Fate of the 21st Armored Division
Egypt's 21st armored fared as poorly as the 4rth. Unlike the latter, all of the 21st was sent to Sinai. Repeatedly squandered in futile attacks, the division was soon a shadow of its former strength. Even worse, it was unable to stave off disaster on the west bank. Misuse of this division, as well as others, doomed Egypt to defeat.
Like the Fourth, the 21st had two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade. Kabil's counterpart, General Oraby, was the division commander. Armored units were equipped with T-55 tanks.
In the 1973 war, the 21st was deployed in the northern, Second Army sector. In that sector, the terrain west of the canal was less suitable for tanks, hence more defensible than that farther south. It was therefore deemed safe to send a brigade of the 21st (the 14th armored) to Sinai at the start, to bolster the 16th Infantry division, just north of the Bitter lake. Also, whereas just one brigade of the 4rth was sent east, all three brigades of the 21st soon found themselves in Sinai. Naturally the 14th armored was the first to see action.
Early in the war, the 14th missed a golden opportunity. After arriving at the canal front on October 8, Sharon left the Second Army area and headed south to battle the Third Army. His departure left the high ground at Hamadia almost undefended. The 14th could easily have seized it on the 8th but didn't. The Egyptian leadership had failed to issue timely orders. When the brigade, which had up to 120 tanks, finally attacked on the 9th, the opportunity had passed. Sharon was back. One of his brigade commanders, Tuvia Raviv, ambushed the 14th's approaching armor. The Israelis claimed thirty tanks destroyed with hardly any loss of their own.
This setback foreshadowed a worse one on the 14th. On the 12th the 21st's two reserve brigades, the 1st armored and 18th mechanized, were ordered to cross the canal, to participate in the October 14 attack.
On the afternoon of October 13, Mamoun, the commander of the Second Army, explained the attack plan to Oraby. The 1st armored brigade was to assault Hamadia while the 14th, farther north, was to advance along the main road to Tasa. The 18th mechanized (the last to cross, on the morning of the 14th) was to follow up these assaults. Oraby said the 21st could fulfill its mission but needed mechanized infantry from the second division to guard its left flank.
Oraby was hindered by lack of clear information on Israeli deployments. He had only 30 minutes before last light on the 13th to scout his path. Battalion commanders didn't have time to gather intelligence.
The attack got underway at 6:30 a.m. Engineers removed mines from the 21st's path. There was a massive barrage, and units advanced into battle.
From the start the 1st faced serious problems. The brigade endured blasts from 175mm guns, while Israeli tanks and ATGMs atop strong point 118 (Hamadia) rained fire down on the 1st. Brigade commander Abu Shady was killed. In the first 15 minutes, the head of the left tank battalion perished along with the brigade artillery commander.
Israeli armor from Kishf ridge, to the south, then struck at the 1st's right flank. The brigade retreated. Sharon made his disparaging remark about the 21st ("they came, got hit and ran"--probably according to a secret, actual plan).
Following Shady's death, the 1st's Chief of Staff took over command. He tried to regroup the brigade but the destruction of the commander's tank cut communication with his units. Some T-55s moved north to avoid fire, and were beside the 14th's tanks. At 8:30 a.m. Mamoun had a heart attack and Oraby tried to help reorganize the 1st.
The 14th performed somewhat better. It managed to destroy strong point 14 in front of it, then advanced around 5km. The next strong point, number 146, halted the brigade.
Around 10 a.m. the 14th was still at strong point 146. Oraby then ordered 18th mechanized into action. Seeking to clear the enemy at point 146, the 18th was to pass the 14th's right flank and hit the enemy's left. After the blocking force was removed the 14th could resume its advance. The 18th was to be assisted by infantry, air strikes and artillery. The 18th began assembling at Talia.
At 13:30 (1:30 p.m.) the 21st's situation was critical. Intense strikes from enemy guns and jets battered its units. Shazly ordered Oraby to pull back and reorganize. The 21st did so during the night of October 14-15.
By then, the 14th brigade's losses totaled 75 tanks. Only 45 remained by the 15th. Equally serious was the weakening of the Egyptian rear.
The absence of the 1st and 18th brigades from the west bank were to have serious consequences. After the Israelis crossed at Deversoir on the 15th-16th, there wasn't much between them and Ismailia. Had the two brigades stayed in reserve they could've halted Sharon's advance before it neared Ismailia. Instead all remaining elements of the 21st were thrown into the cauldron of the Chinese farm.
By then the division had been depleted. According to Egyptian sources, by the 16th, the 1st armored had 66 tanks left, the 14th 39 and the 18th 31. The 21st had been reduced to 136 tanks, about half its original total. The 14th had lost its commander and additional tanks battling the enemy during the night of October 15-16.
More losses soon followed. On October 16, the 21st armored was ordered to attack the Israeli corridor to the canal. Against the better judgement of Shazly and others, the division complied on the 17th. Its fate was not unlike that of the 25th. Israeli tankmen spotted bumps on Missouri ridge. The "bumps" turned out to be T-55s. With 53 tanks, 1st armored was moving south. After a battle, it withdrew with 33 T-55s. The Israelis claim to have knocked out 48 tanks.
The Egyptians say the 1st struck again the next day. With its 33 tanks and a battalion from 18th mechanized, it destroyed 13 Israeli tanks. The 1st, however, lost all but 9 of its T-55s.
By October 21, the entire 21st division had been reduced to just 40 tanks. These vehicles formed half the Egyptian tank force defending Missouri. The defense was successful. After ATGMs had taken a toll on Raviv's armor, counterattacking Egyptian tanks drove him back.
When the war ended the 21st had just 16 tanks left. Like other Egyptian units it fought valiantly, but largely in vain, as Sadat wasted it.
References
The Yom Kippur War Rabinovich
From the Sinai to the Golan Jamal Hamad
Like the Fourth, the 21st had two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade. Kabil's counterpart, General Oraby, was the division commander. Armored units were equipped with T-55 tanks.
In the 1973 war, the 21st was deployed in the northern, Second Army sector. In that sector, the terrain west of the canal was less suitable for tanks, hence more defensible than that farther south. It was therefore deemed safe to send a brigade of the 21st (the 14th armored) to Sinai at the start, to bolster the 16th Infantry division, just north of the Bitter lake. Also, whereas just one brigade of the 4rth was sent east, all three brigades of the 21st soon found themselves in Sinai. Naturally the 14th armored was the first to see action.
Early in the war, the 14th missed a golden opportunity. After arriving at the canal front on October 8, Sharon left the Second Army area and headed south to battle the Third Army. His departure left the high ground at Hamadia almost undefended. The 14th could easily have seized it on the 8th but didn't. The Egyptian leadership had failed to issue timely orders. When the brigade, which had up to 120 tanks, finally attacked on the 9th, the opportunity had passed. Sharon was back. One of his brigade commanders, Tuvia Raviv, ambushed the 14th's approaching armor. The Israelis claimed thirty tanks destroyed with hardly any loss of their own.
This setback foreshadowed a worse one on the 14th. On the 12th the 21st's two reserve brigades, the 1st armored and 18th mechanized, were ordered to cross the canal, to participate in the October 14 attack.
On the afternoon of October 13, Mamoun, the commander of the Second Army, explained the attack plan to Oraby. The 1st armored brigade was to assault Hamadia while the 14th, farther north, was to advance along the main road to Tasa. The 18th mechanized (the last to cross, on the morning of the 14th) was to follow up these assaults. Oraby said the 21st could fulfill its mission but needed mechanized infantry from the second division to guard its left flank.
Oraby was hindered by lack of clear information on Israeli deployments. He had only 30 minutes before last light on the 13th to scout his path. Battalion commanders didn't have time to gather intelligence.
The attack got underway at 6:30 a.m. Engineers removed mines from the 21st's path. There was a massive barrage, and units advanced into battle.
From the start the 1st faced serious problems. The brigade endured blasts from 175mm guns, while Israeli tanks and ATGMs atop strong point 118 (Hamadia) rained fire down on the 1st. Brigade commander Abu Shady was killed. In the first 15 minutes, the head of the left tank battalion perished along with the brigade artillery commander.
Israeli armor from Kishf ridge, to the south, then struck at the 1st's right flank. The brigade retreated. Sharon made his disparaging remark about the 21st ("they came, got hit and ran"--probably according to a secret, actual plan).
Following Shady's death, the 1st's Chief of Staff took over command. He tried to regroup the brigade but the destruction of the commander's tank cut communication with his units. Some T-55s moved north to avoid fire, and were beside the 14th's tanks. At 8:30 a.m. Mamoun had a heart attack and Oraby tried to help reorganize the 1st.
The 14th performed somewhat better. It managed to destroy strong point 14 in front of it, then advanced around 5km. The next strong point, number 146, halted the brigade.
Around 10 a.m. the 14th was still at strong point 146. Oraby then ordered 18th mechanized into action. Seeking to clear the enemy at point 146, the 18th was to pass the 14th's right flank and hit the enemy's left. After the blocking force was removed the 14th could resume its advance. The 18th was to be assisted by infantry, air strikes and artillery. The 18th began assembling at Talia.
At 13:30 (1:30 p.m.) the 21st's situation was critical. Intense strikes from enemy guns and jets battered its units. Shazly ordered Oraby to pull back and reorganize. The 21st did so during the night of October 14-15.
By then, the 14th brigade's losses totaled 75 tanks. Only 45 remained by the 15th. Equally serious was the weakening of the Egyptian rear.
The absence of the 1st and 18th brigades from the west bank were to have serious consequences. After the Israelis crossed at Deversoir on the 15th-16th, there wasn't much between them and Ismailia. Had the two brigades stayed in reserve they could've halted Sharon's advance before it neared Ismailia. Instead all remaining elements of the 21st were thrown into the cauldron of the Chinese farm.
By then the division had been depleted. According to Egyptian sources, by the 16th, the 1st armored had 66 tanks left, the 14th 39 and the 18th 31. The 21st had been reduced to 136 tanks, about half its original total. The 14th had lost its commander and additional tanks battling the enemy during the night of October 15-16.
More losses soon followed. On October 16, the 21st armored was ordered to attack the Israeli corridor to the canal. Against the better judgement of Shazly and others, the division complied on the 17th. Its fate was not unlike that of the 25th. Israeli tankmen spotted bumps on Missouri ridge. The "bumps" turned out to be T-55s. With 53 tanks, 1st armored was moving south. After a battle, it withdrew with 33 T-55s. The Israelis claim to have knocked out 48 tanks.
The Egyptians say the 1st struck again the next day. With its 33 tanks and a battalion from 18th mechanized, it destroyed 13 Israeli tanks. The 1st, however, lost all but 9 of its T-55s.
By October 21, the entire 21st division had been reduced to just 40 tanks. These vehicles formed half the Egyptian tank force defending Missouri. The defense was successful. After ATGMs had taken a toll on Raviv's armor, counterattacking Egyptian tanks drove him back.
When the war ended the 21st had just 16 tanks left. Like other Egyptian units it fought valiantly, but largely in vain, as Sadat wasted it.
References
The Yom Kippur War Rabinovich
From the Sinai to the Golan Jamal Hamad
posted by starman at 6:36 AM
14 Comments:
What would've happened had the 14th taken Hamadia on October 8? Could it have held the position?
Yes the Egyptians probably could've held Hamadia. They successfully defended the nearby position Katib el-Kheil, and much of Hamutal. But even if the 14th seized Hamadia, the position probably would've been occupied by troops from 16th Infantry, while the 14th was withdrawn a bit to resume its role as a reserve for frontline forces.
May 18, 2017
Losses in that war must have influenced Sadat in his decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Of course, that decision made him unpopular with many Arabs. As we know, Sadat was eventually assassinated.
Lol, the '73 war proved Sadat had no talent as a military commander. That meant that as long as he was in power, Egypt stood no chance on the battlefield. With him in charge, the army was doomed to defeat no matter how well equipped it was. Since Sadat would rather sacrifice his country's capabilities than give up his power, peace with Israel was his only option.
May 18, 2017
Military forces can have excellent weapons, but still lose if the planning is inadequate. That has happened numerous times throughout history.
I find some dark humor in the fact all of Egypt's Presidents are incompetent military commanders ( not sure about Mohammed Nageuib and Mubarak was behind the massacre that happened to the heliborne commandos during the 73 war).
According to Cooper et al in ARAB MIGs Vol. 6, the October 14 air battle is myth, made up to bolster Mubarak, as Sadat's VP after '73. There was an air battle that day but smaller than claimed and with at most two F-4s knocked down.
I don't know how those after Mubarak, like Morsi and Sissi, might've done, had there been a conflict. As I suggested in previous posts, Fawzi would've done better than Sadat, and Badawy might've achieved a lot.
May 22, 2017
Well Sissi isnt really doing well in Sinai unless he wants to continue using the war on terror card for as long as possible to justify his actions. Morsi is out of the question as he was never in the military and would have probably left the affairs to Tantawi before he removed him or to Sissi.
I think you meant the air battle of El Mansoura, that is interesting. Any other western or Israeli sources mention the air battle?
Yes I meant the El Mansoura battle. Some of Cooper's information is from Israeli sources, who mention Phantoms attacking in three waves. But the three had only about 27 jets altogether. It was a smaller battle than has been claimed, with fewer losses. I note at least one Egyptian victory mentioned in the ACIG site for the battle is apparently true but didn't really occur on the 14th.
May 24, 2017
By the way apparently the ACIG site is down as I cant find it anymore for some reason. I had some heavy drama and thats why I went AFK but thank God I am over it and today is my Graduation ceremony! Finally.
Anyways, do you think it was possible for Anwar Sadat to have lost his position before the war due to the influence of the "Central Powers"? I wonder what would have happened if he was forced to resign or was removed from office by any other method?
In other news,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/turkey-fast-track-troops-deployment-qatar-170607151127104.html
Good to see you back and congrats on graduating!!
I don't know if the ACIG is a great loss. In his book on Arab MIGs, Cooper had a much different version of the Mansoura battle. The ACIG version appears outdated.
So the Turks will send troops to Qatar, presumably to protect it after the Saudis and others broke off diplomatic relations. This is interesting. Tension between Turkey and Saudi Arabia may help Iran.
Sure, Sadat might've lost his position before the '73 war. Around May 1971, Aly Sabry and General Fawzi wanted to oust Sadat but didn't succeed. Months later there was a plot to free Sabry, possibly so he could lead another challenge to Sadat. I think this had Soviet backing but it too failed.
What might've happened had the plans worked? If Sabry replaced Sadat, relations with the USSR would've been much better. Egypt probably would've been better armed in '73. One thing has puzzled me though. I'm under the impression the USSR didn't want war. It would've been costly and would affect detente with the US. So why did Moscow back Sabry, who thought the only solution was war? Maybe for ideological reasons but I just don't know.
June 8, 2017
I never knew the backed Sabry actually. Yeah its really difficult to predict what would have happened if Sadat wasnt in the picture anymore. But even if Sabry was in power, I doubt the Soviets would have sold MIG 25s to Egypt lol.
Now an interesting point here is, would the Arab reinforcements that arrived during the late days of the war in one way or another affected the outcome if the war had lasted long enough?Or would they merely be used as cannon fodder in some pointless offensive?
The Soviets may not have provided MIG-25s to Egypt but they might've supplied MIG-23s. Despite his demands, in 1972 Sadat wasn't able to get any. He didn't receive the jet until 1975. Syria (which was on better terms with Russia) got its first MIG-23s before the end of the October war. Maybe, with Sabry as head of state, Egypt might've gotten what it wanted sooner. I don't know if the MIG-23 would've made much difference in the war. But, from what NEWSWEEK reported back around 1972, the Egyptians were eager to get some.
As for arab reinforcements, I don't think Libyan or Algerian units would've helped much. I'm not sure how big the Algerian force was. Rabinovich mentioned a brigade. But Drew Middleton, writing soon after the war, mentioned an Algerian armored DIVISION, which he wrote was deployed south of other units, on the shore of the gulf of suez. If the Algerians really sent an armored division, it might've helped greatly in an Egyptian counterattack in December 1973--if it were deployed farther north, closer to Deversoir or Fayid.
On the Syrian front, around October 22-23, a rebuilt Syrian army--with new tanks from Russia--plus three Iraqi divisions and Jordanian units, was ready to launch a major offensive against the Israeli salient near Damascus. The attack was called off because the Russians had doubts it would succeed. Israeli armor was waiting on high ground.
June 13, 2017
Addendum, correction: Syria didn't get its first MIG-23s until 1974 and they were initially plagued by technical issues resulting in frequent crashes.
June 30, 2020
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