Sadat's Incompetence 1973

Today, October 14, is the anniversary of the disastrous Egyptian offensive in Sinai. As Shazli noted in his memoirs, Sadat was behind the catastrophe. Virtually all of the generals opposed his order to attack.

The offensive of October 14, 1973 wrecked much of Cairo's strategic reserve. Two good brigades, the 1st armored (from the 21st Armored Division) and the 3rd armored (from 4rth armored Division) lost many tanks. Other brigades suffered losses. Moreover the operation deprived the west bank of the forces necessary to contain an Israeli thrust across the canal. It marked the turning point of the war, transforming a spectacular success into another humiliation for the Arabs.

Sadat compounded this blunder with others. Sensing the threat of an Israeli counterattack as early as the 15th, Shazly requested the return of Egyptian reserve forces to the west bank. Sadat angrily rejected this good advice. He continued to reject it as late as the 19th. Instead of containing the Israeli bridgehead on the west bank, Sadat ordered a counterattack on the eastern side. Again, professional soldiers knew it was suicide. Egypt's 25th brigade advanced right into a trap and was demolished. Sixty-five of its 75 T-62s were destroyed. The 1st armored was also severely mauled, again. 

Not content with wrecking his army, Sadat insisted on giving Israel enough time to consummate its victory. Soon after the disastrous attack of the 14th, Alexei Kosygin of the USSR arrived to try to talk him into accepting a ceasefire. Sadat stubbornly refused, even though Egypt's situation continued to deteriorate. By the 17th it was clear that the enemy was across the canal. The war was lost and prolonging it only played into Jerusalem's hands. Yet Sadat only agreed to a cease fire at Ismail's urging on the 19th. By then, it was too late to prevent entrapment of the Third Army. Egypt launched the October war to regain honor lost in the rout of 1967, yet Sadat's ineptitude brought Egypt to the brink of a worse catastrophe.

It's not surprising that Sadat drew closer to the US and relied on diplomacy--even going to Jerusalem in 1977--after the October war. The conflict proved that as long as he was in charge, Egypt stood no chance on the battlefield. It didn't have a military option no matter how well equipped or prepared it might be. A military solution was not inherently unworkable. Had Shazli made the decisions, Egypt would've been in a much stronger position to negotiate after the war. Instead of a separate Egypt-Israel peace, there might've been a comprehensive settlement--or a final, decisive showdown. But Sadat preferred to sacrifice his nation's strength rather than sacrifice his power.

Shazly (right) and Sadat (center) at the start of the 1973 war.



















Sadat (center) during the disastrous last days of the war.