Alternate Scenarios Iraq 1980-91

Iraq's defeat in 1991 was probably the most lopsided in military history. Estimates of Iraqi tank losses range from 3,200 to 3,900. In contrast, the US lost just half a dozen tanks, all to mines. Marine M-60s destroyed hundreds of Iraqi T-62s, but the latter didn't score a single hit on any US vehicle. Saddam also lost up to 800 of his best tanks, the T-72s. Their gunners hit only seven M-1 tanks. None of those hits proved fatal, and most failed to penetrate M-1 armor. Baghdad's losses in troops, aircraft, SAMs etc were staggering. Seldom if ever has one side prevailed so overwhelmingly at such minimal cost. Coalition forces wiped out a vast army while losing only a few hundred dead, many of them due to friendly fire.
Was this catastrophic rout inevitable? Could Saddam have tried to dominate the Persian Gulf without incurring such a fate? A number of changes, on both the strategic and tactical levels, might've achieved his dream.
First, Saddam should've better timed his move. The invasion of Kuwait occurred in August 1990. By then, the Cold War was over, and the USSR had disintegrated. Iraq no longer had a superpower backup to restrain the US. As the sole remaining superpower, the US was now free to batter Iraq without fear of Soviet intervention. American and other coalition forces were no longer tied down in Europe to face the Soviets. They could be redeployed to face Saddam.
Had Iraq taken Kuwait much earlier, while the USSR was still viable, the risk of western intervention would've been greatly reduced. Few American forces could be spared for the Gulf and their freedom of action would've been limited. Washington did not want to provoke a nuclear war.
An earlier move south required that Saddam avoid war with Iran. It was foolish to attack Iran in 1980, and become bogged down in a war which drained Iraq's resources and strength. Had the money and personnel wasted fighting Iran been invested in more and better military technology and training, Iraqi performance might've been significantly--perhaps even decisively--enhanced.
As Iraq's early performance against Iran showed, it probably wasn't ready to invade the gulf monarchies had it targeted the latter in 1980. Saddam would've been well advised to build up his country's capabilities for about five years, until c November 1985, before moving south. With a much stronger force and a superpower backup, he could've rolled over Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with hardly more than a protest from Washington. (Of course since its 1979 revolution Iran was no longer willing to defend the arab monarchies.)
There would've been an added benefit to avoiding war with Iran. Without an Iranian front, Iraq's air defenses around Osirak, its nuclear facility, would've been much stronger. They could've prevented the destruction of the facility in 1981, by deterring or repelling Israeli attackers. An intact nuclear program might've granted Saddam the Bomb by the mid '80s, the hypothetical time of his big attack southward. Possession of even a small nuclear arsenal would've made outside powers even more hesitant to oppose Iraq.
But let's assume Iraq made all of the mistakes it did historically down to August 1990. Was it doomed to defeat the moment its forces invaded Kuwait?
Quite possibly not. No doubt, had the Iraqis known the US and its allies would ultimately launch a fullscale military operation against them, they would've gone allout to prevent it. Apparently thinking the West would soon accept his fait accompli in Kuwait, Saddam refrained from invading Saudi Arabia. He could easily have taken the oil rich kingdom. It took days, or weeks, before enough coalition forces had arrived ("Operation Desert Shield") to preclude this option. Had Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia in force right after taking Kuwait, it could've overrun the country's key oil region, exporting facilities, airfields and gulf ports. Most were within reach of Iraqi divisions in Kuwait. The Iraqis could've alleviated the logistical problems of such an operation simply by plundering food and fuel etc in captured areas--which were undoubtedly lucrative.
Had the objectives been taken, Iraq would've accomplished two important goals. First it would've deprived the Coalition of ports and airfields to bring in forces. Second, by seizing Saudi as well as Kuwaiti oil, Iraq would've had too large a share of world oil production for sanctions to be feasible. Either the oil continued to flow or there would've been a critical shortage. Saudi Arabia historically made up for Kuwaiti production, by pumping more oil, but no state could make up for both Kuwaiti and Saudi output, had they both been taken (and exports been stopped by the Coalition). The West probably would've had no choice but to accept Saddam's conquests, and pay him for the needed crude.
But what if Iraq had missed this last great chance, so that Operation Desert Storm was looming? Was it not then condemned to humiliation (withdrawal from Kuwait) or disaster?
Almost certainly yes. By that point, it was essentially too late. Iraq should've just pulled out, by December 1990. It would've been a humiliation, but with its armed forces intact, it would've been in a fairy good position to exert influence after the bulk of coalition forces had gone home.
But in arab eyes, a humiliation is worse than a defeat, so Saddam felt he had no choice but to fight. Could he have done so more effectively? This was possible. Strategically and tactically, the Iraqis could've taken a number of steps to mitigate the disaster, perhaps considerably.

• The Iraqi navy might've disguised its handful of small vessels as dhows, armed them with torpedoes and had them sneak up to US carriers in the gulf at night. When a prearranged signal was given, they'd torpedo the carriers. Even a single hit would probably put a carrier out of action for the duration of the war. If two or three were torpedoed, it would've significantly reduced Coalition airpower arrayed against Iraq.
• The Iraqis should've known that the US had the means to suppress and knock out their SAM radars, with EF-111 airborne jammers and HARM missiles, respectively. Saddam's SAM crews should've made widespread use of optical backup systems of the kind used by North Vietnam. Had its SAMs remained effective, Iraq would've saved more of its ground forces and further reduced coalition airpower.
• Saddam might've considered forming a special force of camel borne commandos. Disguised as beduoin, the force could've infiltrated Saudi Arabia via a circuitous route and moved toward the main coalition airfields. When a prearranged signal was given--same time as the torpedo attacks--the camel corps would've raced to the airfields and destroyed as many aircraft as possible. Or, at least stopped takeoffs for a few hours. While the airfield or airfields were disrupted, around dawn, Iraqi MIG-23BNs and SU-24s, armed only with gun ammunition, could've struck the airfield(s) giving priority to destroying AWACs and other key assets. Heliborne troops might've also participated.
• As for the army, the Iraqi infantry should never have been deployed in southern Kuwait, or along the Iraq-Saudi border. It should've been obvious that Iraq could not adequately supply large forces in southern Kuwait. They were at the end of a long logistical tether largely exposed to air attack. The divisions in Kuwait should've been moved farther north, shortening their lines of communication. Many could've been positioned in Kuwait City, threatening the Marines with a Stalingrad if they tried to root them out.  Infantry forces along the Iraq-Saudi border should've been moved to the north and east, along the Medina ridge. There they would've been less vulnerable to logistical strangulation and better able to counter the coalition offensive against the Iraqi right flank in Kuwait. Some infantry units, though, could've been left in scattered positions along the presumed coalition path of advance, to report US movements and attack logistical units after the armor had passed. 
• Like the infantry, the Republican Guards should've anticipated that the main coalition attack would come from the west toward Kuwait, not through Kuwait itself. The Tawakalna and other RG divisions should've been more alert, and better deployed. In theory they were in a reverse slope position along the Medina ridge, but apparently not well positioned. The T-72s could've aimed their 125mm guns at the ridgeline from a short distance below, so that they could hit the underside of M-1s and other vehicles cresting the ridge. Since M-1 front armor was impenetrable to Iraqi rounds, it was vital to employ some tactic to overcome this difficulty. Firing at vehicles atop the ridge from positions just below was one possibility. Infantry units should've had their RPGs ready for a similar tactic, while other infantry forces alerted the RG of the approaching enemy.
• There was another ambush tactic the Iraqis might've tried. In the months before the war, they might've flooded large areas of southern Kuwait with oil. Together with mines--used, like the infantry, farther back from the border--the flooded areas could've channeled coalition armor into  kill zones. In this scenario, hundreds of Iraqi tanks would be hidden behind dunes, or dug in and covered by sand colored camouflage netting, a few hundred meters from the presumed path of the ingressing enemy. When coalition forces passed nearby, the Iraqis could've diverted their attention by shooting from the opposite direction. Turning to face that direction would've exposed the weakly armored sides and rears of US tanks to fire from scores or hundreds of Iraqi T-62s. In theory, this approach would've solved the problem of impenetrable M-1 front armor, or boxes of reactive armor, installed on the turrets and fronts of M-60s. In addition the close ranges would've enabled even poor Iraqi gunners to hit their targets. Many coalition tanks might've been destroyed.

More realistic and imaginative measures might not have prevented defeat. By making the US pay a higher price, however, Saddam might've made the US public more reluctant to stay in the Gulf, or invade in 2003.