Alternate Mideast Scenario 1980s
Imagine Badawy and 13 other senior officers eating lunch before their fatal copter ride of March 2, 1981. What might've happened had some of them gotten suspicious, averted their fate and taken action against their would-be killer? Here is how things might've gone differently on that fateful day, and subsequently:
Badawy: "Isn't it odd that all of us are to board the copter, just to watch these maneuvers?
General Qasim: "Indeed, what is so important about these exercises that all of us were sent here? There's nothing so special about this. Just last year, there was a key test of our defenses at the eastern entrance to the Mitla pass. It's hard to imagine something more important, but not half of us were there."
Badawy: "What's really odd is, why is the President so keen on getting the views of those whom, just a short while ago, he wanted thrown out of the army? He wanted me to get rid of some of you here."
General Sabbour: "So what might the answer be?"
Badawy: "Gentlemen, I have a strong suspicion the President wants to get rid of us. He doesn't want us dismissed. He wants us dead."
General Qasim: "He wants to kill us??! Then why send us here?"
Badawy: "Gentlemen, I think we should be very careful about that copter. It could be sabotaged. Here are officers he wants to get rid of--especially me--and all of us are supposed to get into that copter..."
General Qasim: "You think Sadat arranged to have a bomb placed aboard?"
Badawy: "I'd strongly advise we inspect that copter before taking off in it."
General Sabbour: "I'll order the aircrew to test fly it."
So with fourteen senior officers watching, the pilot took off on a test flight. Sure enough, the helicopter quickly became unstable, fell, crashed and exploded.
General Qasim: "Field Marshall Badawy, you just saved our lives!"
General Sabbour: "That new guy on the maintanence staff(!!). I wondered what he was doing with the copter last night, and why he left."
Badawy: "He was doing Sadat's bidding! Our lives are saved only for the time being. Sadat will crush us, unless we get him first! The die is cast, gentlemen! We must assume command of our units immediately, and oust Anwar before he tries again!"
General Sabbour: "Field Marshall, I have an idea. To keep blackass (Sadat) in the dark as long as possible, I'll have them report the helicopter came down with all fourteen of us aboard, in an area of dunes not far from Siwa, and troops are trying to locate the crash site."
Badawy: "Excellent! As soon as that message goes out those commanding troops near Cairo will board the plane here and fly back to their units. Hit the Presidential Palace as soon as possible, and report back to me. The rest of us will take command of troops here, and send them back east. "
And so Sadat, who thought he had wiped out all the officers he disliked, was overthrown and killed along with Mubarak. To avoid the appearance of a military junta, Badawy elevated former foreign minister Fahmy to the Presidency. Badawy remained Defense Minister, although he was the de facto head of state. Shazly was recalled from exile and given his old job of Chief of Staff. His skill, and popularity among the soldiers, were key assets. Badawy's reputation as a war hero made most Egyptians willing to support his regime.
The fall of Sadat led to greatly improved relations between Egypt and other arab states, and Iran. Few of them had liked Sadat's peacemaking. The Kremlin was also delighted. Brezhnev could now resume his role as Cairo's chief backer, reversing the work of Kissinger.
Publicly, Fahmy and Badawy said they wouldn't abrogate the peace treaty with Israel. They knew the Egyptian masses preferred peace and they didn't want to provoke Washington and Tel Aviv too soon. Privately, however, the Egyptians told the Syrians, Saudis, Iranians etc the treaty would be dumped eventually--sometime after Israel withdrew from all of Sinai in April 1982. The rise of Fahmy, who resigned during Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem, made the new regime's promise quite credible.
Skeptical that Israel would make the concessions necessary for a comprehensive settlement, Fahmy and Badawy resolved to apply the necessary military and economic pressure. The Saudis and other rich arabs were to provide funding for massive new arms purchases. Badawy's shopping list included Mirage 2000s, TU-22s, MIG-25s, T-72/80s etc, all in lavish abundance.
While preparing for a showdown with zionists, Cairo fostered peace among muslims. To maximize arab capability against Israel, Egypt sought to end the Iran-Iraq war. Rather than openly siding with Iraq, Fahmy contacted Iran and attempted to mediate the conflict. At first Tehran resisted his efforts. However, after its failure near Basra in July 1982, Iran accepted a deal in which its territory was returned in exchange for peace.
Badawy's government also meant peace in North Africa. Given the prospect of a new jihad against Israel, Ghadafy refrained from meddling in Chad, and a terrible misadventure was avoided.
Unwilling to take the onus for the breakdown of peace, Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. The new Egyptian regime did not, however, deter the Israeli strike on Osirak in July 1981, nor the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The latter proved costly to Syria and the Palestinians.
Fahmy and Badawy claimed Egypt was not ready for war and could not help Syria and the PLO. But the Israeli invasion gave Cairo the pretext it needed to dump the peace treaty. This preserved Cairo's new influence in the region. By late 1982 Syria and Egypt were in the midst of massive rearmament, while Iraq, now at peace, was making plans to send forces to Syria.
Badawy knew that Egypt shouldn't mass forces close to the Israeli border. That would invite a rerun of 1967. In 1982, Egypt needed about five years to become fully ready, and Israel was planning a preemptive war. For the time being, most of Cairo's army was deployed along the line of the passes.
In 1983, both sides continued their feverish buildups. Seeking to revive the peace treaty, Washington halted aid to Egypt until it recommitted itself. But Libyan and Gulf aid more than compensated for the the loss. Needless to say, the US continued to arm Israel, but demanded that it not launch a preemptive attack.
Nevertheless, Israel was determined to crush the Arabs. It seemed the best time to attempt this was the election year 1984. In order to get Jewish money and votes, US politicians would have to back Israel no matter what.
In September 1984, the Israeli blitz began. The Arabs were, however, forewarned, and had learned much from the debacle of 1982. SAM and interceptor forces were much improved, so the IAF strikes were unsuccessful. On the ground Israeli forces launched a holding attack near Kuneitra while masses of armor poured into Lebanon. The IDF sought to overwhelm Syria's right flank, and take the Syrian forces near the Golan from the rear. Meanwhile, armored columns raced deep into Sinai.
Soon, Israel's offensives ran into trouble. The thrust into Lebanon bogged down in the Bekaa. Iraqi and Jordanian forces helped contain the attacks. Egyptian troops repulsed the enemy at the passes, including the Jiradi. Soon Israel became mired in a war of attrition. Fighting in static positions proved futile and costly.
Jerusalem's attempt to exploit the elections backfired. Bailing Israel out in a war it had started cost the US billions of dollars. Millions of Americans resented the expense and the lobby behind it. In addition, the US economy began to suffer from a new oil embargo imposed, like that of '73, in retaliation for US aid to Israel.
After the cease fire that fall, Israel had more territory but overall was in worse shape than ever. Eager to end the embargo, the US agreed, by 1985, to pressure Israel out of Sinai and Lebanon. The excellent performance of his forces, and the fact Jerusalem got virtually no concessions from the arabs, enabled Badawy to proclaim a victory. An even bigger political victory soon followed.
Demoralized by the outcome of the war, and fearing a new one that decade, Israel finally agreed to withdraw from all of the territories seized in 1967.
We can't really know what would've happened had the tragic event of March 1981 been averted. It is entirely possible, though, that the outcome for the whole region would've been far better. And even though this scenario is fantasy, I believe some of it will ultimately come true.
Badawy: "Isn't it odd that all of us are to board the copter, just to watch these maneuvers?
General Qasim: "Indeed, what is so important about these exercises that all of us were sent here? There's nothing so special about this. Just last year, there was a key test of our defenses at the eastern entrance to the Mitla pass. It's hard to imagine something more important, but not half of us were there."
Badawy: "What's really odd is, why is the President so keen on getting the views of those whom, just a short while ago, he wanted thrown out of the army? He wanted me to get rid of some of you here."
General Sabbour: "So what might the answer be?"
Badawy: "Gentlemen, I have a strong suspicion the President wants to get rid of us. He doesn't want us dismissed. He wants us dead."
General Qasim: "He wants to kill us??! Then why send us here?"
Badawy: "Gentlemen, I think we should be very careful about that copter. It could be sabotaged. Here are officers he wants to get rid of--especially me--and all of us are supposed to get into that copter..."
General Qasim: "You think Sadat arranged to have a bomb placed aboard?"
Badawy: "I'd strongly advise we inspect that copter before taking off in it."
General Sabbour: "I'll order the aircrew to test fly it."
So with fourteen senior officers watching, the pilot took off on a test flight. Sure enough, the helicopter quickly became unstable, fell, crashed and exploded.
General Qasim: "Field Marshall Badawy, you just saved our lives!"
General Sabbour: "That new guy on the maintanence staff(!!). I wondered what he was doing with the copter last night, and why he left."
Badawy: "He was doing Sadat's bidding! Our lives are saved only for the time being. Sadat will crush us, unless we get him first! The die is cast, gentlemen! We must assume command of our units immediately, and oust Anwar before he tries again!"
General Sabbour: "Field Marshall, I have an idea. To keep blackass (Sadat) in the dark as long as possible, I'll have them report the helicopter came down with all fourteen of us aboard, in an area of dunes not far from Siwa, and troops are trying to locate the crash site."
Badawy: "Excellent! As soon as that message goes out those commanding troops near Cairo will board the plane here and fly back to their units. Hit the Presidential Palace as soon as possible, and report back to me. The rest of us will take command of troops here, and send them back east. "
And so Sadat, who thought he had wiped out all the officers he disliked, was overthrown and killed along with Mubarak. To avoid the appearance of a military junta, Badawy elevated former foreign minister Fahmy to the Presidency. Badawy remained Defense Minister, although he was the de facto head of state. Shazly was recalled from exile and given his old job of Chief of Staff. His skill, and popularity among the soldiers, were key assets. Badawy's reputation as a war hero made most Egyptians willing to support his regime.
The fall of Sadat led to greatly improved relations between Egypt and other arab states, and Iran. Few of them had liked Sadat's peacemaking. The Kremlin was also delighted. Brezhnev could now resume his role as Cairo's chief backer, reversing the work of Kissinger.
Publicly, Fahmy and Badawy said they wouldn't abrogate the peace treaty with Israel. They knew the Egyptian masses preferred peace and they didn't want to provoke Washington and Tel Aviv too soon. Privately, however, the Egyptians told the Syrians, Saudis, Iranians etc the treaty would be dumped eventually--sometime after Israel withdrew from all of Sinai in April 1982. The rise of Fahmy, who resigned during Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem, made the new regime's promise quite credible.
Skeptical that Israel would make the concessions necessary for a comprehensive settlement, Fahmy and Badawy resolved to apply the necessary military and economic pressure. The Saudis and other rich arabs were to provide funding for massive new arms purchases. Badawy's shopping list included Mirage 2000s, TU-22s, MIG-25s, T-72/80s etc, all in lavish abundance.
While preparing for a showdown with zionists, Cairo fostered peace among muslims. To maximize arab capability against Israel, Egypt sought to end the Iran-Iraq war. Rather than openly siding with Iraq, Fahmy contacted Iran and attempted to mediate the conflict. At first Tehran resisted his efforts. However, after its failure near Basra in July 1982, Iran accepted a deal in which its territory was returned in exchange for peace.
Badawy's government also meant peace in North Africa. Given the prospect of a new jihad against Israel, Ghadafy refrained from meddling in Chad, and a terrible misadventure was avoided.
Unwilling to take the onus for the breakdown of peace, Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. The new Egyptian regime did not, however, deter the Israeli strike on Osirak in July 1981, nor the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The latter proved costly to Syria and the Palestinians.
Fahmy and Badawy claimed Egypt was not ready for war and could not help Syria and the PLO. But the Israeli invasion gave Cairo the pretext it needed to dump the peace treaty. This preserved Cairo's new influence in the region. By late 1982 Syria and Egypt were in the midst of massive rearmament, while Iraq, now at peace, was making plans to send forces to Syria.
Badawy knew that Egypt shouldn't mass forces close to the Israeli border. That would invite a rerun of 1967. In 1982, Egypt needed about five years to become fully ready, and Israel was planning a preemptive war. For the time being, most of Cairo's army was deployed along the line of the passes.
In 1983, both sides continued their feverish buildups. Seeking to revive the peace treaty, Washington halted aid to Egypt until it recommitted itself. But Libyan and Gulf aid more than compensated for the the loss. Needless to say, the US continued to arm Israel, but demanded that it not launch a preemptive attack.
Nevertheless, Israel was determined to crush the Arabs. It seemed the best time to attempt this was the election year 1984. In order to get Jewish money and votes, US politicians would have to back Israel no matter what.
In September 1984, the Israeli blitz began. The Arabs were, however, forewarned, and had learned much from the debacle of 1982. SAM and interceptor forces were much improved, so the IAF strikes were unsuccessful. On the ground Israeli forces launched a holding attack near Kuneitra while masses of armor poured into Lebanon. The IDF sought to overwhelm Syria's right flank, and take the Syrian forces near the Golan from the rear. Meanwhile, armored columns raced deep into Sinai.
Soon, Israel's offensives ran into trouble. The thrust into Lebanon bogged down in the Bekaa. Iraqi and Jordanian forces helped contain the attacks. Egyptian troops repulsed the enemy at the passes, including the Jiradi. Soon Israel became mired in a war of attrition. Fighting in static positions proved futile and costly.
Jerusalem's attempt to exploit the elections backfired. Bailing Israel out in a war it had started cost the US billions of dollars. Millions of Americans resented the expense and the lobby behind it. In addition, the US economy began to suffer from a new oil embargo imposed, like that of '73, in retaliation for US aid to Israel.
After the cease fire that fall, Israel had more territory but overall was in worse shape than ever. Eager to end the embargo, the US agreed, by 1985, to pressure Israel out of Sinai and Lebanon. The excellent performance of his forces, and the fact Jerusalem got virtually no concessions from the arabs, enabled Badawy to proclaim a victory. An even bigger political victory soon followed.
Demoralized by the outcome of the war, and fearing a new one that decade, Israel finally agreed to withdraw from all of the territories seized in 1967.
We can't really know what would've happened had the tragic event of March 1981 been averted. It is entirely possible, though, that the outcome for the whole region would've been far better. And even though this scenario is fantasy, I believe some of it will ultimately come true.
37 Comments:
Interesting post!
Glad you like it. :) Btw I just edited the post, as I usually do.
November 25, 2016 (evening).
Things could have been quite different if those men would not have been killed. History would have taken a different turn.
Sadat made himself quite unpopular with some Egyptians (and other Arabs) by making concessions to Israel. If the death of Badawy had been prevented, it would have been a different situation for Egypt, Israel, and other Middle Eastern countries.
I had to revise the post when I realized Gamasy resigned in November 1980. He also had disagreements with Sadat, but was already out of the way months before Badawy and 13 others were targeted.
November 26, 2016
Is it realistic to think Iran would've agreed to end the war in 1982? In real life they stubbornly continued for years.
Good pojnt. I think part of the reason why Libya got involved in Chad, and Iraq and Iran fought so long, was lack of any realistic prospect of beating Israel. Egypt's separate peace with Jerusalem virtually ruled it out. Unable to do much against Israel, arab states turned their attention elsewhere. Iraq attacked Iran while Libya sought gains in Chad. Likewise, Iran was focused on beating Iraq.
But what if Badawy and his friends had turned the tables on Sadat in 1981, and dumped the peace treaty the following year? By then it was too late to prevent the start of the Iran-Iraq war. But the renewed feasibility of a confrontation with Israel may have induced Libya, Iraq and even Iran to wrap up the peripheral wars in which they were engaged and turn to enemy number one. Iran, which was defeated near Basra in July 1982, may have agreed to peace with Iraq, provided its territory was returned. By then, Syria's defeat in Lebanon, coupled with Egypt's repudiation of peace with Israel, would've underscored the risk of fullscale war and the need for Iraqi (even Iranian) reinforcements for Syria.
December 2, 2016
I will comment either today or tomorrow. Dont worry I didnt forget lol.
OK whenever you're ready (you and progrev, and anyone else). :)
One point here is, we are replacing one military dictator with another and we cant say for sure whether his attitude towards Israel would remain the same or could have shifted as he assumes the new role of being the president of Egypt. Also, he might be a great military commander but that doesnt mean he is fit to rule a nation. All the military build up is definitely going to affect the Egyptian economy and living standard unless the Gulf Arab countries are going to cover the ENTIRE bill of armaments. In my opinion the T-80 is a very terrible choice and proved to be ineffective in Chechnya due to its ridiculous engine. The T-72M would fare well against Israeli Merkavas but an even better tank would be the T-64 although I doubt the Russians would sell it given the high possibility of it falling in Israeli hands which means American hands as well.
The Iranian-Iraqi war is a bit more complex than that. The rise of Shiism had a dramatic effect on the gulf arab countries and saw shiite militants especially in Kuwait carry out acts of terrorism. The spread of the Shiite crescent is a very real threat that we can see its effects today. Local "Hezbollah" groups spurted out in more than one country and they are basically Iran's extension.
Weakening of Iran played an important role of not turning it into an even more powerful middle eastern nation than it is today. I cant say for sure what would have happened if Iraq hadnt attacked or the war ended short but its possible they would have used their agents to take over certain gulf arab countries. Biggest example is the Bahranian uprising couple of years ago that was most dominantly a shiite revolution and the Saudis reacted quickly knowing what would happen if they managed to topple the Bahraini Sunni regime. The Amal group (Proto lebanese Hezbollah) took part in massacring Palestinian refugee camps and exterminating Sunnis (just like what would will probably happen if Mosul fell in the hands of the PMU).
I know I went on for a bit with that part but what I am trying to say is, leaving Iran to its machinations would hurt the Gulf Arab nations in the long term.
I am not sure if the Israelis would try to attack Sinai again given that they know who is in command and his military history (not some run of the mill arab general) and I am sure they would wait till he attacks first. Trying to take over Sinai again after the Egyptians learned from their mistakes in the six day war would definitely mean much more losses for the Israelis and possibly a terrible defeat. Again, the only reason the Egyptians had learned from their mistakes is because who is in command and assuming he wont appoint military commanders based on loyalty.
The question here is, would Badawy be satisfied with pre-67 borders or would he push into Palestinian territory given that Israel would be at its worst state possible and how would the US and its allies react to it? Another Gulf War massacre except its Egyptian blown up T-72s all over the desert and not Iraqi ones? Or would they leave Badawy to charge towards Tel Aviv? I would like to add that very more likely other arab expeditionary forces would play bigger role than I ever did in the past especially on the Syrian front.
The funny part is, even if Israel ceased to exist...the Syrian civil war might have still happened lol.
OK great to hear from you in this thread--good, thoughtful commentary! :)
Just prior to his death, Badawy stated in effect that Egypt should retain a strong military. I'd assume he would've pursued a harder, more pan-arab line than Sadat or Mubarak. He wouldn't necessarily have started a war but he'd do everything possible to prepare for it.
Would the rich Gulf arabs and Libya pay the ENTIRE bill of rearmament? Around the time of the Camp David agreements, the Saudis and others offered Egypt $100 BILLION to dump the treaty. Sadat refused, saying, "all the millions in the world, all the BILLIONS in the world, will not buy the will of Egypt." The point is, the other arabs didn't like Egypt's departure from the anti-Israel front and seemed willing to pay an enormous sum to avert it. $100 billion, or even half that, probably would've been more than enough to maximize Egyptian fighting power (although it would've taken a few years to absorb a lot of new weapons). Besides the cash, Libya could've provided plenty of weapons from its big Soviet made arsenal (many lost historically in the Chad misadventure).
Sure, Badawy was a general not a politician. That's one reason why I suggested that, instead of assuming the Presidency himself, he'd give it to a civilian--Fahmy--with experience in the world of diplomacy and statecraft. In this scenario, Badawy would set basic policy, which I think Fahmy would've agreed with, but not be the official head of state. Instead, he'd devote most of his time to military planning. By the way, it's common, even in the USA, for good generals to become heads of state (e.g. Washington, Grant, Eisenhower). If Badawy was considered a hero, that would've helped his regime become established.
The Soviets may have been unwilling to sell the T-80, as well as the T-64, so Egypt may have been spared its mechanical issues. :) So you think the T-72M could've beaten Israeli Merkavas--presumably the early model Merkava-1? I read even the Merk1 had armor impervious to any Arab shell--but that was c 1977, before Syria etc got T-72s.
I think that, even without the Iran-Iraq war, Iran would've become weaker militarily, in part because of lack of US spare parts. Also, it was tough to find anyone willing to sell Iran arms. Also, had Iranians not united to fight Iraq, they might've devoted more energy to fighting themselves.:) I don't think Iran could've taken over any gulf countries since the US, even Iraq, would've helped prevent it if necessary.
I doubt an experienced general like Badawy would've sent most of his army into eastern Sinai to attack first. Not only would the Israelis preempt, they'd have an excellent chance of destroying the Egyptian logistical tether with their air force, and the Egyptian ground forces in mobile warfare.
The Israelis would've been concerned about losses if they tried to storm the heavily defended central ridge, in a preemptive war. But I'm sure they would've concluded they should attack as soon as possible, before the arabs received and absorbed a plethora of new weapons. If Badawy took over in '81 and the Israelis waited until say 1988, they might no longer be confident of success, even if the Egyptians DID strike first.
The US would almost certainly do whatever it could to enable Israel to retain its military edge. It might've been very difficult, though, for the US to do enough if the oil producers really did furnish $75-100 billion to Egypt!
It's hard to imagine the Egyptians advancing to Tel Aviv even in a best case scenario. But what if Israel started a war, contrary to US wishes, was beaten by Egyptian defenders at the passes or elsewhere, and then thrown back with huge losses? Cairo might've been tempted to advance into Israel and finish it completely. Had Israel started a war, the US would've been slow to provide aid. But it would've warned Egypt not to go too far.
December 6, 2016
As I said, Badawy wouldnt strike Israel first and he would wait for the IDF to do that. But would the IDF really carry out their blitz against Egypt? Even without absorbing the new weapons I am sure the Egyptian arsenal was sufficient h for a defensive strategy. I am definitely sure the Sagger was still a major threat to the early Merkavas. The only thing that I fear might have destroyed Badawy's plan is an operation similar to IAF's "operation Rooster" in which they managed to cripple both the air defense and air force of Syria or at least cause significant losses. I doubt Israel would attack before finding the "SAM solution" first as without its air force Israel cant fight aggressively for an extended period of time.
Of course the without american support, most of the iranian military equipment is useless but they will have the time to reverse engineer as they did in our timeline but unhindered and with a better economic situation. Its really hard to say what would happen if they were left alone as the Gulf War really change the face of the middle east but they would have started using uprising of Shiites in Saddam controlled Iraq or perhaps a more remote arab country like Bahrain to avoid having fingers pointed at it. I have seen a scenario in a military simulator (video game) in which Islamic Iran fights against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 80s...that was an interesting scenario. For a long while there was an insurgency in Iran against the new Islamic regime but in the end they got crushed, I highly doubt it would have been any different EXCEPT if the Gulf Arab countries decided to instigate an uprising by the Arab sunni minorities in Iran who are already oppressed.
Back to Badawy, would he really take heed of the warning or simply ignore it and continue moving towards Tel Aviv? What if the situation on the Golan Heights turns with influx of fresh arab units and weaponry? Wouldn't they be encouraged to advance deeper? With such raging unpopularity for Israel in that timeline, would the US still carry out a military intervention? Whats would be the reds reaction?
,
I VERY much appreciate the great comments by Sleepinduringduty and progrev. I'm not talking to myself; this blog is actually alive. :)
I think the Israelis would attack, even if the odds weren't particularly favorable, if they were convinced war was likely anyway, eventually, and the odds would be even worse in the future. I agree that Egypt probably would've been capable of a very strong defense.
No doubt, Israel would've begun a war with a massive SAM suppression campaign. Early in the '73 war, as well as the '82 one, they tried to destroy arab air defenses. Neither Tagar nor Dougman succeeded but they might've had the IAF not been distracted by the need to strike advancing arab armies in '73. An Israeli blitz against Egyptian and Syrian SAMs in say, '84, may not have worked as well as "Rooster" did historically because they couldn't concentrate on just Syrian defenses. Even if the Israelis did cripple the SAMs of both nations, the EAF and SAF could still have provided air cover, albeit at high cost. The Israelis mowed down many Syrian MIG-21s and MIG-23s in '82, but at least this kept the IAF preoccupied, so there were fewer air to ground missions against the Syrian army.
I also remember what Murtagi tried to accomplish after the Israeli breakthrough of '67. He wanted the Egyptian army to make a stand at the central ridge, where a successful defense was considered possible "regardless of the air situation." In other words, in the passes there were plenty of places to hide troops and armor. It wasn't like the open desert farther east, where there was no place to hide! Assuming an Egyptian defense in '84 was based on the passes, from the start, Badawy's troops probably would've had a good chance of holding out even without SAM and fighter cover. (Of course they would've had lighter SAM-7 or SAM-9 missiles and flak:). )
Of course there's always a possibility Israel would've outflanked the central ridge line, possibly by overrunning the coastal road all the way to Kantara and then heading south. The EAF's ground attack force--hopefully with TU-22s in time for war--should've given top priority to strafing and napalming IDF columns on that road. Even Adan admitted the IDF would've suffered high losses had the EAF done that in '73. Cairo should've also had reserve forces, including perhaps an armored division from Algeria, to help counter an enemy breakthrough.
Saddam Hussein would've quickly crushed any Shiite rebellion instigated by Iran. He succeeded in crushing the rebellion of '91, right after his army had been demolished!
I think Badawy would've heeded a US warning not to go to Tel Aviv, especially if his Soviet backers--eager to avoid a confrontation with the US--also encouraged restraint. Maybe the US would send a few Marines to Tel Aviv to show it meant business.
Actually I don't think it would've been necessary to overrun Israel to effectively destroy it. A defeat of that magnitude, posing a real existential threat, would've severely demoralized the Israelis. Tired of endless war and lower living standards because of it, many would've soon left their country and gone to Europe or the US. :)
December 7, 2016
We've forgotten a critical factor--Israel's nuclear bombs! Fear of Israeli nukes, coupled with US pressure, probably would've deterred Badawy from entering Israel, after a hypothetical victory in Sinai. There may not have been any arab WMD sufficient to deter Israel, although the USSR, and US pressure, probably would've limited Israel to use of n-bombs only as a defense of last resort.
I don't think the outcome would've much different from what I wrote above, yesterday. Although not invaded, Israel would've been severely demoralized by its high losses in battle, and economic costs. That might've meant the end of the jewish state.
December 8, 2016
That is absolutely true, we forgot their nuclear arsenal. The question here is, could they possibly use it without notifying the US? Putting USA in face of the fact they used a nuclear missile against, say, Cairo?(Did they have the missiles that could hit Cairo? They do now for sure with their Jericho ICBMs) Plus, what would happen to the nuclear arsenal of Israel if it as a nation ceased to exist due to economic catastrophe? Shipped to the US?
If arab forces were jeopardizing Israel's existence, the US probably would've tried to save Israel itself so it wouldn't have to use nuclear arms. Washington might've warned the arabs to stop. To show it was serious, the US could've sent in the Marines or, at least, stationed a carrier nearby.
One problem was the situation would've been totally unlike that of 1991, when big western forces crushed Iraq. With the USSR still intact (c 1984-85) the US couldn't spare much to help Israel, and Moscow might've deterred it from striking arab forces. Threats of another oil embargo were another factor. Conceivably no matter how bad the situation got for Israel, US aid may have been limited to airlifted weapons and civilian volunteer fighters. Even that would've meant an embargo like that of '73.
Another possibility is giving Israel the green light to detonate one n-bomb near arab forces as a warning.
Israeli Jerichos probably could've hit Damascus and Cairo but they may have chosen to use nuclear weapons tactically against Egyptian troops in the Gaza strip or the Negev. The arabs would've retaliated with SCUDs with poison gas warheads.
If such a war caused Israeli morale to collapse to the point where the jewish state ceased to exist, I suppose the US would takeover Israel's n-arsenal--unless all the bombs were used up.....
December 9, 2016
Oh another thing. Examination of Soviet made tanks and APCs captured in '73 indicates they were designed to operate in a nuclear contaminated battlefield. IIRC the crews even had anti-radiation sickness pills. It is conceivable, therefore, that a nuclear blast or two wouldn't have stopped the arabs. Also, if they had the Israelis on the run they may have adopted the tactic of closing with the enemy, for example getting close to cities like Beersheba, Askelon or Ashdod, making it too dangerous to use n-weapons.
December 9, 2016
I wonder about the intensity of PLO operations within Israel. Or perhaps by late 80s we could say Hamas.
The PLO had a little army in Lebanon by the late '70s but Arafat was driven out in '82, prior to the hypothetical conflict. I don't think the Palestinians would've been much of a factor in a conventional war. One might speculate, though, that had the IDF been badly mauled, West Bank arabs, maybe even those in Israel proper, would've launched a major rebellion. They might've assumed Israel could no longer spare enough troops to hold them down. Rebelling would've been a very high stakes gamble. By sowing chaos behind Israeli lines, when arab armies had Israel on the run, rebels might've caused a general collapse of the enemy. It would've been just as likely, however, if not more so, that they'd be crushed and expelled.
December 10, 2016
Its a shame that your theories are now way further than reality than ever before.
Yeah it seems silly to fantasize about victories which might've been, decades ago, when the arab world is currently a shambles. It can be called a kind of escapism, just like using drugs. Without much good in the real world, I get a "high" from alternate scenarios, lol.
But who knows? The news today isn't all bad. The Syrian civil war may end in 2017. Russia has shown a willingness to get involved again in the Mideast, on behalf of arab clients. The US remains staunchly pro-Israel, but a resurgent Russia, and China etc, may challenge its status as the sole superpower (or at least its dominant influence in the Mideast). The West remains heavily dependent on arab oil. The muslims retain their big advantage in sheer numbers and money. In other words, the potential is still there. All the basic ingredients still exist. But how can the arab world and Iran stop this terrible internecine fighting, refocus on Israel and build up strength to oppose it?
I think the answer lies in zionist miscalculation. In an attempt to exploit aran weakness, they may pave the way for a revived arab front against them. Confident the arabs no longer pose any real threat, and assured of American support no matter what, the Israelis may "ethnically cleanse" the West Bank. As Israel itself becomes too crowded, they'll soon want the whole West Bank for themselves, and may act more boldly and arrogantly than ever to get it. They could cause another exodus of Palestinians. The Israelis may get away with it in the short term. But they'll again be the focus of arab/muslim hatred--on the official as well as the popular level. World public opinion will turn against Israel, and more nations will help the muslims oppose it. We'll see....
December 13, 2016
I disagree with you on the whole Russian intervention. Their intervention is nothing but to save the good old status quo; Bashar in power and using Anti Zionist and patriotism rhetoric as an excuse to any crime the regime commits just like any typical dictator (Sunni extermination is very possible as any territory sunni dominant territory captured by the regime its sunni inhabitants are forced to evacuate. On the other hand, many sunni Syrians will begin to favor ISIS over FSA/ Islamic Front as both these factions are supplied by nations such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and indirectly USA, and of course with weapons comes orders. Its the only explanation to why they didnt try to launch a third a counter attack or at least do something, anything against the regime other than the occasional BM-21 bombardment here and then.
ISIS are seen as the guys who "get shit done" and even under their oppression, there are Sunnis who would favor it over the Shiites. I can see this as a part of a grand plan to give the West more than the East the green light to bomb Idlib region as the locals rebel against the "warlords" and pledge allegiance to ISIS. Or perhaps some sort of military coup within the the Rebel Elements that give the middle finger to the suppliers and fight with what they have and what they can possibly loot from the battlefield.
Luckily for me as I know Arabic, You can hear the Iraqi militias celebrating their victory and chanting "Aleppo is Shiite"
ISIS will DEFINITELY capitalize on what happened in Aleppo for sure.
Its no a war on terrorism but a religious civil war ..well..ideological if you involved the Kurds into the equation with their socialism/communism.
Not now, not in 100 years will ever a Shiite controlled Syria be at war with Israel as the whole pan arab unity is dead for sure. The only time we can now have a war against Israel would be based on a religious notion than a Nationalist one. A Sunni Islamic resurgence , something like the MB taking over and even toppling the royal family of the US. Shiism have a totally different agenda. For them the sacred places are in Iraq and Kaaba only, the Aqsa mosque for them is almost forgotten.
The difference between Sunnism and Shiism is so large you can really call them different faiths.
Isn't it now too late for ISIS? Their "caliphate" has steadily shrunk; they are losing Mosul and may lose Raqqa.
Iran is a shiite state and quite hostile to Israel. Teheran has armed Hezbollah--no friend of Israel either, lol. In fact it seems that shiite Iran and Hez are the only ones who openly oppose Israel anymore. If Assad wins, he'll be beholden to both.
It would be great if the MB, or somebody, topples the Saudi monarchy. Maybe the Saudi failure in Syria and quagmire in Yemen will accelerate loss of support for the Saudi monarchy, and its fall. :)
December 15, 2016
Tehran armed Hezbollah to establish its presence in Lebanon. After the 2006 incident which Hezbollah started to flex their muscles with the kidnapping of the IDF soldier; they wouldnt dare to take a hostile action against Israel. Hezbollah's main role is securing the Shiite dominance in Lebanon and the safety of the shia population. Hezbollah or as it was known back during the lebanese civil war as "Amal" played a role in massacring palestinian refugee camps, no different than their Phalangist counterparts. Iran's rhetoric is no different than that of its vassal state Syria. Some anti zionist talk to fool the masses.
Iran is more than likely to hit Saudi Arabia than Israel. Actually, they are indirectly doing that with sending weapons and instructors to the Houthis in Yemen. Iran's main role is subjugating the entire region to the Shiite Crescent...AND AFTER THAT they would think about attacking Israel.
With Trump's presidency, I doubt I would see America jumping in to save the Gulf Arab states. He would probably applaud Khamenei for the invasion of Saudi Arabia to end "Islamic Radicalism" or something along that line.
ISIS captured Palmyra and as we speak are engaging Russian SF units in T4 Airbase. Even when its shrinking they are launching massive assaults somewhere else. Snuffing them out wont be easy and the battle for Mosul will probably go on for quite a while due to the incompetency of the Iraqi army (the PMU is a different story though).
When Raqqa and Mosul fall, I have a feeling they would have already established a new HQ center for them which will be even harder to locate. Plus, you have other regions in Iraq that are still in ISIS control and are pretty damn active in their actions against the Iraqi army/militias. To move all the forces that were fighting in Mosul to engage them would take a considerable time due to the size of the forces and incompetency of most if not all the Iraqi Army commanders (PMU again is a different story).
Unfortunately, their popularity is now growing in Syria as well as the FSA/ Islamic Front did almost nothing with the last massive Syrian regime assault. People are not seeing them now as revolutionary liberators but warlords working for their own benefits, confused rabble with guns or incompetent leaders who cannot act without their arms supplier giving them the green light. demonstrations with ISIS flags and chanting spreading throughout the region.
They decided to ally themselves with the devil than a weak fragile angel.
If the final stronghold for FSA/Islamic Front falls to ISIS, the West will have more excuse than the East to carpet bomb it.
Probably it was all planned.
Then what? post civil war Iranian Syria will aim its fresh new T-90s 125mm cannons at the Golan? BAH! Even if some miracle happened and all the infrastructure damage disappeared within a blink of an eye, it wont aim its guns at one inch of Israel, but aim it towards KSA.
Egypt is Pro syrian regime+ Putin, Iraq, Yemen (shia insurgency), Iran and most gulf arab states have a large population of Shia who are well armed (at least in Kuwait, over here these guys have their own secret arms depot and equipped with all kinds of light arms and light AT-more than enough for an all out attack if the order ever comes.)
Bahrain sooner or later would fall in their hands as well.
True, Iran is currently focused on its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. That's understandable. If financial woes, the Yemen mess and failure in Syria weaken the Saudi monarchy, the shiites there may help effect regime change. If or when that happens, it'll mean another regional ally for Tehran, and a very important one.
I doubt Iran would launch a major conventional attack on Saudi Arabia. Trump is hostile to Iran, opposing the nuclear deal. His advisors would tell him he'd better repel an attack on Gulf oil states.
Yes, of course Syria won't be in any shape to fight Israel anytime soon. The next decade may see Iran gain in regional influence, slowly eliminating its opponents. But Israeli misdeeds on the West Bank may refocus attention on the zionists by the time most of the inter-muslim conflicts are resolved. Maybe by 2025 or 2030.
December 16, 2016
The Shiites in Saudi Arabia arent strong enough to carry out a regime change but will keep internal security forces occupied. The Sunni population of Saudi Arabia as a whole oppose Iran and Shiism ideology (one of the reasons why the Saudi Shia have their own ghettos so to say).
The shiites there would have to face the saudi military (including national guard), police force and an armed Saudi sunni populace (owning a firearm in Saudi Arabia isnt hard for Saudis).
A regime change in Saudi Arabia will be pretty much more likely by Sunnis who would still be anti Iran. Regarding Trump, in one or more speeches he mentioned how Kuwait didnt pay US anything (as he claims, I am sure the US had their bargain deal with Kuwait completed) for their efforts in expulsion of Saddam's army. It might be just to "vote speech" to rile up the audience with his nationalistic rhetoric but I am pretty sure he means it.
Iran wont take any action against Saudi Arabia as long as its protected by the West especially the US. Although, if Iran does attack KSA, Trump would exert huge pressure on the Saudis before accepting to help them and I am pretty sure he is the kind of person who would cut all strings with KSA if they dont comply.I can say what his advisors would tell him because on one hand, you have KSA that is seen (Ironically) as labyrinth of "radical Islam" and on the other hand you have "Pseudo Islamic Persian Empire" on the rise.
The previous American governments kept everything balanced in an equilibrium for maximum benefit. I cant tell what will happen under Trump.
Trump had better listen to State Department pros or foreign relations will be a disaster. What if he sides with Taiwan, angering mainland China, and moves the US embassy to Jerusalem? Russia would love the opportunity to expand its influence at US expense...
Even if Trump doesn't move the US embassy, his looming presidency is interpreted by many Israelis as a green light for settlement construction. Not that previous administrations did much to oppose it but now it may be accelerated. Palestinian anger, and the death of Abbas, may lead to a real crisis.
I don't know if Iran can effectively attack KSA. I don't think its airforce is better, and there's no common border. One possibility is an attack via shiite southern Iraq, but Kuwait would get in the way. Unless Kuwaiti shiites toppled the regime.
December 17, 2016
Iran wouldnt attack KSA anytime soon except after at least a decade or two from now with a revitalized Shiite Iraq and Syria. Even before the main act begins, they would probably cause attrition to the Gulf armies by sleeper cells and insurrections spreading chaos and panic throughout the region. The Shiite Kuwaiti population for example is heavily armed and many of them serve in the police force and the military.
And regarding green light for Israeli settlement, I assume you read Trump's statemnents lol.
Sure, it'll take quite a while for Syria and Iraq to get back on their feet. The destruction incurred during these civil wars is appalling. But Iran needn't necessarily wait for its allies to recover before acting, if only covertly, against Kuwait and KSA. Kuwait would be a nice prize if pro-Iranian elements did take over there. That might embolden shiites in KSA's eastern oil producing region. Of course the Saudis have excellent security--they sure have money to pay for it. But if support wanes that may not be enough. Soviet security didn't suffice in 1989.
I'm glad that UN resolution condemning settlements passed. Netanyanhu is acting like crybaby--recalling ambassadors, cancelling meetings and aid--like a spoiled kid who doesn't always get his way, lol. But he looks forward to a Trump Presidency, especially after Trump urged the resolution be vetoed.
December 16, 2016
I forgot to mention, did you check what Sisi did as well? There is absolutely nothing he would gain from his decision EXCEPT pleasing Israel, no financial gains whatsoever or any gains that would improve Egypt's image. In fact, quite the opposite.
I was pretty surprised when Egypt, "under intense Israeli pressure" decided not to introduce a UN resolution condemning Israeli settlements. I can understand if Egypt caves in to AMERICAN pressure. But ISRAELI pressure??!! What is Egypt coming too?? Is it now a satellite of Israel?
December 27, 2016
Btw the date in my previous comment was off by ten days. It should be December 26, not 16!
Now you see why I am saying he is a zionist puppet? And trust me there was no pressure whatsoever.
Haaretz had an article published thanking him LOL
The article said Egypt withdrew the resolution due to "intense Israeli pressure." Does Sissi SUPPORT settlement construction?
December 28, 2016
http://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/12/23/feature/politics/egypt-responds-to-israels-plea-and-delays-un-motion-on-settlements/
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/tag/al-sisi/
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/egypt-trump-sisi-resolution-israel-settlements-161223064418355.html
http://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/28/14090228/9-questions-un-vote-israel-settlements-explained
Non Israeli articles dont mention any sort of pressure. The mildest one is "plea" as mentioned in the first link
Thanks for the links. So it was TRUMP who got Sisi to delay/abandon the motion on settlements. It was American pressure after all. :)
Btw I may have a new blog post soon, maybe early next year. :)
December 29, 2016
You know, 73 was gust about the most ideal way a war could start for Egypt, and it still lost really badly, thats why Sadat made the peace deal, all the oil money in the world isn't going to help the Egyptian army go round 5, especially if they try to fight in the Sinai, much better ground to monuver agenst a enemy that has figured out how to deal with the sam system, thats a good way of losing the Sinai for good.
There also the fact that even after Sadat was assinated and years later a military government did come in and both supported the peace shows that it wasn't universally Disliked and had a significant constancy behind it. Meaning its very unlikely a couple would even work.
@Unknown:
I just saw your comment above. The circumstances of 1973 were FAR from ideal for Egypt to launch a war. Cairo had to squander vast resources just to breach a water barrier, and get its army into Sinai. No doubt, it would've performed better if the resources spent on bridging equipment, ferries, boats and pumps were invested in more (and if possible better) ATGMs, SAMs, jets and tanks. Now of course Egypt already has forces in Sinai, and has had years to prepare for conflict there (recent fighting with "sinai province" may teach lessons of some relevance in a future fight with Israel.)
The terrain of Sinai isn't entirely favorable for maneuver warfare. I've posted on possible defense lines based on the well-known defiles, and not entirely in western Sinai.
Peace survived the assassination of Sadat because of war weariness at the time and because it was held to be the key to better living standards. Now however a new generation has grown up without war weariness and is upset over the current economic crisis. These factors may have a bearing on policy after Sissi is gone.
March 16, 2023
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