Relevance of '67
To the younger generation, the Six Day War war may seem like ancient history. In addition, Arabs, understandably, prefer to remember the 1973 war, when they fared better. Nevertheless, Egyptians would do well to study the 1967 war and learn from its lessons. There are two good reasons for this.
First, Egypt may ultimately ditch the peace treaty with Israel. For many years it has been evident that Israel sees the treaty not as a prelude to a comprehensive peace but as carte blanche to bully other arabs. Bereft of Egyptian help, Syria, the Palestinians and others have been repeatedly brutalized. It is a fallacy to think Cairo will remain indifferent to any outrage committed by its "peace partner," and only a matter of time before the threshold is reached. No doubt, the treaty would've been dumped long ago had there only been a major power besides the US to turn to. The rise of a more assertive Russia, possibly willing to resume the old role of the USSR, may give Cairo the needed alternative. Egypt needn't always rely on Washington. Inasmuch as Egyptian Badr maneuvers have viewed Israel as the potential enemy, it makes little sense to rely on the principal backer of that enemy.
Second, if peace ever breaks down, Egypt will be in a geographical/strategic situation like that of 1967 not 1973. Egypt will begin any conflict in possession of Sinai and will try to repel the IDF.
In any future showdown, the strategy outlined in the previous post, below, will be the most realistic one. Weapons systems may be vastly more modern, names of units may be different, but the basic plan will remain sound. Cairo should avoid any foolish hubris. It will be a grave error to deploy much of the army close to the frontier. That would invite a rerun of 1967. A more careful strategy may lead to a resounding victory for Egypt.
First, Egypt may ultimately ditch the peace treaty with Israel. For many years it has been evident that Israel sees the treaty not as a prelude to a comprehensive peace but as carte blanche to bully other arabs. Bereft of Egyptian help, Syria, the Palestinians and others have been repeatedly brutalized. It is a fallacy to think Cairo will remain indifferent to any outrage committed by its "peace partner," and only a matter of time before the threshold is reached. No doubt, the treaty would've been dumped long ago had there only been a major power besides the US to turn to. The rise of a more assertive Russia, possibly willing to resume the old role of the USSR, may give Cairo the needed alternative. Egypt needn't always rely on Washington. Inasmuch as Egyptian Badr maneuvers have viewed Israel as the potential enemy, it makes little sense to rely on the principal backer of that enemy.
Second, if peace ever breaks down, Egypt will be in a geographical/strategic situation like that of 1967 not 1973. Egypt will begin any conflict in possession of Sinai and will try to repel the IDF.
In any future showdown, the strategy outlined in the previous post, below, will be the most realistic one. Weapons systems may be vastly more modern, names of units may be different, but the basic plan will remain sound. Cairo should avoid any foolish hubris. It will be a grave error to deploy much of the army close to the frontier. That would invite a rerun of 1967. A more careful strategy may lead to a resounding victory for Egypt.