself the coming king after "the son of man" arrived, so he didn't deny the charge (he couldn't "sin" by lying). So Jesus was then flogged and crucified. The fact the accounts say Jesus was executed for considering himself a king argues he wasn't crucified immediately for causing a ruckus. There are other problems with Crossan's chapter 6.

Crossan shows how the "crown of thorns" was an invention stemming from an older tradition (recorded c 100 CE by Barnabus) as were other things. But the part about Roman soldiers mocking the "king of the jews" seems historically plausible. It wasn't based on the Carabas farce. Gospel writers wouldn't have used that. Carabas wasn't from the Old Testament hence did nothing to "fulfill prophecy." It's likely the claim of a nobody like Jesus to be king humored Roman soldiers, who mocked him.

The central point of chapter 6--that Jesus wasn't given a decent burial but was eaten by scavenging dogs or crows--is brilliantly argued and presented. It's noteworthy that Ehrman, who originally dismissed Crossan's view, later came to accept it.

Addendum: A summary execution of Jesus, unauthorized by Pilate, is also unlikely because the gospel accounts pass the criterion of dissimilaity. Gospel writers wanted to blame the death of Jesus on the Jews not the Romans. If Pilate had no involvement in the crucifixion of Jesus why would Mark, John etc mention Pilate at all? If their purpose was to blame the Jews it made no sense to make up a story about Pilate sentencing Jesus to death. As prefect, Pilate represented Roman authority. The Gospel authors would've preferred to avoid any hint of Roman complicity so the Jews would appear entirely and unambiguously at fault.* Mark and later authors included Pilate's role because that was the original, correct account they inherited.

* It would've been unwise for gospel writers to antagonize the Romans since they wrote at or near the apogee of Roman power.

SETI and UFOlogy

For many years SETI, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (or its putative radio emissions) has been respectable. In contrast, UFOlogy is often dismissed. This attitude is not reasonable; it should be the other way around.

The assumption underlying SETI, that other civilizations communicate in ways familiar to us, such as radio, reflects temporocentrism and a failure of imagination. It is highly naive to think aliens are at our level technologically, and dependent on our current methods.

Civilization has existed on Earth for only about 6-7,000 years--nothing on a galactic timescale. We are mere beginners. Any or all alien civilizations are almost certainly older--perhaps by many millions of years. With so much more time to progress, they are likely far more advanced, and well beyond the use of radio. Even Earth is nearing the abandonment of radio. It has been said that a switch to fiber optics, and peace, would see Earth "disappear from the radio map of the heavens." Alien civilizations probably "disappeared" long ago. The failure of SETI to discover artificial transmissions of ET origin attests to the obsolescence of the approach. With the possible exception of the "WOW" signal SETI has failed utterly, which isn't at all surprising.

Considering the substantially greater age of ET worlds, it's more reasonable to expect means of communication and travel we are scarcely able to grasp. The UFO phenomenon fulfills this prediction. Reports of strange craft, with unknown propulsion methods, and speed and maneuverability surpassing that of familiar craft, is exactly what we should expect. Instead of being marginalized, UFOlogy should be embraced. There is no need to search for ET. He has found us, as he is not essentially confined to home and dependent on radio.

Below, SETI radio receiver and UFO.

Illusory Success in Syria

The looming collapse of the Syrian regime is touted as a "huge blow to Iran" and a great victory for the US and its Mideast allies. The ultimate outcome, however, may look quite different.

If or when Homs falls, Assad and his allies will realize the game is up. Unable to prevent an HTS takeover, they will simply abandon Syria. Assad will load the gold and cash obtained from the captagon trade onto planes and fly to Iraq or Iran. Similarly, Syrian pilots shall escape with their MIG-25s and SU-22s etc.

HTS and its allies will boast of their victory; there may be a triumphal entry into Damascus. But they will inherit a bankrupt, ruined nation. Needless to say a return of refugees from Turkey and other nations will compound the problems. The rebels won, but their backers will have little to show for it.

The Syrian disaster will reduce Iranian prestige and influence, but it won't be fatal. It may actually be beneficial. Like the US in 1975, when South Vietnam fell (and more recently, following the failure in Afghanistan) Iran will be relieved of the awful burden of propping up a precarious regime in a nation wracked with problems. There will be no more futile squandering of blood and treasure. From now on, Syria's massive problems will be someone else's.

The US, HTS, Turkey, Israel etc will cheer over Assad's fall and gloat over Iran's putative setback. Things will look much different, however, in 2025 and 2026. The "winners" will see just how high the price of victory will be. They'll be stuck with the costs of the war, refugee resettlement and reconstruction. Economically ruined, and with its captagan business eliminated, Syria will require massive infusions of cash. This will prove onerous for the US, EU and Saudi Arabia.

The enormous cost of reviving Syria will ultimately prove a waste, for the nation won't be subservient to the West. If, following masssive aid, Damascus become reasonably prosperous and stable, it'll again focus on foreign policy. Almost certainly, this will be to the detriment of relations with Israel and the US. It's hard to imagine any Syrian regime just writing off the Golan. Inevitably, Damascus will demand its land back. Regaining Golan will require allies, as Syria won't be strong enough to achieve this without help. There may be a Syria--Iran rapproachment (if Iran and Iraq reconciled after a decade of bloody war so may Iran and Syria).

Even without such a development, the new Syrian state may ultimately pose a more formidable challenge to Israel than the old alawite regimes. Assuming the new regime is based on the Sunni majority, it should prove more stable, with greater support, than past governments. This will reduce the need for internal security measures, such as promotion based on loyalty rather than merit, which so plagued Syrian forces in the past. Better led and motivated forces should perform much better than those of 1967 or 1973. They may prove to be Israel's nemesis in a future war.

As Rabin often said, one can't predict the future of the Mideast. The fall of Assad is just the latest example. But those who think it'll mean an end to Iran's current regime, and perpetual peace in the region, are probably dead wrong.

Below, victorious rebels.

The Syria Scheme

The Mideast has witnessed a startling new development. HTS launched a sudden, major invasion of northern Syria, imperiling Assad's regime and raising the specter of a nation ruled by an al-qaida offshoot. Aided by surprise, the rebels overran the city of Aleppo and have just forced the Syrian arab army (SAA) to withdraw from Hama. Reports that the SAA has stabilized the front appear premature. A further HTS advance, to Homs, may prove fatal for the regime. Besides troops, Syrian losses include Buk and Pantsyr AD systems, an S-400 radar and T-90 tanks. The Syrian air force (SAF) has fought hard, hitting HTS troops, drone and ammo dumps. But it hasn't stemmed the rebel tide.

The setbacks are a major embarrassment for Assad, and may auger a geopolitical shift in the Mideast. Heavily beset, Assad sent an SOS to Iran, which instructed its Iraqi allies to help. Reinforcements are arriving in Syria. Little if any help, however, is forthcoming from Assad's erstwhile saviours, Russia and Hezbollah. Battered by Ukraine and Israel, respectively, neither can do much. Iraqi forces might compensate for their absence, but this is far from certain. Turkish drones may decimate Iraqi armor, just as they massacred Syrian tanks advancing toward Idlib a few years ago.

Why did the HTS offensive occur, and who was responsible? No doubt, Erdogan aided HTS but the assault wasn't on his initiative. The US was the real power behind it. Lately, Washington sensed a golden opportunity to eliminate most of Iran's allies and influence in the region. Ultimately, Israel is to be the main beneficiary, as successful implementation of the scheme would eliminate its entire northern front.

Preoccupied with Israel lately, Syria let down its guard and neglected its HTS front. Aware of this, the US devised a plan to topple Assad with local forces--including, besides HTS, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. With his northern front weak, and bereft of Russian and Hezbollah assistance, Assad looked temptingly vulnerable. Ousting him would end Iranian influence not only in Syria but also in Lebanon. Cut off from Iran by the fall of Assad, Hezbollah would wither on the vine and die.

Despite US denials, America's role as instigator is confirmed by the participation of US artillery and jets in SDF attacks--operations coordinated with those of HTS. The SDF reportedly has taken Deir Ezzor and may soon take Boukamal. By taking border crossing areas SDF seeks to prevent reinforcements from Iraq or Iran from saving Assad.

Coming weeks may witness either the success of the scheme, or an embarrassment for the US.

Below, Assad.

Dating Error

Desmond's The Hot Blooded Dinosaurs is an old, mid 70s book. It's main purpose is to show that dinosaurs were endothermic not gargantuan reptiles. The book also addresses the issue of extinction.

At the time, the impact theory was not established and other views were still in vogue. The author noted evidence for a gradual demise instead of a sudden, catastrophic one. Among both dinosaurs and ammonoids, diversity in North American waned before the end. Desmond mentioned other evidence: eggshell pathologies in Europe. Unknown at the time, these do point to extinction but it was only partial, and not associated with the K-Pg. A summary of the book's view:

Can we ever witness the suffering of dinosaurs towards the end? What evidence could reveal the anguish of creatures separated from us by 70 million years? The last dinosaurs were subjected to unbearable pressure. That much is certain. Evidence comes from the French Pyrenees. As Professor Erben noted, local eggs display features indicative of a crisis. The strata in which the eggs are found are of late Maastrichtian age and therefore document the period immediately prior to the final extinction of the dinosaurs. Erben's analysis has had startling and unforeseen results. The stratigraphically highest eggs display thinning; shell thickness fell from 2.5mm to just 1mm. In birds, thinning of eggshell is associated with stress from predation, poisoning etc. In the latest Cretacous, this condition proved fatal as a fetus could not derive enough calcium to build a skeleton. Desmond's conclusion: "The majestic dinosaurs....had departed not with a bang but with a whimper--the whimper of the young as they perished incarcerated in tiny prisons."

The problem is, the dating of the Pyrenees strata was erroneous. The strata are of middle Maastrichtian age, and therefore irrelevant to the final extinction. Although stress, reproductive issues and extinction really happened, only local taxa were affected and they were replaced. The crisis resulted from an influx of lambeosaurs into western Europe. Blasisaurus and others outcompeted local titanosaurs, rhabdodonts and ankylosaurs. Loss of their niche severely stressed the titanosaurs. The result was pathology and extinction. But dinosaurs generally lived on, until the K-Pg three million years later.

Assigning a late Maastrichtian age to a somewhat older unit was once common. Because of widespread erosion at the K-Pg, the geological record is strongly biased against late Maastrichtian strata. The North American record is an exception. Elsewhere, units of 71-68 Ma are the youngest Cretaceous horizon hence were often mistaken for the end. Examples include the Sanpetru formation of Romania and the Amur localities of east Asia. Evidence from such units has no bearing on the final demise.

Eggshell pathologies do occur in close proximity to the K-Pg elsewhere, in southern China. Researchers have documented eggshell anomalies in the Nanxiong. However, even these predate the K-Pg and the presumed cause was different. In India, Deccan volcanism spewed chemical pollutants into the atmosphere. Transported to southern China by the wind, the pollutants adversely affected the local biota. Nanxiong pathologies suggest extinction, albeit of limited geographical extent. Contaminated eggshells may be the only evidence for a Deccan role in the K-Pg. Chicxulub was undoubtedly the main cause. (Tyrannosaurus seems to have had an impact c mid Maastrichtian but a subsequent role, while possible, is quite speculative.)

References

Desmond, Adrian. The Hot Blooded Dinosaurs Dial Press 1976.

Sellas, Albert. Vila, Bernat. Galobart, Angel. Evidence of Reproductive Stress in Titanosaurian Sauropods Triggered by an increase in Ecological Competition. Scientific Reports 2017.

Below, Desmond's book, published in 1976.

Extinction and Escalation c 69 Ma

Previous posts mentioned the demise of centrosaurines and survival of chasmosaurines. This post examines the actual transition, around middle Maastrichtian time, and the specific taxa involved. It is interesting that well-armed chasmosaurines--forerunners of Triceratops--appeared concurrently, more or less, with the disappearance of the last centrosaurine. And both coincided with the advent of the archpredator.

Known from a high latitude paleoenvironment (in Alaska) Pachyrhinosaurus perotorum was the last species of its genus, and the last of the centrosaurines. P. perotorum vanished around 69 m.y.a. It's noteworthy that Tyrannosaurus first appeared around this time. Tyrannosaurus replaced Albertosaurus, which apparently disappeared c 69 m.y.a. Clearly, this represented predator escalation; a quantum leap in the threat level facing herbivores. Chasmosaurine escalation was in response to it. Apparently unable to adapt in time, P. perotorum succumbed.

At least four chasmosaurine taxa lived right after P. perotorum. Presumably the four evolved as P. perotorum vanished, and outlasted it. Discovered in the uppermost Horseshoe Canyon, Eotriceratops clearly anticipated Triceratops. So did the roughly coeval SW taxa Ojoceratatops and Torosaurus utahensis. Another close relation, Regaliceratops, differed from the other three in that it resurrected the prominent nasal horn of Styracosaurus. In other words Regaliceratops converged with centrosaurines--not the deescalated later ones but the well-armed taxa preceding them. Although atypical for a chasmosaurine, a prominent nasal horn was a good antipredator weapon. No doubt, Regaliceratops was better able to withstand the archpredator than the virtually hornless P. perotorum. It does not, however, appear widespread or numerous, hence not as successful as the lineage with large orbital horns, culminating in Triceratops.

This intepretation has a potential problem: Apparently known only from the SW or Alamosaurus bearing units at first, Tyrannosaurus may not have impacted mid Maastrichtian taxa in northern areas. At least two of the chasmosaurines, however, Ojoceratops and Torosaurus, existed in the SW. The similarity of Eotriceratops to these genera suggests interaction with the more southerly faunas (which as the North Horn indicates, extended northward, perhaps even farther than Utah). Like Torosaurus, Eotriceratops may have ranged into both northern and southern biomes. Ceratopsians probably migrated regularly in search of food, hence were exposed to the archpredator in some areas even if they weren't affected in all of them, initially. As for P. perotorum, its far northern location didn't ensure safety from Tyrannosaurus. Like other ceratopsians, P. perotorum probably migrated southward. In addition, the archpredator is thought to have entered Laramidia via the Bering area, in which case the Alaskan habitat of P. perotorum may have been the first to be affected.

Eotriceratops. A forerunner of Triceratops, Eotriceratops lived around 68.8 m.y.a.--essentially at the same time, or right after, the last centrosaurine disappeared (c 69 m.y.a.). As was noted in previous posts, the centrosaurines were at a disadavantage because they had evolved a nasal boss, from which it was apparently impossible to re evolve a nasal horn. In contrast chasmosaurines, retaining horns since the Campanian, simply improved upon their defense.

Ojoceratops a taxon of about 68 m.y.a.

Holotype skull of Regaliceratops, showing the prominent nasal horn. It may have lived 68.5 m.y.a. or soon after the faunal turnover spurred by Tyrannosaurus.