Fate of the Fourth Armored Division
Long the mainstay of Egypt's strategic reserve, the 4rth fought with tenacity and valor. In his memoirs, Sadat praised Kabil, the division's commander. He had consummate tactical skill. With one armored division, Sadat wrote, Kabil did the work of three. The need for such skill, however, mirrored desperate circumstances late in the war, for which Sadat was to blame. His first blunder was to order the October 14 attack. Together with other units, the Fourth complied with Sadat's order, to the detriment of itself and its country.
Consisting of at least three brigades, the 2nd and 3rd armored and 6th Mechanized, the Fourth was at first kept in reserve, around Obeid mountain, west of the Geneifa hills. When the order for the ill-starred attack came, only one of the brigades, the 3rd, was to participate. Because the terrain west of the waterway, in the Third Army sector, was well suited to armored warfare, the Egyptians decided to keep two of the brigades on the west bank. Good tank ground favored the enemy, so it was prudent to keep two thirds of the division in that area.
At 12:30 AM on October 12, Kabil informed the commander of the 3rd of his mission. He was to enter Sinai and reach the Mitla pass. Around 1300 on October 13, the brigade crossed, and entered the El Shatt/Un Moussa crossroads area. Enemy artillery, firing from the Mitla area, caused some losses.
The main road leading to the objective, the El Shatt Mitla, was blocked by Israeli armor concentrations. Consulting local Beduoins, the 3rd's commander learned of an alternate route. He decided to go south before heading east. Leaving one of his three battalions in reserve, the commander neared his objective via the wadi El Mour and Wadi Mabouk. Advancing 25 kilometers, the 3rd bypassed the Israeli first line of defense but was spotted, and faced a second, about 6km west of the entrance to the Mitla.
The defenders there had tanks, guns and ATGMs. When the 3rd's leading elements came within range, they opened fire, destroying the vanguard companies of the two advancing battalions along with the command vehicles. Others were also hit. Some T-55s managed to fire back, and claimed to have blasted 13 enemy tanks. An Egyptian officer, Nour Eldean el Aziz, tried to organize the tanks but perished. Surprisingly, survivors said most losses were due to ATGMs. They seemed to have a longer range than SS-11s known to be in Israeli service. The Egyptians suspected the Israelis were using TOWs supplied by the US.
Soon, the 3rd faced another threat. Moving beyond SAM cover exposed it to air attack. Enemy jets began pounding the brigade. They targeted mainly artillery and support vehicles. The Egyptians had to pull back.
The battle of Wadi Mabouk is said to have cost the 3rd 50-60 tanks. If true, that would imply the virtual destruction of both battalions sent into action. The brigade's final battle line on the 14th was just 2km east of the Third Army's 19th division. There the 3rd established defenses and recovered damaged vehicles. Just after the 14th it had 58 tanks.
Soon, as Israeli forces poured across the canal, action shifted to the west bank. Around the 18th, the 3rd was ordered back west (initially its reserve battalion was attached to the 7th Infantry to replace the 25th but it went back west with the 3rd's other units on the 19th). But the 2nd armored was already on the west bank and saw action sooner.
The 2nd armored brigade sent one of its battalions, the 207th, to the Deversoir area. There the battalion attacked repeatedly into the flank of Israeli forces at the Uri position, close to the canal. Advancing from cover of trees, the 207th's T-55s inflicted and sustained losses. By this time, Adan's division had crossed in that area. It was a mistake to confront it with a single battalion (said to number only 25 or so tanks). Adan ordered a subordinate, Lapidot, to head south along the Test road, along the canal, and then strike the 207th in the flank. The Israelis claim to have set half its tanks ablaze, while others became mired in mud and were abandoned.
The next day, the 19th, the Israelis broke out of their bridgehead and penetrated deep into Egypt. Sadat's insistence on sending units east of the canal had forced Kabil's depleted command to spread out far and wide to try to stop them. There weren't many other units. As related, Kabil sent the 2nd's surviving battalions, the 208th and 209th, to Om Habara and a nearby dune area. Another battalion, possibly the remnants of the 207th, was guarding the Geneifa hills. The 3rd was moving back west. The 4rth's other brigade, the 6th Mechanized, was at Kilometer 109 north of Jebel Ataka.
On the 19th, the 2nd knocked out about 20 of Adan's tanks and other vehicles. On that day, however, Kabil received an order to prepare an offensive against Deversoir. He instructed all elements of the 4rth, save a few, to assemble at Gafra for this attack, scheduled for noon the next day. *
The speed of Adan's advance disrupted Egyptian plans. After the battalion guarding the Geneifa hills was pulled out, Adan overran the hills with scant resistance and threatened to cut the Cairo-Suez road. On the 20th, a battalion of the 3rd armored and a battalion from the 113th brigade (the latter not part of the 4rth) attempted to replace the battalion sent to Gafra. But the Israelis now held the hills and their fire forced both battalions to withdraw. Meanwhile, the enemy thrust south had caused the attack on Deversoir to be cancelled. Forced to bolster the Third Army's line of communications, Kabil now sent his units south of the Geneifa hills.
On the 20th, enemy progress proved rapid. One of Adan's brigade commanders, Natke, effectively cut the Cairo-Suez road with long range tank fire. The 4rth did however, stop the Israelis farther east. In the southeastern part of the Geneifa hills near the Egyptian camps at Odeda, the 3rd armored stopped the advance of another commander, Aryeh. Targeted by tanks, artillery and missiles, Aryeh suffered losses. He resumed his advance the next day, toward Metzila, but encountered more tough resistance.
October 21st saw elements of the 4rth and another unit attempt to restore the situation in Natke's area. Forty Egyptian tanks, with infantry, attacked the site of SAM base 5122, then held by the enemy, and reached its center. According to Adan's account, they knocked out five Israeli tanks but lost 15 of their own then, and ten more soon afterwards. Israeli progress remained slow, however.
The next day, one of the 4rth's tank battalions, advancing from the west, attacked an Israeli force moving on the Arish track toward the Cairo-Suez road. The Israelis claimed to have hit a few tanks and the rest withdrew. This was probably the depleted 3rd brigade, which Dupuy wrote had fought stubbornly until, greatly reduced in strength, it fell back westward toward Kilometer 101.
When General Wassel, commander of the Third Army, realized the Cairo-Suez road had been cut he ordered Kabil to attack with the 6th brigade to reopen it. In view of enemy superiority in armor and in the air, Kabil and Shazly were reluctant to comply. Kabil cited lack of SAM cover as a reason not to attack. By the 22nd enemy air activity had greatly increased, and the Egyptian SAM network had been disrupted.
Despite the odds the 4rth tried to break through. On the morning of the 23rd, after the first cease fire broke down, its tanks attacked Magen's forces on the Cairo-Suez and Asor roads. Adan wrote that Magen contained these attacks and inflicted high losses. This wasn't the full truth. The Israelis were forced to retreat a few kilometers, and request air support. To the end of the war, the Fourth remained a force to be reckoned with.
Unfortunately, losses in fighting power sapped the division's effectiveness. Egyptian sources say on the 25th, right after the war, it had 170-180 tanks. But that figure almost certainly includes tanks from the 27th and replacements from the 1st Army. It's noteworthy that Kabil, right after the war, was still reluctant to try to reopen the road. "My men are prepared to die to reach the Third Army" Shazli recorded him as saying. "But if we fail, the road to Cairo is open." One source said Egypt had only 46 tanks left between the Israeli army and its capital. It is stark testimony to the 4rth's courage and the ineptitude of the president.
* According to Shazly, before the war the Egyptians anticipated a possible Israeli crossing at Deversoir. If it materialized, they planned to use the 4rth division, and 25th brigade, to launch a counterattack toward the area. It's not surprising, therefore, the 4rth actually received an order to do this. But by October 19th the 25th had been wrecked and the 4rth depleted.
References
Anwar El-Sadat In Search of Identity An Autobiography Sadat
On the Banks of the Suez Adan
The Crossing of the Suez Shazly
Elusive Victory Dupuy
No Victor no Vanquished O'Ballance
The Yom Kippur War Rabinovich
From Sinai to the Golan Hamad
Consisting of at least three brigades, the 2nd and 3rd armored and 6th Mechanized, the Fourth was at first kept in reserve, around Obeid mountain, west of the Geneifa hills. When the order for the ill-starred attack came, only one of the brigades, the 3rd, was to participate. Because the terrain west of the waterway, in the Third Army sector, was well suited to armored warfare, the Egyptians decided to keep two of the brigades on the west bank. Good tank ground favored the enemy, so it was prudent to keep two thirds of the division in that area.
At 12:30 AM on October 12, Kabil informed the commander of the 3rd of his mission. He was to enter Sinai and reach the Mitla pass. Around 1300 on October 13, the brigade crossed, and entered the El Shatt/Un Moussa crossroads area. Enemy artillery, firing from the Mitla area, caused some losses.
The main road leading to the objective, the El Shatt Mitla, was blocked by Israeli armor concentrations. Consulting local Beduoins, the 3rd's commander learned of an alternate route. He decided to go south before heading east. Leaving one of his three battalions in reserve, the commander neared his objective via the wadi El Mour and Wadi Mabouk. Advancing 25 kilometers, the 3rd bypassed the Israeli first line of defense but was spotted, and faced a second, about 6km west of the entrance to the Mitla.
The defenders there had tanks, guns and ATGMs. When the 3rd's leading elements came within range, they opened fire, destroying the vanguard companies of the two advancing battalions along with the command vehicles. Others were also hit. Some T-55s managed to fire back, and claimed to have blasted 13 enemy tanks. An Egyptian officer, Nour Eldean el Aziz, tried to organize the tanks but perished. Surprisingly, survivors said most losses were due to ATGMs. They seemed to have a longer range than SS-11s known to be in Israeli service. The Egyptians suspected the Israelis were using TOWs supplied by the US.
Soon, the 3rd faced another threat. Moving beyond SAM cover exposed it to air attack. Enemy jets began pounding the brigade. They targeted mainly artillery and support vehicles. The Egyptians had to pull back.
The battle of Wadi Mabouk is said to have cost the 3rd 50-60 tanks. If true, that would imply the virtual destruction of both battalions sent into action. The brigade's final battle line on the 14th was just 2km east of the Third Army's 19th division. There the 3rd established defenses and recovered damaged vehicles. Just after the 14th it had 58 tanks.
Soon, as Israeli forces poured across the canal, action shifted to the west bank. Around the 18th, the 3rd was ordered back west (initially its reserve battalion was attached to the 7th Infantry to replace the 25th but it went back west with the 3rd's other units on the 19th). But the 2nd armored was already on the west bank and saw action sooner.
The 2nd armored brigade sent one of its battalions, the 207th, to the Deversoir area. There the battalion attacked repeatedly into the flank of Israeli forces at the Uri position, close to the canal. Advancing from cover of trees, the 207th's T-55s inflicted and sustained losses. By this time, Adan's division had crossed in that area. It was a mistake to confront it with a single battalion (said to number only 25 or so tanks). Adan ordered a subordinate, Lapidot, to head south along the Test road, along the canal, and then strike the 207th in the flank. The Israelis claim to have set half its tanks ablaze, while others became mired in mud and were abandoned.
The next day, the 19th, the Israelis broke out of their bridgehead and penetrated deep into Egypt. Sadat's insistence on sending units east of the canal had forced Kabil's depleted command to spread out far and wide to try to stop them. There weren't many other units. As related, Kabil sent the 2nd's surviving battalions, the 208th and 209th, to Om Habara and a nearby dune area. Another battalion, possibly the remnants of the 207th, was guarding the Geneifa hills. The 3rd was moving back west. The 4rth's other brigade, the 6th Mechanized, was at Kilometer 109 north of Jebel Ataka.
On the 19th, the 2nd knocked out about 20 of Adan's tanks and other vehicles. On that day, however, Kabil received an order to prepare an offensive against Deversoir. He instructed all elements of the 4rth, save a few, to assemble at Gafra for this attack, scheduled for noon the next day. *
The speed of Adan's advance disrupted Egyptian plans. After the battalion guarding the Geneifa hills was pulled out, Adan overran the hills with scant resistance and threatened to cut the Cairo-Suez road. On the 20th, a battalion of the 3rd armored and a battalion from the 113th brigade (the latter not part of the 4rth) attempted to replace the battalion sent to Gafra. But the Israelis now held the hills and their fire forced both battalions to withdraw. Meanwhile, the enemy thrust south had caused the attack on Deversoir to be cancelled. Forced to bolster the Third Army's line of communications, Kabil now sent his units south of the Geneifa hills.
On the 20th, enemy progress proved rapid. One of Adan's brigade commanders, Natke, effectively cut the Cairo-Suez road with long range tank fire. The 4rth did however, stop the Israelis farther east. In the southeastern part of the Geneifa hills near the Egyptian camps at Odeda, the 3rd armored stopped the advance of another commander, Aryeh. Targeted by tanks, artillery and missiles, Aryeh suffered losses. He resumed his advance the next day, toward Metzila, but encountered more tough resistance.
October 21st saw elements of the 4rth and another unit attempt to restore the situation in Natke's area. Forty Egyptian tanks, with infantry, attacked the site of SAM base 5122, then held by the enemy, and reached its center. According to Adan's account, they knocked out five Israeli tanks but lost 15 of their own then, and ten more soon afterwards. Israeli progress remained slow, however.
The next day, one of the 4rth's tank battalions, advancing from the west, attacked an Israeli force moving on the Arish track toward the Cairo-Suez road. The Israelis claimed to have hit a few tanks and the rest withdrew. This was probably the depleted 3rd brigade, which Dupuy wrote had fought stubbornly until, greatly reduced in strength, it fell back westward toward Kilometer 101.
When General Wassel, commander of the Third Army, realized the Cairo-Suez road had been cut he ordered Kabil to attack with the 6th brigade to reopen it. In view of enemy superiority in armor and in the air, Kabil and Shazly were reluctant to comply. Kabil cited lack of SAM cover as a reason not to attack. By the 22nd enemy air activity had greatly increased, and the Egyptian SAM network had been disrupted.
Despite the odds the 4rth tried to break through. On the morning of the 23rd, after the first cease fire broke down, its tanks attacked Magen's forces on the Cairo-Suez and Asor roads. Adan wrote that Magen contained these attacks and inflicted high losses. This wasn't the full truth. The Israelis were forced to retreat a few kilometers, and request air support. To the end of the war, the Fourth remained a force to be reckoned with.
Unfortunately, losses in fighting power sapped the division's effectiveness. Egyptian sources say on the 25th, right after the war, it had 170-180 tanks. But that figure almost certainly includes tanks from the 27th and replacements from the 1st Army. It's noteworthy that Kabil, right after the war, was still reluctant to try to reopen the road. "My men are prepared to die to reach the Third Army" Shazli recorded him as saying. "But if we fail, the road to Cairo is open." One source said Egypt had only 46 tanks left between the Israeli army and its capital. It is stark testimony to the 4rth's courage and the ineptitude of the president.
* According to Shazly, before the war the Egyptians anticipated a possible Israeli crossing at Deversoir. If it materialized, they planned to use the 4rth division, and 25th brigade, to launch a counterattack toward the area. It's not surprising, therefore, the 4rth actually received an order to do this. But by October 19th the 25th had been wrecked and the 4rth depleted.
References
Anwar El-Sadat In Search of Identity An Autobiography Sadat
On the Banks of the Suez Adan
The Crossing of the Suez Shazly
Elusive Victory Dupuy
No Victor no Vanquished O'Ballance
The Yom Kippur War Rabinovich
From Sinai to the Golan Hamad
posted by starman at 7:51 AM
18 Comments:
This is a good comprehensive Overview of the 4rth in '73.
How could the 4rth have done better,in Sinai and west of the canal?
Yes I think so.
On October 14, the 3rd armored shouldn't have made a serious attempt to reach the Mitla pass. Even if it had actually reached its objective it couldn't hold out there because it lacked air cover.The brigade should've just advanced a short distance and opened fire at very long range at Israeli armor on the Shatt el Mitla. As soon as the enemy returned the fire the 3rd should've pulled back and claimed it was "stopped and repulsed." That would've been consistent with the "show offensive" plan the Egyptian generals wanted.
If the 3rd had preserved virtually all its strength on the 14th, it should've then crossed back west earlier than it did if possible, and established an ambush in the northern or middle area of the Geneifa hills. If Adan were mauled that might've stopped the drive on Suez.
The 2nd armored shouldn't have sent the 207th to the Uri area, or positioned its units to attack Deversoir by the 20th. After leaving Om Habara (replaced there by the 27th) it should've established an ambush, or blocking position in the southern part of the Geneifa hills, with the 6th in reserve.
April 24, 2017
Egyptian forces definitely performed better in the 1973 war than they had during the 1974 war. With better planning, they could have made it even more difficult for the Israelis.
Hi Neal,
Agreed but surely you meant 1967 war instead of "1974 war." :)
April 26, 2017
Great article and definitely learned new things I never knew about. I was wondering if its possible to find out the formations of the battalions and brigades within the 4th. I think the 207th attack is consistent with the whole point of Egyptian general command not knowing the nature of the IDF forces that crossed the canal.
What also caught my attention was the TOWs , I thought they were sent right during the waning days of the fighting and not that early!
Much of the information comes from Hammad. In the old Iran Defense Forum HORAS translated some of his book. There was a lot of data I had not seen elsewhere. Too bad we don't have HORAS here now.
Yes, the Egyptians were slow to realize the Israelis had crossed and initially underestimated the scale of their operation. By the 18th, Adan had crossed, which meant the 207th battalion was far too small a force to deal with the enemy.
I have doubts about TOWs on the 14th too. The story of TOWs in the Wadi Mabouk battle reminds me of what was written about the 25th armored in O' Ballance's NO VICTOR NO VANQUISHED. According to that version, which hardly seems credible, the 25th was stopped and thrown back by a barrage of TOW missiles, appearing as red dots in the sky.
By the way, getting back to my previous post, about the Om Habara battle. It was somewhat speculative but I assume Magen wouldn't have gotten reinforcements (Sarig's brigade) unless he requested them. Magen's presumed request (I wrote SOS) and the speed with which they were rushed, from as far away as Golan, hints at a serious setback.
April 29, 2017
Starman, I am sorry to inform you that one of the old Pakistani members from Iran Defense forum got killed in a bike accident in Washington DC 2-3 days ago. I will get you the information ASAP.
I'm real sorry to hear that.
May 3, 2017
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-man-killed-in-motorcycle-crash/2017/05/01/69db6fc0-2e14-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html
His username was Abu Zulfikhar on the forum.
I am still wondering what are the guided missiles uses by the Israelis. I know they had some European ATGMs _(SS-11) but as AFAIK its accuracy was extremely poor. Cant see it doing that kind of damage to the battalion except if it was used in massive numbers.
I don't seem to recall him. I usually only posted in the Egypt subforum. I remember gomig, qweasd1, frogman, the crocodile etc.
The Israelis may have used SS-11s at Wadi Mabouk but I assume the bulk of damage was inflicted by their tanks.
May 4, 2017
I have some news, I managed to acquire Gomig's phone number and its not from him haha! I am sure it will be quite a surprise if you gave him a call.
Another thing that confuses me is where was the recon elements of the battalion? Or did they just rush through the desert?
When I talked to Gomig on the forum, I learned he lived not far from Boston, which isn't very far from here. I usually prefer emails to phone calls though--they can come at a bad time, lol.
I don't know about recon elements of the 3rd armored brigade. I suppose it was hard to know what was near them because they were advancing through a wadi (the Wadi Mabouk). The 3rd's commander may have assumed his brigade wouldn't be spotted in the wadi and wouldn't encounter enemy tanks as far east as the Mitla. But he was spotted and the Israelis sent tanks to stop his brigade.
I wonder what might have happened if the 3rd had advanced at night--before dawn on the 14th. Maybe, using night vision equipment, it could've advanced through the wadi undetected, emerged near the Mitla, and taken the Israeli armor from the rear, while a small force knocked out the Israeli artillery at the pass. I know Syrian tanks were equipped for night fighting. Don't know about Egyptian T-55s but it's possible.
May 4, 2017
If that scenario had happened. What would be the IDF's reaction to it most likely?
If the 3rd was able to advance through Wadi Mabouk undetected at night, and emerge undetected, it might've inflicted high losses on the Israeli armor on the main road to the Mitla (the el shatt Mitla). If the Egyptian attack came from the rear and night vision equipment gave them a further advantage, the el shatt force might've been slaughtered. But the Egyptians could have had trouble navigating properly at night and coordinating movement of all units to prevent friendly fire losses. No doubt, the Israelis would've sent reinforcements and jets to the area in the morning. By that time, the 3rd should've been withdrawn the 19th division area.
I suppose the 3rd could've tried another approach: after advancing at night, just seize the western entrance to the Mitla and establish an ambush for counterattacking Israeli tanks. But while the 3rd might've inflicted substantial losses that way, it might've been trapped, pounded by enemy jets and annihilated.
I don't think the 3rd's original mission--to reach the Mitla--was realistic. It would've meant advancing beyond SAM cover. The first scenario, above, might've been the best way to beat the enemy. I suppose the 3rd could've just advanced straight at the el shatt armor at night, relying on night vision gear without the advantage of surprise, or striking from an unexpected direction. But despite the difficulty of maneuvering at night, I think hitting the enemy from behind and then continuing on to the 19th would've been best.
May 9, 2017
I just consulted a map in Adan's book. The "Vadi Mabuk" extends almost to the road known to the Israelis as the Mavdil (or southern Supply) road. Its eastern exit is well to the SW of the Mitla entrance and well south of the "Atifa" road leading to the Mitla. The "Atifa" had a northward bend between the Egyptian lines and the Mitla. At the time the Israelis were probably deployed in that part of the road and a little to the south and east.
My scenario of advancing at night through the Wadi Mabouk and then taking the Israelis from the rear has a problem. Based on the probable location of enemy armor, in order to assault it from the rear, the 3rd would've had to get on the Mavdil road and head to the Mavdil-Atifa intersection, before turning west. If the 3rd entered the Mavdil road they might've encountered enemy supply vehicles. They were most likely to see them when they reached the Atifa. Enemy truckers could've raised the alarm, and spoiled the chances for surprise. But it is possible few trucks moved on the Mavdil, or even the Atifa at 2-3 in the morning, and if they did they'd assume the 3rd's tanks were their own. :) The alternate scenario would've been risky but probably no more so than the actual attack in broad daylight when detection and air attack were virtually certain.
May 9, 2017
Just a quick clarification. By "Its eastern exit is well to the SW of the Mitla entrance and well south of the Atifa road leading to the Mitla" I was referring to the Wadi Mabouk not the Mavdil road.
May 10, 2017
Addendum: Kabil, commander of the 4rth armored, passed away recently. RIP
November 12, 2023
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