Postwar situation 1973-74

This is from an old article by Drew Middleton appearing in The New York Times on January 3, 1974. I have a number of questions and comments.
Middleton wrote that west of the canal, facing the Israeli bridgehead, Egypt deployed a full strength infantry division of 11,800 men, an artillery brigade and "probably an armored brigade" (the 35th? 27th?)
"An Algerian armored division, deployed to the south of these forces along the shoe of the Gulf of Suez, is under the operational command of the Third Army."
As for the Second Army, besides 23,00 men east of the canal, with independent armored brigades (15th, 24th?) it had "another division in reserve on the west bank, between Tantara (sic) and Ismailia."
Several questions arise: Why was the Algerian armored division sent to the gulf of suez, where was the Fourth Armored Division, why was there a big gap between the 2nd and 3rd army west of the canal, and why wasn't the second's reserve division positioned to face the bridgehead?
Regarding the first question, the Algerians may have been sent south to guard the right flank of the Third Army, SW of Suez. But I doubt that. Although the Israelis kept over 20,000 men and three armored brigades west of the canal after November (when other units went back east) they contemplated attacking the 3rd Army in Sinai, not its positions west of the canal. Nevertheless, the Algerians were sorely needed where they were. If war resumed it was vital to reach the trapped divisions quickly. They were doomed, unless Cairo was able to resupply them, send reinforcements and reestablish SAM cover. The Algerian deployment reflected the importance of this mission. While the 4rth attacked via the Cairo-Suez road, Algerian armor might've broken through from the south.
The third and fourth issues remind me of what Sharon told Dayan after the war. Sharon, whose division fought in the northern part of the bridgehead, claimed there were gaps in the Egyptian deployment, so it would be easy to infiltrate through them and take the Egyptians from the rear. But I doubt there was a gap as large as the map seems to indicate. I assume the Second Army reserve was deployed to prevent a further northward advance, to Ismailia and beyond. Maybe the Egyptians feigned weakness in this area, to tempt the Israelis into deploying their armor there instead of guarding the Cairo-Suez road. But that's pure speculation.