Obscure Battle 1973

Most of the October war is well documented. A great deal has been written about the Golan battles, the October 14 attack, the destruction of 25th armored and other clashes. One aspect of the war, however, has been neglected. Jebel Um Katif, or Mitznefet, has received scant attention from historians. Engagements fought there from October 19-22 were a sideshow. The main Israeli effort was directed south, toward Suez City. Nevertheless, Mitznefet saw major fighting. The tendency to gloss over it invites suspicion. Did the Israelis cover up a serious setback?
Mitznefet, or Om Habara, is a hill west of Fayid (an airbase near the western shore of the Bitter lake). Jebel Um Katif is a larger area of high ground immediately to the west of Mitznefet. After the Israeli crossing of the canal on October 16, the area witnessed troop deployments and combat. Fighting erupted when Israel's advancing forces encountered elements of Egypt's 4rth Armored division.
 Kabil, commanding the 4rth, had only part of one brigade, the 2nd armored, in the vicinity. Originally consisting of three tank battalions, the 207th, 208th and 209th, by October 19th 2nd armored had been reduced to two. Kabil ordered the surviving battalions, the 208th and 209th, to Om Habara and the Om Kathib dune area. So grave was the emergency the battalions had to be reinforced by 14 tanks from the training school, and RPGs.
On the 19th tankmen atop Om Habara saw Israeli armor passing below them. They were part of Adan's 162nd division. The Egyptians opened fire, knocking out ten tanks and other vehicles. T-55s north of Mitznefet inflicted additional looses. Adan's division continued southward, however. Another Israeli division, Magen's 252nd, soon arrived in the area.
Soon, Kabil had to pull out. After overrunning the Geneifa hills, Adan threatened to cut off the Third Army. Kabil was forced to take the 4rth south to try to shore up defenses there. Meanwhile, another brigade, the 27th Armored, was ordered to Jebel Um Katif. Attached to the command of the 4rth, the 27th probably had 90 or so T-55s. On the morning of October 21, it deployed for action.
By then, Magen's division had reached Mitznefet. According to the Israeli version, part of the 252nd was ordered to protect the flank there while the rest of the division continued southward. For the next three days, the tanks left behind are said to have battled a brigade of Egyptian tanks and inflicted heavy losses on them.
It appears the Israelis were also mauled. For many of their vehicles and men, Om Habara became a graveyard. After a period of fighting a brigade commanded by Shomron left Mitznefet. Racing to Adabiya, it completed the encirclement of the Third Army. By then, however, Shomron had only 17 tanks left. Of the 80 tanks that crossed with Magen, only Shomron's force and a few others (on the Cairo-Suez road) remained. West of the canal, the original total seems to have fallen to around 30, perhaps even fewer. The Israelis admit the 252nd had been reduced to 50 tanks, and that figure probably includes newly arrived vehicles. On October 22, Magen was informed that an understrength brigade would reinforce him. Commanded by Ran Sarig, this brigade was rushed from the Golan front, arriving in just 33 hours.
What had happened? Despite official silence, a reconstruction of events is possible. The 252nd  attempted to do more than contain Mitznefet, or bypass it. Magen tried to capture the hill. Adan originally planned to do this and made some preparations, but decided to move south. Apparently the task was left to Magen. Dupuy hinted at his effort when he wrote that on the eastern slopes of Mitznefet, an Israeli battalion got into a firefight with Egyptian tanks. If the mission was just to guard the flank, why were Israeli tanks fighting on the slopes of the hill i.e. climbing it? Given the greater range and accuracy of their guns, why didn't they just fire at the enemy from the plain below? But while hinting at the truth Dupuy, or his Israeli source, downplayed it. A single battalion wouldn't have been committed against a brigade. The entire 252nd must've participated.
 By throwing in every tank, Magen believed, he could quickly crush the enemy, obviate any need for a flank guard, and then advance with all his armor. On the basis of easy victories on the 14th and 17th, Magen underestimated the 27th. To his great surprise, the attack was smashed. The presence of tanks and instructors from the training school meant Egyptian gunnery skill was well above average. T-55s picked off dozens of vehicles ascending the hill; those which reached the top were blasted at close range. Stunned by the massacre, Magen sent an SOS to his superiors, urgently requesting replacements. Remnants of his division then advanced to the Cairo-Suez road. Initially, Sarig's brigade, after arriving   at Mitznefet, stayed there to contain the 27th. Part of Sharon's force then came and freed the brigade to go south with the others. But the advancing 252nd was gravely depleted.
 Available figures suggest the 27th destroyed over half of Magen's original force. Apparently, fifty tanks had been wrecked; conceivably the Egyptians hit sixty. Sarig's brigade had just 30 tanks. It raised the total (for the time being, around the 23rd) to 50. The addition of 30 to reach 50 would imply all but 20 of the original 80 were lost. Certainly the speed with which reinforcements were sent hints at a serious setback. So does the Israeli tendency to gloss over the battle, in contrast to so many others.*
On October 21, the same day the Israelis got a bloody nose at Mitznefet, they were repulsed at Missouri. This was a fairly minor setback; only 22 tanks were lost. Interestingly, the minimum possible loss at Mitznefet, around 30 tanks (80-50 remaining without addition of new units) is not much more than the Missouri toll, yet the latter is well known, whereas Om Habara is not. This suggests the 252nd's setback wasn't marginally worse than the one at Missouri, but far worse, hence was concealed. Unofficial Israeli sources tend to confirm this. For the most part, though, the Israelis provide very little or misleading information.
 No Israeli author ever provided a detailed account of Om Habara actions; some omit the subject altogether. Adan's On the Banks of the Suez mentions 2nd brigade battalions on Mitznefet, but not the losses he took on the 19th or those incurred there later. Rabinovich, who also wrote from an Israeli perspective, mentioned clashes with Egyptian armor during Adan's drive south, but provided no details. The truth seems too awful to be revealed.
If the Egyptians won at Om Habara, why didn't they tout it as a great victory? That may be due to the eventual fall of the hill. Elsewhere in the last days, Egyptian successes prevented the capture of Ismailia, Suez City and Kabrit fort. There were other issues like high losses and lack of strategic significance.
After the Third Army was trapped, the 27th was ordered to help other units break through to it. Kabil and Shazly were reluctant to comply because of Israeli tank superiority. The 27th is said to have left its hills without a fight and established defenses some distance away. Overall, the brigade may have availed little. But it still accomplished something.
In his memoirs, Hamad wrote the 27th had a successful battle and prevented the Israelis from extending their bridgehead farther west. Magen's main intention was to head south, to encircle the Third Army. It appears likely, though, the 27th made his victory a pyrrhic one.

* It is true that Magen fought at other places besides Mitznefet, notably Tsach, near the canal, and Fayid. Neither battle, however, was likely to have been costly. After being softened up by airstrikes, Tsach was attacked from the north and west, whereas its defenses faced east. And Fayid wasn't strongly defended.

References

Elusive Victory  Dupuy
No Victor No Vanquished   O'Ballance
The Yom Kippur War        Rabinovich
From the Sinai to the Golan      Hamad