Friday, July 01, 2022

Situational Awareness and Soviet Doctrine

Unable to see the enemy, Egyptian pilots often ended up like this one (arrow) bailing out of his stricken MIG-21

Back in the 70s pilots complained about poor cockpit visibility in Soviet fighters, specifically the MIG-21 and MIG-23. Heavy framing limited front, side and rear vision. All too often, poor visibility meant no situational awareness, which led to high losses in combat.

In theory, poor visibility should not have been a problem. The MIG-21 and MIG-23 were not designed to operate autonomously, but as part of an integrated air defense system, in which ground control intercept (GCI) guided their every move. Acting on the basis of radar, ground controllers were to provide situational awareness. They were to direct pilots to their targets and warn of dangers. In theory, therefore, cockpit visibility was not an issue.

Unfortunately, things didn't work out the way Soviet strategists had planned. The problem was that the enemy also had radar and could warn his pilots of an approaching enemy (guided by GCI). Once warned, the other side could avoid a surprise attack, and engage the oncoming fighters in a swirling dogfight. Once a dogfight began it became difficult, if not impossible, for radar operators to distinguish friend from foe. Even if they could, the constantly changing situation within a dogfight meant that there was no time or opportunity to act on instructions. Under those circumstances, lack of situational awareness proved disastrous--especially in the Mideast. Unable to see an attacking enemy, arab MIGs went down in droves.

Why did the Soviets opt for a fully automated system while the West didn't? The crux of the issue was Soviet ideology. Unlike western democracies, which favored individual freedom--hence proved conducive to autonomous operation of fighters--an authoritarian system emphasized central authority and limited individual initiative.

Addendum: Soviet jet radars, like that of the MIG-23, only searched a narrow slice of the sky in front of the jet. This was for the same reason as poor cockpoit visibility. Backed by GCI a jet did not, in theory, need broad radar coverage. In contrast, the radar of an F-15 searched a broad area of sky, hence proved conducive to autonomous operations. The pilot could better find the enemy himself.